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ABSTRACT 
In November, 2008, Colorado and Nebraska voted on amendments that sought to end 
race-based affirmative action at public universities in those states. In anticipation of the vote, the 
University of Colorado at Boulder (CU) explored statistical approaches to support class-based 
(i.e., socioeconomic) affirmative action. This dissertation introduces CU‟s method of identifying 
socioeconomically disadvantaged and overachieving applicants in undergraduate admissions. In 
addition, sensitivity analyses were conducted to gauge the impact of technical decisions that 
were made when these measures were devised. Two experiments were carried out to determine 
whether or not implementing this approach would change the racial and socioeconomic diversity 
of accepted classes. Finally, historical student records were examined to explore the likelihood of 
college success for the beneficiaries of CU‟s class-based approach.  
The sensitivity analyses identify particularly consequential issues that architects of class-
based systems may face, including modeling application to college, defining target populations, 
and addressing missing data. The experiments suggest class-based affirmative action can 
potentially increase acceptance rates for low-SES and minority applicants, particularly if it is 
used alongside race-conscious admissions. Analyses of historical data do not rule out the 
possibility of college success for the beneficiaries of class-conscious admissions, but they do 
argue for the provision of robust academic support to marginally qualified, low-SES students 
when they matriculate. This dissertation is intended to serve as a resource for postsecondary 
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institutions considering class-based admissions policies. If race-based approaches are overturned, 
universities like CU could struggle to develop race-blind metrics to identify applicants who have 
faced adversity. This research examines one method of quantifying the barriers these students 
encounter. 
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Research Problem 
In November, 2008, Colorado and Nebraska voted on amendments to their state 
constitutions seeking to eliminate consideration of race, ethnicity, gender, and national origin in 
the operation of public education. Passage of these amendments would have ended race-based 
affirmative action at public universities in those states. In anticipation of the vote, I was hired to 
explore statistical approaches that would support class-based affirmative action at Colorado‟s 
flagship public institution – The University of Colorado at Boulder (CU). This study details the 
development, implementation, and evaluation of this method of identifying disadvantaged and 
overachieving applicants in undergraduate admissions. The concepts of disadvantage and 
overachievement are elaborated in greater detail throughout this dissertation, but brief 
introductory definitions are useful here. Disadvantage, in this context, is present when 
socioeconomic factors align to diminish an applicant‟s “life chances” (see Weber, 1946). 
Overachievement is observed when an applicant‟s academic performance in high school exceeds 
the performance of students with similar socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Few debates in higher education are as charged and divisive as affirmative action. The 
collection of factors we consider in admitting students to college ought to be a reflection of our 
values (Moses, 2002; Bowen & Bok, 1998). Prominent among these values are two goals that 
some believe operate at cross-purposes: rewarding academic excellence and removing barriers to 
equal opportunity. The harshest critics of affirmative action charge that considering race in 
college admissions actually perpetuates inequity by undermining meritocratic ideals (Connerly, 
2000). These criticisms seem to have gained impetus, and as a result, the landscape of race-
conscious admissions has changed. In the last two decades, court cases and ballot initiatives have 
reshaped and profoundly limited the practice of race-based affirmative action in college 
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admissions. At the same time, the higher education research community has grown attentive to 
the prospects (i.e., the feasibility and potential implications) of class-based affirmative action. 
This is a recent phenomenon: The most heavily cited work in this field has been produced in the 
past 15 years (see Kahlenberg, 1997; Malamud, 1997; Sander, 1997; Bowen & Bok, 1998; Kane, 
1998; Studley, 2003; Carnevale & Rose, 2004; Long, 2004; Laird, 2005; Reardon, Yun, & 
Kurleander, 2006; Linn & Welner, 2007; Espenshade & Radford, 2009). The increased focus on 
class-based affirmative action is at least partially attributable to the vulnerability of race-based 
policies to court rulings and ballot initiatives. That vulnerability shows little sign of waning; the 
Supreme Court has suggested that in 17 years, race-based admissions policies will no longer be 
necessary (Grutter, 2003) and ballot initiatives intended to ban race-based affirmative action 
should continue to surface (Moses, Yun, & Marin, 2009). It is critical, then, that we carefully 
examine class-based policies that arise as the political viability of race-based affirmative action 
continues to erode.  
Class-based affirmative action comes under a variety of names. It is alternately referred 
to as “economic” or “socioeconomic” affirmative action, and in some cases loosely characterized 
as admissions preferences for students in poverty (Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Long, 2004; 
Bowen & Bok, 1998). These differences reflect a fundamental difficulty defining the traits 
universities should examine to grant applicants additional consideration in class-based systems. 
Most of this trouble owes to disagreement over what class-based policies should actually 
accomplish. Deborah Malamud (1997) rightly observes that supporters of class-based affirmative 
action are divided into two camps: “race-neutral” supporters, who favor class-based 
considerations solely as a remedy for economic hardship, and “race-conscious” supporters, who 
believe class-based considerations can augment or maintain racial diversity. In other words, race-
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neutral supporters embrace the value of class-based affirmative action in and of itself – as 
remediation for socioeconomic disadvantage, unbound to any race or ethnicity. Race-conscious 
supporters, on the other hand, view class-based affirmative action as promising only insofar as 
socioeconomic disadvantage serves as an adequate proxy for minority status. These delineations 
are somewhat crude, so it would be difficult to categorize prominent scholars definitively in one 
of these two camps. Still, it would be fair to place the advocates of class-based affirmative action 
on its own merits (e.g., Kahlenberg, 1997; Sander, 1997; West, 1993; D‟Souza, 1991) in the 
race-neutral camp. A review of class-based arguments and analyses published thus far suggests 
that race-neutral supporters tend to embrace the enactment of class-conscious admissions in lieu 
of race-conscious programs. Still, those who advocate the use of class-based policies to serve 
class-based ends – but not as an adequate or logical replacement for race-based affirmative 
action – are also sufficiently described as race-neutral supporters (Moses, 2001). On the other 
hand, those who examine the effects of class-based policies largely in terms of their effects on 
racial diversity in higher education (e.g., Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Long & Tienda, 2008; 
Bowen & Bok, 1998) may be placed in the race-conscious camp. Nevertheless, this area of study 
is relatively new; as more varied class-based approaches are widely implemented and studied, 
the race-neutral / race-conscious debate should be brought into sharper relief.  
It is unclear to whether this dissertation fits neatly into one of the two camps described 
above. Substantial focus is devoted to the changes in minority acceptance rates that can be 
attributed to implementing CU‟s class-based system. In that vein, this is race-conscious work. On 
the other hand, CU‟s class-based system is grounded in notions of socioeconomic disadvantage 
and overachievement, and is explicitly agnostic to race. Such a conceptual lens aligns closely 
with a narrowly defined, race-neutral approach to class-conscious admissions. Ultimately, there 
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is no reason a class-based approach cannot be implemented alongside a race-based approach. As 
such, the class-based system CU developed does not require – conceptually or methodologically 
– the absence of race-based affirmative action. 
Ostensibly, class-based policies are designed to place a “thumb on the scale” in college 
admissions for applicants who have faced obstacles to upward mobility (Kahlenberg, 1997). We 
further expect class-based approaches to admit a group of students more socioeconomically 
diverse than groups admitted in the absence of such policies. Ideally, class-based approaches 
would be evaluated according to their success achieving these goals. However, because race and 
class are correlated, class-based approaches often take hold in the wake of a ban on race-based 
affirmative action. For example, public universities in Texas, Michigan, and Florida immediately 
implemented race-neutral programs to maintain campus diversity following legal rulings or 
successful ballot initiatives that outlawed race-conscious programs (Chapa & Horn, 2007; 
Orfield, Marin, Flores, & Garces, 2007; Ancheta, 2005). Furthermore, UCLA‟s School of Law 
developed its own class-based admissions considerations in response to a ballot initiative that 
eliminated race-based affirmative action in California (Sander, 1997). Because such class-based 
programs immediately follow – and implicitly replace – race-based programs (Laird, 2005), 
class-based affirmative action is usually evaluated in terms of its success maintaining levels of 
racial diversity (e.g., Hinrichs, 2009; Long & Tienda, 2008). 
Even given this narrow definition of outcomes, most of the debate surrounding class-
based affirmative action has taken place in an empirical vacuum (Sander, 1997). Moreover, 
research on this topic is spread thinly across a variety of academic disciplines, including 
education, sociology, economics, and law. Published analyses tend to focus on one type of class-
based affirmative action in particular – “Top X%” plans, where a sufficiently high class rank in 
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high school would guarantee admission to a state university. The failure of Top X% plans to 
maintain rates of minority representation has been documented (e.g., Long & Tienda, 2008; 
Long, 2007; Long, 2004; Horn & Flores, 2003). It is important to acknowledge that Top X% 
plans are nominally “race-neutral,” and not explicitly class-based. Still, their rationale – and 
success – depends upon racial and socioeconomic stratification in high schools to boost racial 
and socioeconomic diversity in universities (Tienda & Niu, 2006). As such, these plans are 
treated as examples of class-based affirmative action in this dissertation.  
Supporters of the class-based philosophy argue that the failures of Top X% plans 
specifically should not reflect poorly on the prospects of class-based affirmative action in general 
(Kahlenberg, 1997). These advocates stress the need to account for the varying obstacles 
individual applicants have faced – a consideration explicitly absent from Top X% plans. Further, 
they have identified some measurable factors related to socioeconomic hardship (e.g., parents‟ 
education, family income) that are critical for both flagging disadvantaged applicants and 
assessing these policies‟ effects. The same advocates have not, however, sufficiently explained 
how admissions officers should account for these factors in concert to arrive at a systematic 
judgment of disadvantage. For the most part, more sophisticated class-based programs using 
applicant-level information have been evaluated only hypothetically, via simulation studies (e.g., 
Carnevale & Rose, 2004). Furthermore, research on class-based policies (both simulations and 
empirical work) often examines trends in the racial compositions of freshman classes. Campus 
diversity is an important outcome, but this focus tends to conflate college enrollment (i.e., a 
student‟s decision to matriculate) with college acceptance (i.e., an admissions officer‟s decision 
to admit or refuse). To date, no studies have empirically investigated the effects of class-based 
policies on undergraduate admissions decisions. 
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Expected Contribution to the Class-Based Affirmative Action Literature 
The University of Colorado‟s class-based approach aims to address some of the 
shortcomings outlined above. Using a nationally representative dataset (ELS; U.S. Department of 
Education, 2006), I established operational definitions of disadvantage and overachievement that 
can be applied in admissions decisions. While the overachievement measures I devised are 
extensions of prior research, the disadvantage measure is novel; the introduction of these 
innovations will be a major focus of this dissertation. As such, I describe the development of 
CU‟s class-based system in depth, and consider the impact of technical decisions made along the 
way. Additionally, two experiments were conducted to estimate the effects of implementing this 
class-based approach on both the racial and socioeconomic diversity of accepted classes. Finally, 
I examined historical student records at CU to explore the likelihood of college success for the 
beneficiaries of CU‟s class-based approach. For the purposes of this dissertation, and in 
acknowledgement of data availability, measures of “college success” include course grades, 
credit hours earned, and degree attainment (i.e., graduation). The focus on these outcomes owes 
to data constraints; it is not meant to diminish the importance of standardized achievement 
measures, indices of student engagement and satisfaction, or post-graduate employment. Each is 
fundamental to the purpose of higher education, and should be examined in future research.  
It is critical to acknowledge at the outset that this dissertation represents a single-case 
study. While every effort is made to distinguish between those findings that are CU-specific and 
those that may replicate across universities, the full extent to which these results speak for 
American higher education in general cannot be known. Some readers may be chiefly concerned 
with the applicability of my results to highly selective universities. While understanding 
admissions policies at elite schools is critical to understanding the intersections of class, race, 
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and college access in America, these schools are not the focus of this dissertation. In fact, CU 
represents a certain class of institution – large, moderately selective public universities – that has 
up to this point been underrepresented in affirmative action scholarship. This knowledge gap is 
significant, because large public schools account for more than half of the total undergraduate 
enrollment in the United States (Snyder & Dillow, 2010). Moreover, research suggests that 
unlike highly selective schools, these moderately selective institutions field applications from 
disadvantaged students for whom the stakes are quite high: Many low-income and minority 
applicants may not have the opportunity to attend a four-year college if they are refused 
admission to a school like CU (Hurtado, Inkelas, Briggs, & Rhee, 1997). When race-based 
policies are overturned, these institutions may struggle to develop new race-blind metrics to 
identify applicants who have overcome adversity. Through this research, I intend to introduce a 
methodology for developing and assessing admissions tools that account for the socioeconomic 
barriers applicants face. 
Chapter Overview and Research Questions 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are intended to provide a detailed introduction to the research 
problem that motivates this dissertation. Specifically, Chapter 2 covers the history of race- and 
class-based affirmative action, and reviews the existing body of research on this subject. Chapter 
3 provides necessary background regarding the undergraduate admissions process at CU. 
Chapter 4 introduces the measures of disadvantage and overachievement that comprise CU‟s 
class-based system, along with the implementation rules that guide these measures‟ use. 
The next three chapters – 5, 6, and 7 – are devoted to this dissertation‟s methodology and 
its findings. Chapter 8 provides a discussion of results, limitations, and areas for future research. 
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The analyses are varied, both in terms of the outcomes they examine and the methods they 
employ. As such, within each chapter, the research methods and findings are presented together. 
Chapter 5 contains an array of sensitivity analyses concerning the data and the regression models 
that underpin CU‟s class-based approach. Chapter 6 covers experiments designed to estimate this 
class-based system‟s impact on acceptance rates. In Chapter 7, I consider the chances of college 
success for students who might not be admitted to CU without class-based considerations. These 
tasks were driven by three primary research questions: 
1. To what extent are CU‟s measures of disadvantage and overachievement sensitive to the 
sample and the regression models used to devise them? 
2. To what extent does the implementation of CU‟s class-based affirmative action policy 
change the likelihood of acceptance for low-SES and minority students? 
3. What is the likelihood of college success for students admitted under CU‟s class-based 
policy? 
The research questions directing this study were crafted with a unifying goal in mind: 
investigating the validity of CU‟s approach to class-based affirmative action. Validity, in this 
context, is a function of admissions officers‟ interpretation and use of CU‟s class-based 
measures, along with the potential consequences of implementing this system. Measures of 
disadvantage and overachievement may not be valid instruments for high-stakes decisions if 
these measures are extremely sensitive to the sample and models that generated them. 
Furthermore, the use of CU‟s approach may not be valid if the university fails to admit additional 
disadvantaged students upon implementing this system. Finally, the credibility of class-based 
affirmative action at CU must be questioned if its beneficiaries – students admitted under class-
based policies who might otherwise have been refused – are unlikely to succeed in college. To 
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sum, this dissertation examines CU‟s socioeconomic measures and the consequences of their use, 
in roughly equal measure. This research introduces a methodology – spanning design through 
implementation – for developing, carrying out, and evaluating a system of class-conscious 
admissions. 
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A Brief History of Affirmative Action 
Before turning to the class-based affirmative action literature, it is useful to examine 
briefly the turbulent history of race-based affirmative action in the United States. Following the 
Second World War, a few key legal decisions dramatically changed the prospects for equal 
educational opportunity for minorities in this country. In Sweatt v. Painter (1950) the Supreme 
Court ruled that Texas‟s maintenance of separate law schools for Blacks and Whites violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Sweatt, 1950). In 1954, the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
ended de jure segregation in public schools (Brown, 1954). The roots of race-based affirmative 
action are generally traced to Executive Order 10925, issued by President John F. Kennedy in 
1961. This order established the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and for the first 
time required that projects using Federal funds take “affirmative action” to ensure hiring and 
employment practices were free of racial bias (Kennedy, 1961).  
The emergent push for equal educational opportunity was strengthened following the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. One year later, affirmative action was the centerpiece of 
a speech offered by President Lyndon Johnson. In June of 1965, addressing graduates of Howard 
University, Johnson argued, “You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by 
chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, „you are free to 
compete with all the others,‟ and justly believe that you have been completely fair.” Johnson 
claimed the next stage in the battle for civil rights would be the pursuit of “not just equality as a 
right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result” (Johnson, 1966). Forty-five 
years later, these words continue to define the terms of the debate over race-based affirmative 
action and its plausible alternatives. 
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Johnson‟s position was essentially an extension of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which 
held that “No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance” (Civil Rights Act, 1964). Universities and colleges in the United States took this as a 
call to recruit and admit minority students, but it was not long before opponents of race-
conscious admissions policies used Title VI to challenge the legality of affirmative action. 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) remains prominent in affirmative action 
case law. The deciding opinion, authored by Justice Lewis Powell, forbade the use of rigid 
quotas (i.e., setting aside admissions spots) based solely upon race. The decision did not, 
however, deal a fatal blow to race-based affirmative action. Powell also ruled that universities 
could take race into account in admissions decisions, as long as minority status was weighed 
among a host of other factors. The compelling interest in this regard, Powell argued, was the 
educational benefit realized by a diverse student body (Bakke, 1978).  
Four court cases since have figured prominently in the evolution of affirmative action – 
Hopwood v. Texas (1996), the 2003 Gratz and Grutter decisions in Michigan, and in 2007, 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, et al. In stark contrast to 
Bakke, the Hopwood decision held that while race-based affirmative action is not permissible to 
achieve campus diversity, it should be allowed to remedy the present effects of institutional 
discrimination (Hopwood, 1996). Soon after, the Gratz and Grutter rulings essentially 
invalidated Hopwood. Firstly, the Gratz decision held that the University of Michigan‟s approach 
to racial diversification via undergraduate admissions violated the mandates of equal protection, 
because racial minorities were specifically awarded points to bolster their likelihood of 
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acceptance. This ruling confirmed that any quota system or allocation of points for minority 
status is strictly forbidden.  
The Grutter ruling, which focused on the University of Michigan‟s law school, held that 
race-conscious admissions policies were permissible, insofar as they aimed to enroll a “critical 
mass” of minority students. The notion of a critical mass is essential to this case, because such 
conditions should reduce the likelihood that minority students feel isolated on campus. Thus, 
Grutter affirmed Bakke, holding that the compelling interest served by race-based affirmative 
action was the educational benefit realized by a diverse campus – not the need for remediation of 
discrimination (Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003; Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003). The emphasis on campus 
diversity echoed Justice Powell‟s opinion in the Bakke case, and the Grutter decision is generally 
viewed as a substantial victory for proponents of race-based affirmative action (Karst, 2004). 
Finally, in 2007 the Supreme Court heard two cases regarding race-conscious assignment to K-
12 schools in Louisville and Seattle.
1
 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, et al (2007), the Court held that voluntary racial integration plans in 
Louisville and Seattle were unconstitutional. Still, the Court‟s decision in Grutter – that a diverse 
campus is a compelling interest for postsecondary institutions – was not overturned. Thirty-eight 
years after President Johnson argued for the use of affirmative action to remediate 
institutionalized injustices, these decisions established the “diversity rationale” as the most 
legally viable justification for race-conscious admissions policies. These developments – 
especially the rise of the diversity rationale – are important to keep in mind as we examine the 
researched effects of policies intended to replace race-conscious admissions. 
                            
1
 These two cases – Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education and Parents Involved in Community Schools 
v. Seattle School District No. 1, respectively – were combined under the heading Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, et al. 
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The Rise of Class-Based Affirmative Action 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, race-based affirmative action was challenged at the ballot 
box. Voters in California, Washington, Michigan, Colorado, Nebraska, and Arizona voted on 
variants of the “Civil Rights Initiative,” intended to ban race-based affirmative action. The 
measure passed in every state except Colorado (Moses, Yun, & Marin, 2009). In addition, 
Florida Governor Jeb Bush eliminated affirmative action in college admissions via Executive 
Order 99-821 (the One Florida Initiative), preempting a vote in the 2000 election. Nearly 40 
years removed from the passage of the Civil Rights Amendment, the Civil Rights Initiatives use 
language remarkably similar to Title VI. These initiatives, however, charge that race-based 
affirmative action undermines equal opportunity by granting race-based preferences.  
Several public universities implemented class-based affirmative action in response to 
these bans (Long, 2007). Class-sensitive admissions policies may seem well suited to replace 
race-based affirmative action; the strong relationship between race, social class, and life chances 
has been widely documented (Rothenberg, 2006; Sleeter, 2003; Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 1997; 
Kahlenberg, 1997, Anderson, 1990). Theoretically, class-based systems implemented after the 
passage of a Civil Rights Initiative may also be designed to recover rates of gender diversity. I 
have never seen such a goal in the literature; class is not correlated with gender, and females 
currently tend to be overrepresented on college campuses in general (Goldin, Katz, & Kuziemko, 
2006).  
Despite observed linkages between race and class, class-based affirmative action had 
received little attention before race-based programs were legally challenged. Bob Laird, Dean of 
Admissions at the University of California – Berkeley when race-conscious policies were 
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outlawed in that state, reminds us that long before the introduction of bans on race-based 
affirmative action, admissions officers recognized and tried to account for the damaging effects 
of low socioeconomic status (SES). He acknowledges, though, that such considerations varied 
from institution to institution and were not often implemented systematically (Laird, 2005). That 
uneven implementation seems to have resulted in a small net effect for admissions using class-
based considerations. Recent analyses suggest that on average, universities still grant little to no 
preference to low-income college applicants (Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Bowen, Kurzweil, & 
Tobin, 2005; Carnevale & Rose, 2004). 
Research on the effects of class-based affirmative action did not initiate in force until 
various race-based programs were outlawed. Because class-based programs arose as 
replacements for race-based programs, the research literature focuses primarily on the extent to 
which class-based admissions systems maintain levels of racial diversity on college campuses. 
Many class-based programs installed in the absence of race-based preferences took the general 
form of Top X% plans (Long, 2004; Long, 2007). Although relatively simple to implement, 
these plans were met with some skepticism. Because Top X% plans guarantee admission to state 
universities based on high school class rank, the success of this approach with respect to 
maintaining levels of racial diversity on college campuses depends implicitly upon racial 
segregation in high schools (Tienda & Niu, 2006). Further, concerns have been raised regarding 
a potential “creaming” effect: Even at extremely poor high schools, the most affluent students 
likely will rise to the top of the class (Carnevale & Rose, 2004). Numerous studies have shown 
that outlawing race-based affirmative action profoundly reduces minority representation on 
college campuses (Saenz, 2010; Contreras, 2005, Horn & Flores, 2003). Minority representation 
in has also plummeted in graduate programs following legal bans on race-conscious admissions 
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(Garces, 2010; Cantwell, Canche, Milem, & Sutton, 2010). This is especially true for selective 
institutions. Although Top X% plans enable colleges to regain some ground with respect to 
minority representation, diversity levels continue to lag behind pre-ban levels (Long, 2004; 
Long, 2007; Long & Tienda, 2008; Hinrichs, 2009). Notably, the One Florida Initiative only 
banned the consideration of race in admissions decisions; other race-related apparatuses such as 
scholarships for minorities remained legal. Economist Mark Long has shown that Florida, unlike 
other states where all race-conscious programs were banned, was able to relatively quickly 
recover rates of minority enrollment at public universities (Long, 2003). 
In his 1997 book, The Remedy, Richard Kahlenberg stressed the inadequacy of class-
based approaches – such as Top X% plans – where applicant-level considerations are implicitly 
absent (Kahlenberg, 1997). Rather, he argued that successful class-based policies would rely on 
applicant-level characteristics (e.g., family income and parents‟ education) as well as 
neighborhood- or high-school-level data (e.g., concentration of poverty). In addition, Kahlenberg 
emphasized the need for class-based policies to be evaluated according to their usefulness in 
increasing socioeconomic diversity. Findings from sociological research appear to support 
Kahlenberg‟s stance regarding indicators of disadvantage. Demographic factors often present 
substantial obstacles to upward mobility. Situating this research in the context of college 
admissions, SES has been shown to exert a powerful influence on one‟s likelihood of attending a 
four-year college (Kinzie et al., 2004; Berkner & Chavez, 1997; Baker & Velez, 1996; Orfield, 
1990; Hearn, 1984; McDill & Coleman, 1965). This is especially true when students live in 
neighborhoods and attend schools where disadvantage is concentrated. To briefly clarify, 
“concentrated disadvantage” occurs when factors associated with student success or failure – for 
example, school-wide poverty, English Learner prevalence, and low teacher certification rates – 
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appear in concert. Educational researchers John Yun and José Moreno demonstrate that the 
confluence of these factors can overtax schools in their efforts to prepare students for university 
study (Yun & Moreno, 2005). 
Moreover – irrespective to one‟s decision to attend college – SES has been shown to 
significantly impact the academic measures (e.g., high school grade point averages and 
standardized test scores) admissions officers use to gauge applicants‟ college readiness 
(Cameron & Heckman, 2001; Hu & St. John, 2001; Perna, 2000; U.S. Department of Education, 
1999; Astin, 1997; Hurtado et. al., 1997; Manski & Wise, 1983). It would seem, then, that 
Kahlenberg was on fairly stable ground proposing certain factors admissions departments must 
consider when conceiving of disadvantage. Still, his prescription for the mechanics of class-
based affirmative action fails to explain specifically how these factors might be aggregated to 
make systematic determinations of disadvantage. Rather, Kahlenberg broadly recommends that 
as many such factors as possible be considered in class-based policies.  
Beyond the socioeconomic factors admissions officers should account for in making 
determinations of disadvantage, critical questions arise regarding the amount of additional 
consideration that should attend a determination of disadvantage. Kahlenberg‟s suggestion is 
strictly outcome-oriented: A university should enact class-based considerations large enough to 
ensure the racial and socioeconomic diversity it desires. Admissions officers might agree on a 
policy via the simulated outcomes of various levels of additional consideration (Kahlenberg, 
1997). In one such simulation study, researchers proposed a class-based policy that accounted for 
some of the applicant-level factors Kahlenberg advocates (Carnevale & Rose, 2004). Of course, 
research of this sort only hypothesizes levels of socioeconomic and racial diversity that would 
result from strict implementation of class-based measures. Carnevale and Rose found that class-
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based considerations would increase socioeconomic diversity, but racial diversity would be 
negatively impacted unless some form of race-based consideration was retained. 
In 1997, the UCLA School of Law more fully operationalized class-based affirmative 
action as conceptualized by Kahlenberg (Sander, 1997). This effort, led by economist and policy 
analyst Richard Sander, coincided with the passage of Proposition 209 – California‟s Civil 
Rights Initiative. Under this program, the school collected six socioeconomic variables similar to 
those Kahlenberg had suggested. Applicants who were located one or more standard deviations 
below the mean on any socioeconomic variable received “disadvantage points,” to be added to 
the points they had already accrued via LSAT scores and college course grades. While this 
approach did fit multiple socioeconomic measures to a single quantitative scale, the points 
received from an identification of disadvantage varied depending upon the socioeconomic factor 
under examination. The differential weighting of these factors was somewhat arbitrary. Weights 
– and the attendant additional consideration – were formulated via simulation to achieve desired 
levels of racial and socioeconomic diversity among accepted students. Sander‟s approach 
increased socioeconomic diversity at UCLA Law School, but minority representation fell 
substantially (Sander, 1997).  
Other class-based strategies for achieving racial diversity goals are situated in the context 
of K-12 public education, but the spirit of these programs is quite similar to those described 
above. For example, San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD) has, since 2003, used an 
index of SES to diversify schools in a system where parents may apply to have their children 
attend any district school. Under this race-neutral approach, the SES index is used to increase 
socioeconomic diversity within schools and, to the extent possible, limit minority isolation. The 
index relies on student- and school-level poverty indicators similar to those proposed by 
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Kahlenberg. Those indicators include status as a foster child, residence in public housing, 
eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch, native language, and aggregate academic performance 
at the student‟s prior school. The goal of SFUSD‟s program is to increase school-level diversity 
with respect to these indicators. Implementation of this plan increased socioeconomic diversity 
in SFUSD schools, but racial segregation worsened compared to a race-conscious system of 
student assignment (Reardon, Yun, & Kurleander, 2006). 
The failures of the class-based approaches described above to achieve desired levels of 
racial diversity served to vindicate the nearly unanimous conclusions of prominent affirmative 
action researchers. In The Shape of the River, William Bowen and Derek Bok addressed the 
question of whether or not class-based policies could adequately replace race-conscious 
admissions (Bowen & Bok, 1998). Their conclusions are clear and intuitive. Race-based 
considerations at most selective universities are quite large. Even if universities were to grant 
low-income students “minority-sized” levels of additional consideration, racial diversity should 
plummet because minority status and poverty are not perfectly correlated. These simulations 
have been reproduced in subsequent research, and their results are consistently confirmed 
(Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Espenshade & Chung, 2005; Sander, 2004; Bowen, Kurzweil, & 
Tobin, 2005). As education policy analysts Robert Linn and Kevin Welner note, “The correlation 
between income (or socioeconomic status) and race is not nearly high enough that one can 
simply serve as a proxy for the other” (Linn & Welner, 2007, p. 42). Economist Thomas Kane 
echoes this sentiment: “No race-blind substitute can substantially cushion the effect of ending 
racial preferences. The problem is one of demographics” (Kane, 1998, p. 448).  
With the challenges inherent in class-based affirmative action vividly apparent, a Civil 
Rights Initiative – Amendment 46 – reached Colorado ballots in 2008. This was the catalyst for 
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CU‟s implementation of class-based affirmative action. The introduction of Amendment 46 
posed serious challenges to The University of Colorado‟s mission. It is the policy of the 
university to recruit and admit students possessing perspectives and life experiences that will 
provide a unique contribution to the campus environment. Moreover, CU seeks applicants who 
have overcome significant adversity, and is devoted to building racial and socioeconomic 
diversity among its students. Because Civil Rights Initiatives had been successful in other states, 
and Amendment 46 was polling favorably in early 2008, the Office of Admissions feared it 
would lose a critical tool with the passage Amendment 46. The University of Colorado was 
aware of the arguments for class-based affirmative action as a substitute for race-based policies, 
and had observed the mixed success achieved by other states that implemented class-based 
considerations once race-based policies were outlawed. I was hired in June, 2008 to evaluate and 
improve upon class-based approaches developed in other states and in the scholarly literature. 
The first task in this endeavor required a review of the class-based policies both proposed 
and in use (e.g., Kahlenberg, 1997; Carnevale & Rose, 2004; Sander, 1997, Studley, 2003). The 
University of Colorado identified both areas of promise and room for improvement. The 
applicant-level factors proposed by Kahlenberg and used by the UCLA Law School provide 
individualized indicators of disadvantage. However, the methodology underpinning the weights 
assigned to each factor, and the means by which these factors were aggregated to form a single 
quantitative scale representing disadvantage, were inappropriate for use at CU. Specifically, the 
architects of the UCLA system relied on various simulated outcomes to decide how each factor 
should be weighted (Sander, 1997). Because the undergraduate admissions process – at least at 
CU – is a rather subjective endeavor, conducting simulations to project acceptance rates for 
disadvantaged applicants would have been imprecise. Likewise, Top X% plans offered both 
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possibility and peril. While these plans clearly employ a blunt instrument to identify 
disadvantage, they do provide a tremendous benefit to applicants who are identified: guaranteed 
admission. 
One clarification is appropriate here. Thus far, class-based admissions systems have been 
discussed largely as potential replacements for race-based policies. There is, perhaps obviously, 
another aim of class-based admissions policies – socioeconomic integration on college 
campuses. Recent research suggests that this brand of desegregation has been historically 
overlooked, and its time may have come. In Rewarding Strivers, Anthony Carnevale and Jeff 
Strohl (2010) detail the case of socioeconomic inequality in higher education. They note that 
only one third of high school students who occupy the lowest socioeconomic quartile (as 
measured by family income, parents‟ education, and parents‟ occupational prestige) eventually 
attend four-year colleges. More startling, only seven percent of students in the bottom 
socioeconomic quartile earn college degrees. Similarly focused research efforts have confirmed 
these figures (Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009). The effect seems even more stark at the 
most selective postsecondary institutions: At these universities, 74% of students come from the 
top socioeconomic quartile, while just over three percent come from the bottom (Bowen, 
Kurzweil, & Tobin, 2005).  
To be sure, there are disparities in academic preparation between top and bottom 
socioeconomic quartiles, but it would be difficult to argue those disparities are so vast as to fully 
explain the socioeconomic stratification these statistics suggest. Indeed, Carnevale and Strohl 
estimate that some 400,000 low-income high school students graduate every year who are 
qualified to attend four-year colleges but do not. Our failure to provide college access for these 
students may owe to declining investment specifically in less selective universities (Bound, 
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Lovenheim, & Turner, 2009), and the shifting of higher education dollars to private as opposed 
to public institutions (Kane, Orszag, & Gunter, 2003). These factors place CU close to ground-
zero in the socioeconomic integration debate: The University of Colorado is a public institution, 
and its admissions process is moderately selective. 
So, class-based affirmative action is often explored when traditional means of racial 
diversification are suddenly unavailable. Such was the case at CU; the class-based system 
described in this dissertation likely would not have been developed were it not for the looming 
threat of a ban on race-based admissions considerations. As such, this study dutifully attends to 
the usefulness of this class-based system vis-à-vis maintaining racial diversity. Still, the 
Colorado Civil Rights Initiative of 2008 inadvertently provided a tremendous opportunity for the 
study of an admissions-based remedy to class-based segregation in postsecondary education. As 
noted earlier, researchers observe very little – if any – measurable extra consideration for low-
income college applicants. Ignoring class in college admissions plays out as we might expect: 
The lowest socioeconomic quartile is drastically underrepresented on American college 
campuses. Therefore, much of this dissertation is devoted to investigating whether or not CU‟s 
class-based approach holds promise for alleviating such underrepresentation. 
Carnevale and Strohl (2010) – who advocate the use of both race and class in college 
admissions – discuss some options for feasible class-based measures in their research, but 
emphasize that this field is relatively young, and often shrouded in secrecy by universities 
reluctant to publicize their admissions procedures. This dissertation makes every effort to buck 
that trend. I discuss the development – both conceptually and statistically – of quantitative 
measures to support class-based affirmative action, explain how those measures are used in 
admissions decisions, and explore the potential impact of putting the class-based system to use. 
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In that vein, this dissertation borrows strength from its single-case-study design. It does not 
examine a diversity of class-based methodologies, but rather discusses one such methodology in 
great depth. By structuring the dissertation so, I hope to offer a detailed “existence proof” (see 
Linn, 2003) of class-based considerations in undergraduate admissions – coupled with forecasts 
of impact – from which the higher education research community can learn. 
Ultimately, developing a class-based policy at CU required both measures (i.e., applicant 
traits that can be quantified) and implementation rules (i.e., guidelines for applying those 
measures in decision-making processes). Such measures and rules rely on conceptual arguments 
regarding the fair consideration of personal qualities (e.g., class or race) in undergraduate 
admissions. Those conceptual arguments are elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4, following a 
comprehensive description of the undergraduate admissions process at CU. 
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Before attending to class-based affirmative action at CU, it is necessary to first overview 
the process by which undergraduate applicants are granted or refused admission to the university. 
This chapter provides that overview. First, I broadly discuss the rates at which high school 
seniors apply, are accepted, and ultimately matriculate at CU. That summary is followed first by 
a presentation of certain academic measures that serve as numerical minimum thresholds for 
admissibility to CU, and then a description of the academic and personal qualities that guide 
admissions officers‟ decisions to admit or refuse applicants. Finally, this chapter discusses where 
class-based affirmative action fits within this decision-making process. CU‟s class-based system 
was designed such that it could be seamlessly integrated into the existing admissions framework. 
As such, the background provided in this chapter is critical to understanding how class-based 
measures impact both admissions processes and admissions decisions. 
Application, Acceptance, and Enrollment 
Each academic year, CU‟s Office of Admissions receives more applications from 
qualified students than there are available places at the university. Therefore, CU selects the 
applicants that present the strongest credentials for admission. This decision point, of course, 
represents only one component of the larger process of recruiting, admitting, and enrolling 
undergraduates. Admissions officers at CU describe the larger process as a “funnel,” and that 
process is detailed briefly here. Outlining the college admissions funnel should not only provide 
context for the admissions decision as part of a larger enrollment management mechanism, but 
also clarify the circumstances that cause the strength and depth of incoming classes to vary from 
one year to the next. This second point is critical to keep in mind as later chapters focus on the 
examination of historical student records to determine the likelihood of college success for 
beneficiaries of class-based affirmative action. The estimates in this section were provided by 
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CU‟s Office of Admissions and CU‟s Office of Planning, Budget, and Analysis. These figures 
represent typical application flows in one admissions cycle. 
Over the course of an academic year, admissions officers at CU contact approximately 
130,000 high school seniors. Roughly three-quarters of contacts are established proactively by 
the Office of Admissions, either via high school visits and college fairs or by purchasing the 
names of students who have taken the SAT or ACT college admissions tests. The rest of the 
contacts are established when applicants seek out CU, either by sending SAT or ACT scores to 
the university or submitting an application without prior contact. Of those 130,000 contacts, 
about 17% ultimately apply for admission to CU.  
Applicants must select one of CU‟s six undergraduate schools: Architecture and 
Planning, Arts and Sciences, Business, Engineering and Applied Science, Music, or Journalism 
and Mass Communication
2
. Forty percent of applicants come from Colorado (i.e., in-state), while 
60% come from outside Colorado (i.e., out-of-state). The historical acceptance rate at CU is 
roughly 80%, and that rate is consistent across in-state and out-of-state applicant groups.
3
 Of the 
in-state students admitted, roughly half confirm their intent to enroll at CU. That figure is 25% 
for the out-of-state applicant group. These proportions are commonly known as “yield rates.” As 
a rule, yield rates tend to increase as academic credentials decline. Applicants with lower high 
school GPAs and admissions test scores are more likely to confirm their intent to enroll at CU 
than applicants with high GPAs and high test scores. This pattern is to be expected; as academic 
credentials decline, so does the likelihood of acceptance to selective universities, so CU may be 
                            
2
 In late 2010, the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at CU was discontinued. 
3
 Acceptance rates vary according to undergraduate program (e.g., acceptance rates are lowest for engineering 
applicants at 40%). All students not accepted to a more selective program are automatically considered for Arts and 
Sciences. This dissertation focuses broadly on acceptance to CU, not acceptance to a particular undergraduate 
program area. 
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the most prestigious institution to which many low-scoring applicants are admitted. Finally, 
about 90% of those applicants who have confirmed their intent to enroll at CU ultimately 
matriculate at the outset of the fall semester of the following academic year. Applicants who 
have confirmed their intent to enroll but do not matriculate have usually been granted delayed 
(i.e., waitlist) admission to a university they prefer over CU. As such, these students rescind their 
commitment to CU and attend college elsewhere. In general, CU aims to enroll about 5,500 
freshmen matriculants each fall. Figure 3.1 presents a visual representation of the “funnel” 
process described here. 
Figure 3.1. Typical Undergraduate Application Volumes at the University of Colorado at 
Boulder 
Note: The numbers in Figure 3.1 are based on application flows in the 2009-2010 academic year. 
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The University of Colorado receives application not only for freshman admissions, but 
also for transfer to CU from other postsecondary institutions (e.g., community colleges). 
However, transfer applications would not be reviewed using either a race or class-based 
admissions approach so these applications are not considered in the analyses that follow. For 
freshman applications, CU utilizes both “Early Notification” and “Regular Application” 
deadlines. The deadline for application to CU under Early Notification is December 1 of a given 
academic year, and the deadline for Regular Application is January 15. The application review 
processes for Early Notification and Regular Application submissions are identical; no 
preference is given to students who apply early. Under either deadline, applicants who are either 
clear refusals or clear admits receive expedited notification of their admissions decision. Those 
who are neither clear refusals nor clear admits are termed “borderline” applicants. These 
students‟ applications require additional review, and these admissions decisions are 
communicated no later than April 1. 
When the projected size of the freshman class is either too large or too small, there is 
usually one juncture in the application funnel that can be effectively manipulated by the Office 
of Admissions: the number of students accepted for admission. When the projected class size is 
too small, acceptance rates are increased, and when the projected class size is too large, 
acceptance rates are decreased. While it may seem reasonable to focus admissions officers‟ 
efforts on increasing yield rates, CU admissions personnel noted such efforts are not consistently 
successful, and cannot be counted upon to fill available places in the freshman class. As such, the 
academic depth and strength of freshman classes may vary from year to year. When acceptance 
rates are decreased, the aggregate academic credentials of the freshman class are raised. 
Conversely, when acceptance rates are increased, aggregate academic credentials of the 
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freshman class decline. The patterns described here may seem intuitive, but they are important to 
bear in mind nonetheless. It is worth noting that the academic strength of any given freshman 
cohort varies enough from one year to the next that historical CU data may contain students who 
closely resemble beneficiaries of class-based admissions policies. Furthermore, the high yield 
rates observed for applicants accepted with marginal academic credentials suggest such students 
would be highly likely to enroll at CU. 
Minimum Standards for Admissibility 
Admissions decisions at CU are made holistically. That is, admissions officers consider 
the full complement of credentials each applicant possesses before rendering an admissions 
decision. Still, there are certain numerical thresholds a student must meet in order for his or her 
application to be considered, and those thresholds deserve elaboration here. First, the Colorado 
Commission on Higher Education (CCHE) produces an index score based on each applicant‟s 
highest entrance exam scores and high school GPAs. The CCHE index scale ranges from 45 to 
146. Approximately 10% of the accepted pool may possess CCHE index scores between 93 and 
102, inclusive. An additional 1% may score below 93. The rest of the accepted pool (roughly 
89%) must possess CCHE scores above 102. To ensure limited numbers of applicants with 
CCHE index scores below 103 are accepted, no such student may be admitted to CU without 
permission from the Director, an Associate Director, or a Senior Assistant Director of 
Admissions. Furthermore, applicants with CCHE index scores below 93 must present compelling 
evidence they deserve admission to CU. Acceptances in this score range are extremely rare. 
Beyond the cut-points that trigger either near-certain refusal (below 93) or consultation with a 
supervisor (below 103), CCHE index scores are not given significant consideration in the 
admissions process. Index scores are aggregated for reporting purposes to the CCHE. 
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In contrast, each applicant‟s predicted freshman-year grade-point average (PGPA) is used 
as both a threshold for admissibility and a quantitative measure to gauge that applicant‟s 
academic potential. Confidentiality agreements with the Office of Admissions do not permit 
descriptions of the PGPA equations in any mathematical detail. Essentially, each applicant‟s 
PGPA is calculated via regression models, which are estimated using CU student performance 
data from prior years. In those regressions, CU students‟ freshman-year GPAs are modeled as a 
function of high school GPA, SAT scores, and ACT scores. Coefficients from those regression 
models form prediction equations, which are applied to all CU applicants. Separate regressions 
are specified for the School of Engineering and Applied Science. The Office of Admissions 
prefers this PGPA measure to the CCHE index, because it has been crafted using CU student 
data, and the formulae may be adjusted depending on the undergraduate program to which a 
student has applied. First, an applicant‟s PGPA is used as a threshold for admissibility. No 
student with a predicted freshman-year GPA below 2.0 may be admitted. Exceptions are 
exceedingly rare; the Office of Admissions estimates that historically, about 0.1% of CU 
students were admitted with a PGPA below 2.0. The Office of Admissions sets the PGPA 
threshold at 2.0 because an undergraduate GPA below 2.0 triggers academic probation at CU. It 
would be unethical, then, to accept applicants whose high school academic credentials suggest 
they will struggle in college. 
In addition to minimum standards for admission, CU has established criteria for 
guaranteed admission to the university for Colorado residents. These criteria are based on 
course-taking requirements in high school, cumulative GPAs, and admissions test scores. The 
criteria vary depending upon the undergraduate school to which a student has applied. The class-
based affirmative action system employed at CU does not impact applicants whose high school 
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performance has guaranteed them admission to the university, nor can a class-based 
identification guarantee acceptance. As such, the criteria for guaranteed admission are not 
discussed in detail here. Standards for guaranteed admission appear in Appendix 3.1. 
Primary and Secondary Factors in the Admissions Process 
Some applicants to CU do not meet minimum academic standards for admission, and 
some have performed well enough in high school to guarantee acceptance to CU. The rest are 
evaluated according to primary and secondary factors for admission. Primary factors are 
discussed first. These carry the most weight in any admissions decision. Historically, CU has 
used 10 primary factors to evaluate undergraduate applications: 
 PGPA. As noted above, each applicant‟s PGPA is interpreted as his or her predicted 
freshman-year GPA, based on high school grades and entrance exam scores. Because this 
measure is calculated using the CU-specific undergraduate academic performance data, PGPA is 
granted significant attention during application review. Although no PGPA threshold is 
established to trigger an automatic admission, accepting an applicant with a relatively low PGPA 
(e.g., less than 2.7) must be justified via mitigating strengths in the application. An applicant‟s 
PGPA is the most influential of all primary factors. With respect to decision criteria, this is the 
exception to the rule. All other primary factors are granted roughly equivalent weight. 
 High School Course Rigor. Competitive applicants are expected to have taken a full 
schedule of college preparatory courses in high school. Applicants who have taken more 
demanding courses (e.g., Advanced Placement courses) and have earned good grades in those 
courses are particularly compelling. Still, applicants attending high schools that do not offer such 
demanding courses are not penalized. 
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 High School Grades. Each applicant‟s performance throughout high school in their 
academic courses is considered carefully during the admissions process. Grades earned during 
the student‟s junior and senior years are of particular interest: If an applicant‟s GPA trends 
downward during his or her junior year, the Office of Admissions generally requests that 
student‟s course grades from the first semester of his or her senior year. Conversely, students 
whose grades are trending upward during their junior year (assuming their cumulative GPA 
meets minimum standards for admission) present a strong case for acceptance to CU. 
 Class Rank. Rank in one‟s high school class is determined by cumulative GPA. An 
applicant‟s class rank is considered during the admissions process, when it is provided by his or 
her high school. A measure of class rank is partially dependent upon the aggregate academic 
strength of an applicant‟s high school peers. As such, any consideration of class rank must be 
made in light of that student‟s course-taking patterns and admissions test scores. 
 Admissions Test (ACT or SAT) Scores. Excluding international applicants, every student 
who applies to CU is required to take either the ACT or the SAT. The Office of Admissions 
maintains that entrance exam scores are an important part of any applicant‟s academic record, 
but these scores must be considered in concert with other criteria. In addition, admissions 
officers pay particular attention to the subject-specific scores most relevant to each applicant‟s 
intended program of study. For example, competitive applicants to the School of Business should 
demonstrate strong quantitative skills, as measured by the quantitative sections on the ACT and 
SAT. 
Minimum Academic Preparation Standards. Each applicant to CU is required to complete 
at least 17 units (e.g., 17 year-long courses) of academic study in high school.  In addition, 
students must complete a minimum number of academic courses in certain subjects relevant to 
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their chosen area of undergraduate study.  If any applicant has more than three deficiencies in 
academic preparation and an admissions officer wishes to recommend admission, permission is 
required from the Director of Admissions. 
CCHE Index. The Colorado Commission on Higher Education requires public, four-year 
universities in Colorado to consider CCHE index scores during review of undergraduate 
applications. As such, CU implements thresholds for admissibility based on the index, as detailed 
above. Beyond those cut-points, the CCHE index is not given significant weight in the review 
process. 
 Quality of High School. Admissions officers use all available high school profile 
information to determine the competitiveness of an applicant‟s secondary school. Pertinent 
information includes admissions test (ACT and SAT) score distributions, GPA distributions, 
availability of challenging courses, and academic support services. These factors are used to 
contextualize each applicant‟s high school course-taking patterns and grades. For example, the 
absence of challenging courses on a high school transcript may owe to a dearth of such courses 
at an applicant‟s high school. Furthermore, a superficially unimpressive cumulative GPA may be 
more compelling if it is earned at a rigorous high school where grades are deflated generally. 
 Personal Essays. Two personal essays are required of all undergraduate applicants. The 
essays are intended to complement each student‟s academic record in demonstrating the potential 
for success at CU. Admissions officers review applicants‟ essays with a eye toward applicants‟ 
personal backgrounds, goals, aspirations, and motivation.  In addition, admissions officers 
evaluate the essays in terms of their clarity, organization, and syntax. 
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 Letters of Recommendation. Recommendations are not required from CU applicants, so 
their absence cannot be used to penalize an undergraduate applicant. Letters of recommendation 
are reviewed by admissions officers, who collect and summarize information that may add to the 
applicant‟s profile. For example, letters of recommendation may contain information regarding 
health or personal difficulties that affected the academic record of the applicant under 
consideration. 
Secondary factors are less influential in the admissions process. Historically, CU has 
defined eight secondary factors. These characteristics are generally demographic in nature and 
unrelated to measures of academic performance. Secondary factors exist to ensure holistic 
review is conducted authentically. That is, CU admissions personnel construe “holistic review” 
as demanding evaluation of the whole applicant, and secondary factors ensure non-academic 
information is utilized during the admissions process. 
Family Income and Foster Care. Admissions officials note that low gross family income 
or a history in foster care may negatively impact a student‟s access to higher education. As such, 
applicants exhibiting either of these traits are granted additional consideration. It should be noted 
that CU is a need-blind institution. In other words, CU does not admit a student based on 
whether or not admissions officers believe that student can pay tuition. 
Race/Ethnicity. Legal counsel at CU has recommended that admissions policies specific 
to racial and ethnic minorities should be stated as briefly as possible. As such, CU‟s statement 
from application readers‟ guidelines is provided verbatim: “Students from traditionally 
underrepresented racial or ethnic populations may receive additional consideration.” 
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First-Generation College Students. Applicants whose parents, guardians, or primary care-
givers did not complete college (at either a two-year or four-year institution) receive additional 
consideration during application review. 
 Athletes. All applications from students who have been recruited to compete on 
intercollegiate athletic teams at CU are reviewed by the Director of Admissions. 
 Nontraditional College Students. Nontraditional applicants are defined by the Office of 
Admissions as older students entering college for the first time, or students who have 
experienced a hiatus in their postsecondary education. That hiatus must generally be longer than 
two years. The University of Colorado‟s view is that such students often demonstrate 
extraordinary maturity and have shouldered responsibilities unfamiliar to most undergraduate 
applicants. As such, nontraditional applicants are granted additional consideration. 
 Geographically Underrepresented Students. Additional consideration is grated to 
applicants from areas of Colorado and the United States that are historically underrepresented at 
CU. Furthermore, additional consideration is granted to applicants who attend high schools that 
are underrepresented on campus. 
 Performing Arts. Additional consideration is given to students who demonstrate evidence 
of talent and interest in performing arts, and who indicate the intent to major in fine arts, film 
studies, theater, or dance. Evidence of talent and interest in fine arts is generally gathered in the 
personal essay, high school activities, and awards, in addition to coursework.  
 Legacies. Similar to its policy regarding racial and ethnic minorities, CU‟s statement 
regarding legacy applicants is decidedly brief: “Legacies (applicants who have a parent, 
grandparent, or sibling who is a CU alum or current student) may be given some additional 
consideration.” 
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 Although primary and secondary factors are utilized in concert to evaluate an application, 
primary factors exhibit far greater influence on an applicant‟s prospects for admission. The 
distinction between primary and secondary factors is critical to understanding how class-based 
policies are implemented at CU, so I will illustrate the difference through two examples. The 
simplest way to conceive of primary and secondary factors‟ weight is to conceive of tie-breaking 
scenarios in undergraduate admissions. As noted above, PGPA tends to exhibit more influence 
than any other single factor during application review. Imagine two applicants with identical or 
nearly identical PGPAs (i.e., separated by no more than 0.01 predicted grade points). The 
presence of a secondary factor for one of those students (e.g., minority or legacy status) would 
move him or her ahead of the other with respect to acceptance priority. A primary factor would 
do the same.  
 Now imagine two applicants with different PGPAs – “Applicant A” has a PGPA 0.2 
predicted grade points above the PGPA of “Applicant B.” The presence of a secondary factor for 
Applicant B could not move him or her ahead of Applicant A in the acceptance queue. However, 
the presence of a primary factor – Applicant B may have attended a famously rigorous high 
school, or may have a glowing letter or recommendation – could vault him or her ahead of 
Applicant A. This represents the quintessential difference between primary and secondary 
factors: Secondary factors serve primarily as tie-breakers, while primary factors may relocate 
applicants much more substantially, in terms of admissions preference. 
 Ultimately, there is no combination of primary and secondary factors that either ensures 
or precludes acceptance to CU. When admissions officers are unsure whether an applicant‟s 
credentials merit an offer of admission, they are encouraged to seek a second opinion from a 
colleague. In addition, admissions officers meet regularly to discuss, in depth, the relative 
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strengths and weaknesses of applicants on the cusp of admission. This sort of collaborative 
application review is mandatory for all borderline applicants (those deemed neither clearly 
admissible nor clearly inadmissible). These meetings are formally referred to as “Committees of 
the Whole.” 
Class-Based Considerations in the Admissions Process 
Class-Based Measures as Primary and Secondary Factors 
 The class-based system developed at CU was designed for incorporation into the families 
of primary and secondary factors. First, any applicant identified by this class-based system is 
automatically referred to a “Committee of the Whole.” No applicant flagged by this system can 
be refused admission without a comprehensive second look. Furthermore, if applicants are 
flagged as having experienced particularly severe disadvantage, or if they have demonstrated 
particularly impressive achievement in light of their circumstances, identification by this class-
based system can be a primary factor for admission to CU. Less severe identifications can be 
counted as secondary factors. Class-based measures at CU replace secondary factor 
considerations of family income, because income is integral to the new class-based methodology. 
Considerations of foster care status are retained because that variable is not included in the new 
methodology. Finally, considerations of first-generation status are retained because that indicator 
is a critical measuring stick for gauging the socioeconomic diversity of an accepted class. 
Essentially, first-generation status has been retained as a secondary factor simply because it has a 
long history of use at the Office of Admissions. The new class-based system includes finer 
measures of parents‟ education, so the use of a first-generation indicator will be phased out over 
time. In the next chapter, the mechanics of this class-based system are introduced in much 
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greater detail. At this point, it will suffice to understand that identification under this approach 
can have a tremendous impact on an applicant‟s prospects for admission. 
 In addition to affecting an applicant‟s likelihood of admission, CU‟s class-based 
measures help determine eligibility for academic support on campus. Specifically, the McNeill 
Academic Program at CU is designed to support underprivileged students who may enter college 
lacking academic preparation in certain areas. While all McNeill students must be deemed 
admissible by common standards for acceptance at CU, the students selected for this program 
may benefit from the small classes, workshops, mentorship opportunities, and extracurricular 
activities the McNeill Program offers. The goal of the McNeill Program is to support its 
participants during undergraduate work, ensure they graduate with a degree, and prepare them 
for life after college. Students who enter the McNeill Program stay in it throughout their 
undergraduate careers at CU. In previous years, first-generation status combined with low levels 
of family income could make an applicant eligible for the McNeill Program. Beginning in 2011, 
CU‟s class-based measures serve as indicators to determine eligibility for the McNeill Academic 
Program. 
Relevant Qualifications 
The following chapter details the mechanics of implementing this class-based system. 
Before those statistical methods are introduced, it is important to clarify the conceptual argument 
that justifies the use of class-conscious admissions policies at CU. This justification relies 
primarily on the “relevant qualifications argument,” advanced by Amy Gutmann (Gutmann, 
1987, Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Gutmann‟s position was originally crafted to consider the 
position of minority status in admissions processes that employ race-based affirmative action. 
The relevant qualifications argument is grounded in the principle of nondiscrimination, which 
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holds that “All citizens are worthy of consideration [for admission to college] on the basis of 
how much they can contribute to the democratic purposes of higher education” (Gutmann, 1987, 
p. 195). Thus, relevant qualifications for admission to a postsecondary institution are defined by 
the legitimate social purposes of that institution. The purpose of higher education is not merely to 
identify and admit the students with the most impressive high school grades and admissions test 
scores. Universities serve as gatekeepers to prized professions and prepare future leaders, and as 
such nonacademic qualifications are relevant to their missions. For example, being Black might 
be relevant to the social purpose of an institution if that institution aims to (1) train Black 
doctors, lawyers, and professors who might serve as role models in their communities, or (2) 
increase awareness among all students about struggles particular to Black communities. Through 
Gutmann‟s argument, affirmative action is justified not necessarily as a remediation for past 
injustices, but rather as a system necessary to acknowledge and pay special attention to applicant 
qualifications relevant to a university‟s social purpose. 
The relevant qualifications argument may be extended reasonably to support class-based 
affirmative action at CU. First, following Gutmann‟s reasoning, it is essential to understand CU‟s 
stated mission – especially as it relates to inclusiveness on campus. The University of Colorado‟s 
Office of Diversity, Equity, and Community Engagement (2009) articulates the mission as such: 
We envision a campus that addresses the special needs of groups and individuals 
who historically have faced institutional barriers, where the quality of education is 
enhanced and enriched by a diverse campus community, and where the entire 
campus benefits from participation in a multicultural community. 
 
The University of Colorado asserts that education on its campus is enhanced by diversity. 
The statement above recognizes a fundamental social function of higher education: training 
professionals and leaders for service in the economically diverse communities that comprise this 
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country. To that end, CU students‟ educations benefit substantially from exposure to peers from 
varied socioeconomic backgrounds. Thus, applicants who will contribute to the socioeconomic 
diversity of CU possess relevant qualifications for admission. Admissions at CU is not presently 
– nor has it ever been – based solely on high school academic credentials. The University of 
Colorado desires undergraduates who can contribute to and elevate the lively exchange of 
disparate ideas, both within the student body and between faculty and students. Possession of life 
experiences that give rise to unique perspectives is a relevant and highly valued qualification for 
admission to CU. A central purpose of this university is the exposure of its students to new ideas 
– notions that challenge conventional norms and mores with which many students are 
comfortable prior to postsecondary study. 
Gutmann argues that recognizing and paying special attention to racial/ethnic minority 
status in undergraduate admissions may be justified if a university‟s purpose includes exposing 
its students to the problems racial/ethnic minorities face. This argument can be applied to low-
SES students as well; to the extent CU aims to graduate students sensitive to the needs of groups 
who face institutional barriers, measures of socioeconomic disadvantage are relevant 
qualifications for admission. Furthermore, CU plays a gatekeeper role as a selective 
postsecondary institution. Any institution that occupies such a role must carefully consider 
barriers to opportunity. As Gutmann points out, “even if selective universities are not themselves 
responsible for creating deprivation, they – along with many other institutions – may be 
responsible for not perpetuating it” (Gutmann, 1987, p. 219). 
In deference to the qualifications argument, when describing class-based affirmative 
action at CU, I avoid using traditional affirmative-action terminology such as “preference” (e.g., 
Espenshade, Chung, & Walling, 2004) or “boost” (e.g., Kahlenberg, 1997). These terms carry an 
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improper connotation, as if disadvantage or overachievement were unfairly conferred or 
completely unrelated to what students identified by class-conscious policies could offer to CU. 
Instead, I tend to use the term “additional consideration,” to imply that additional consideration 
of applicants is warranted when relevant qualifications have been revealed by the CU‟s class-
based system. Finally, this theoretical justification for class-based admissions policies leaves CU 
with little anxiety regarding public perception of its consideration of disadvantage and 
overachievement as relevant qualifications. Use of this system is ethically defensible. As 
educational researcher Michele Moses notes, “class considerations fit appropriately into the 
socially conscious mission of selective colleges and universities. Students from poor families, 
depressed inner city neighborhoods, or those who are the first in their family to attend college 
have a background characteristic that is relevant in the admissions process” (Moses, 2001, p. 16). 
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Developing Measures to Support Class-Based Affirmative Action 
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The University of Colorado‟s approach differs from those elaborated in Chapter 2, in 
meaningful ways. Development of statistical methods to capture disadvantage and 
overachievement owe to Richard Kahlenberg‟s description of the goals embodied in class-based 
affirmative action (Kahlenberg, 1997). Essentially, it is Kahlenberg‟s position that for many high 
school students, socioeconomic obstacles prevent access to college, and all the benefits 
(increased wages, informed participation in a democratic society) that subsequently accrue from 
attending college. So, firstly, any class-based system seeking to compensate for those obstacles 
must recognize and attempt to account for socioeconomic barriers to college access. Secondly, 
Kahlenberg argues many high school students‟ academic credentials are depressed by variables 
outside their control. Some such students perform much better than we would predict, based on 
their backgrounds. The concept is not entirely novel; other researchers have labeled such 
students “strivers” (Carnevale & Strohl, 2010).  
The Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices 
Following from Kahlenberg‟s argument, CU developed measures to identify these two 
traits. The university sought to quantify the obstacles to life chances each applicant faced, and 
the extent to which that applicant had overcome those obstacles. With these goals in mind, CU 
chose to model certain outcomes relevant to college admissions and shown in the literature to be 
influenced by socioeconomic factors. Specifically, CU investigated four outcomes – enrollment 
in a four-year college, cumulative weighted high school GPA, ACT scores, and SAT scores – 
and devised four indices to operationalize the goals Kahlenberg sets forth. “Obstacles to life 
chances” are construed as disadvantage, and disadvantage is quantified as the reduction, owing 
to socioeconomic circumstance, in an applicant’s likelihood of attending a four-year college. 
This is the “Disadvantage Index.” The university construes “overcoming obstacles” as 
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overachievement, and overachievement is quantified as the extent to which an applicant’s 
academic credentials exceed what is expected, conditional on socioeconomic factors. These are 
the “Overachievement Indices.” The sections that follow elaborate on the statistical methods that 
underlie each Index. 
The Disadvantage Index 
The Disadvantage Index is derived from two prediction equations. Specifically, one 
number is calculated for each applicant: the marginal increase or decrease in the probability of 
four-year college enrollment, owing to socioeconomic circumstance. The Disadvantage Index is 
based upon an underlying logistic regression model, where the dependent variable is a binary 
indicator of enrollment in a four-year college in October following a student‟s graduation from 
high school. The binary logistic regression model is presented in Equation 4.1 below: 
        
            
              
 
(4.1) 
In the model above, individuals are indexed by i (i = 1, . . . , N). The variable Ei takes a 
value of “1” if applicant i enrolls in a four-year college, and 0 otherwise. Let Xi be a vector of 
academic credentials and Zi be a vector of socioeconomic measures for applicant i. Let β and ξ 
represent the two vectors of parameters associated with Xi and Zi, respectively. P(Ei = 1) 
represents the probability that applicant i will enroll in college. The associations between 
academic credentials (Xi) or socioeconomic measures (Zi) and college enrollment are quantified 
via parameters in β and ξ. So, for example, when a parameter estimate associated with a 
particular academic credential (say, SAT scores) is positive, increases in that academic credential 
translate to increases in the estimated probability of college enrollment. 
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Independent variables used in this logistic model fall into three separate categories. 
Student-level socioeconomic variables (included in the vector Zi) are (1) whether the applicant‟s 
native language is English, (2) parents‟ highest education level, (3) family income level, and (4) 
the number of dependents in the family. Family income and the number of dependents are 
modeled solely as an interaction term. High-school-level socioeconomic variables (also included 
in the vector Zi) are (5) whether the applicant attended a rural high school, (6) the school-wide 
percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (%FRL), (7) the school-wide 
student-to-teacher ratio, and (8) the size of the 12
th
-grade class. Student-level academic 
credentials (included in the vector Xi) are (9) high school cumulative weighted GPA, and (10) 
the higher of two standardized admissions test scores (ACT composite or SAT combined)
4
. 
These Disadvantage Index predictors are presented in Table 4.1 below.  
Table 4.1. Socioeconomic and Academic Predictors for the Disadvantage Index 
 
A further step is necessary for calculating the Disadvantage Index: Two different 
probabilities are computed for any given applicant. The first is                    , which 
represents the probability that applicant i will enroll in college given his or her specific academic 
credentials (Xi) and socioeconomic measures (Zi). The second is                 
  , which is 
                            
4
 ACT and SAT scores are converted to standard units using their means and standard deviations in the ELS dataset. 
The mean ACT composite score is 21, with a standard deviation of 4.7. The mean SAT combined score is 1030, 
with a standard deviation of 208. 
Student-Level SES 
Predictors
High-School-Level SES 
Predictors
Student-Level Academic 
Predictors
Native Language English Rural High School High School GPA
Parents' Education %FRL ACT Composite
Family Income Student-to-Teacher Ratio SAT Combined
Dependents 12th-Grade Enrollment
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identical to the first probability with one important change: The values for the circumstance 
variables are fixed at those of a “typical” applicant. This distinction is represented by the 
substitution of Z* for Zi. For continuous socioeconomic measures, the values for a “typical” 
applicant are defined as the mean from the full distribution of CU applicants. For categorical or 
ordinal predictors, values for the typical applicant are defined as the mode. Those typical values 
are presented in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2. Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Typical CU Applicant 
 
The Disadvantage Index (DI) represents the difference between the two probabilities 
defined above. Larger negative values are interpreted as more disadvantage. 
DIi =                                       
   
(4.2) 
For further clarification, a visual representation of this Index is provided in Figure 4.1. 
For the purposes of illustration, the probability of enrollment in a four-year college is plotted as a 
function of SAT combined score for two groups of applicants – those with typical socioeconomic 
characteristics and those with socioeconomic characteristics indicating disadvantage. It is 
important to point out that the ogive representing typical CU applicants remains fixed, because 
Socioeconomic Variable Value
Native Language English Yes
Parents' Highest Level of Education 4-Year College
Family Income $100,000 - $199,000
Dependents 2
Rural High School No
%FRL 15
Student-to-Teacher Ratio 18
12th-Grade Enrollment 400
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the socioeconomic characteristics of the typical applicant are fixed in Z*. The ogive representing 
a disadvantaged applicant, however, may vary as a function of the socioeconomic measures 
specific to that applicant. 
Figure 4.1. Visual Representation of the Disadvantage Index  
 
At this point it is useful to apply the Disadvantage Index equation (4.2) to an example 
applicant to illustrate how low SES results in negative values for this Index. To that end, let us 
consider James. His parents make between $15,000 and $35,000 per year. James is a native 
English speaker, and there are three dependents in James‟s family. Both his parents graduated 
from high school and attended some college, but neither graduated. Seventy percent of the 
students at James‟s high school are FRL-eligible. James attends a rural high school, with 100 
students in the 12
th
-grade class and a school-wide student-to-teacher ratio of 15. His HSGPA is 
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2.7, and he scored 20 on the ACT. Computing a Disadvantage Index value for James requires 
regression coefficients (i.e., parameter estimates for β, and ξ) for the logistic model underlying 
this Index. Those estimates are presented in Table 4.3 below. Later in this chapter, I discuss the 
process by which these parameters were estimated. 
Table 4.3. Parameter Estimates for CU’s Model of College Enrollment 
 
 The parameter estimates in Table 4.3 suggest that of all socioeconomic predictors, 
parents‟ education exhibits the strongest association with college enrollment. The parameter 
estimates in Table 4.3 are not readily interpretable; first the exponential function must be applied 
Independent (Predictor) Variables Log Odds Estimate S.E.
Intercept -2.07 0.020
Native Language English -0.07 0.008
Dependents * Income @ $0 - $14,999 -0.12 0.001
Dependents * Income @ $15,000 - $34,999 -0.06 0.001
Dependents * Income @ $35,000 - $49,999 -0.03 0.003
Dependents * Income @ $50,000 - $74,999 0.02 0.003
Dependents * Income @ $75,000 - $99,999 0.07 0.002
Dependents * Income @ $100,000 - $199,999 0.11 0.002
Dependents * Income @ $199,000+ 0.18 0.001
Parents' Highest Level of Education
No/Some High School 0
High School Graduate 0.13 0.006
Some College 0.39 0.004
2-year College Graduate 0.52 0.005
4-year College Graduate 0.71 0.002
Postgraduate Study 0.88 0.001
Rural High School -0.15 0.006
High School Percent F/R Lunch -0.003 <0.001
Student-to-Teacher Ratio -0.03 0.001
Size of 12th-Grade Class 0.0001 <0.001
High School Weighted GPA 0.86 0.004
Highest Test Score, Standardized 0.60 0.003
Model Summary Statistics
Nagelkerke R
2
0.31
-2 Log Likelihood 1130118.6
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to reveal how changes in the predictor variables are associated with changes in the odds of 
college enrollment. So, all else equal, students whose parents engaged in some postgraduate 
study are 2.4 times (e
0.88
) more likely to enroll in college than students whose parents did not 
earn a high school diploma. Also of note, increases in family income (dependents held constant) 
are associated with increased odds of college enrollment, and increases in %FRL are associated 
with decreases in the odds of college enrollment. Finally, increases in academic credentials 
exhibit a strong positive influence on the odds of college enrollment. For example, an increase of 
one grade point in HSGPA translates to a 2.36-fold increase (e
0.86
) in the odds of college 
enrollment.  
The parameter estimates in Table 4.3 enable calculation of James‟s Disadvantage Index. 
That calculation is performed via Equations 4.3 through 4.5 below. First, James‟s probability of 
enrolling in a four-year college is calculated. The numbers in parentheses represent James‟s 
specific socioeconomic and academic values. Those numbers are multiplied by the 
corresponding parameter estimates given in Table 4.3. 
                                                                                           
                                                                                             
 
= 0.391 
(4.3) 
Next, CU calculates James‟s probability of enrolling in a four-year college, with his 
socioeconomic characteristics fixed at values for a typical CU applicant. In the equation below, 
only the last two terms (associated with academic credentials) on the right-hand sides of the 
numerator and denominator refer specifically to James. 
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= 0.636 
(4.4) 
 Finally, James‟s Disadvantage Index value represents the difference between the two 
probabilities computed above: 
DI = 0.391 – 0.636 = –0.245 = –24.5% 
(4.5) 
So, relative to the SES of a typical CU applicant, James‟s low SES has reduced his 
estimated probability of enrolling in college 24.5 percentage points. Later in this chapter, I 
discuss CU‟s approach to determining which values for this Index represent substantial 
disadvantage. 
The Overachievement Indices 
Development of the Overachievement Indices followed the work of Studley (2003) and 
Carnevale and Rose (2004). The three Indices are derived from three prediction equations. Two 
to three values are calculated for each applicant, as a function of that applicant‟s (1) cumulative 
weighted high school GPA, (2) ACT composite score, and (3) SAT combined score
5
. The 
Overachievement Indices‟ prediction equations are based on parameter estimates from three 
separate multiple regression models, where the dependent variables in each case are (1) HSGPA, 
                            
5
 Because applicants to CU are required to take either the ACT or the SAT, most applicants (roughly 73%) have an 
Overachievement Index for only one of those two admissions tests. 
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(2) ACT composite score, and (3) SAT combined score
6
. The general form of the regression 
model is given below: 
          
(4.6) 
In the model above, individuals are indexed by i (i = 1, . . . , N). Yi is the value for the 
academic credential under examination (HSGPA, ACT, or SAT). Let Ki be a vector of 
socioeconomic measures. Let θ be a vector of parameters associated with K. The unobserved 
error term is represented by  i. Independent variables (i.e., the vector Ki) used in the 
Overachievement Index are nearly identical to the socioeconomic variables employed in the 
Disadvantage Index. Student-level variables include (1) the applicant‟s native language, (2) 
single parent status, (3) parents‟ education level, (4) family income level, and (5) the number of 
dependents in the family. High-school-level socioeconomic variables include (6) whether the 
applicant attended a rural high school, (7) %FRL, (8) student-to-teacher ratio, and (9) the size of 
the 12
th
-grade class. The Overachievement Indices‟ predictors are presented in Table 4.4 below.  
Table 4.4. Socioeconomic Predictors for the Overachievement Indices 
 
                            
6
 For the Overachievement Index, SAT scores represent the sum of scores on the math and verbal sections of the 
SAT. 
Student-Level SES 
Predictors
High-School-Level SES 
Predictors
Native Language English Rural High School
Single Parent %FRL
Parents' Education Student-to-Teacher Ratio
Family Income 12th-Grade Enrollment
Dependents
53 
 
The associations between socioeconomic measures (Ki) and academic credentials (Yi) are 
quantified via parameters in θ. So, when a parameter estimate associated with a particular 
socioeconomic measure (say, family income) is positive, increases in that socioeconomic 
measure translate to increases in the predicted value of the academic credential.  
For any given academic credential Y, the Overachievement Index (OI) value for applicant 
i is based on ei, the residual from the multiple regression specified in Equation 4.6: 
OIi =            
(4.7) 
Rather than reporting a student's HSGPA or test scores, this approach instead estimates 
the student's achievement beyond what is predicted by his or her socioeconomic circumstance. 
The difference between what was predicted for a given applicant and what he or she actually 
achieved functions as a measure of achievement beyond circumstance. Positive values are 
interpreted as overachievement. For further clarification, a visual representation of the 
Overachievement Index is provided in Figure 4.2. For the purposes of illustration, SAT 
combined score is plotted as a function of one socioeconomic measure: the percentage of 
students school-wide receiving free or reduced-price lunch. 
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Figure 4.2. Visual Representation of the Overachievement Index (SAT) 
 
 Again, it may be helpful to apply one Overachievement Index equation (the SAT 
measure) to an example applicant. This time, let us consider Sandra. Sandra‟s parents make 
between $35,000 and $60,000 annually. She is a native English speaker, and she is an only child 
living with a single parent. Her mother attended some college, but did not graduate. Sandra 
attends an urban high school where 40 percent of the students are eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch. There are 500 students in her 12
th
-grade class, and the school-wide student-to-
teacher ratio is 15. Sandra has earned a 3.1 GPA in high school, and scored 1170 on the SAT. As 
with the previous example, computing an Overachievement Index (SAT) value requires the 
parameter estimates for θ. Those are provided in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5. Parameter Estimates for CU’s Models of HSGPA, ACT scores, and SAT scores 
 
Parameter estimates from the HSGPA, ACT, and SAT regression models are more easily 
interpreted than those from the logistic model of college enrollment. Essentially, all else equal, a 
one-unit increase in any predictor variable (e.g., single-parent status) is associated with a change 
in the outcome variable (e.g., SAT combined score) equal to the parameter estimate. So, single 
parent status, all else equal, translates to a 39-point decrease in predicted SAT score. Again, in 
each case, increases in parents‟ education and income are associated with increases in academic 
credentials, while increases in %FRL are associated with decreases in academic credentials. Also 
Independent (Predictor) Variables
OLS 
Estimate S.E.
OLS 
Estimate S.E.
OLS 
Estimate S.E.
Intercept 2.60 0.005 16.81 0.044 923.25 1.680
Native Language English -0.05 0.002 0.94 0.021 -16.96 0.809
Single Parent -0.19 0.002 -0.96 0.015 -38.53 0.643
Dependents -0.03 0.001 -0.15 0.004 -6.54 0.200
Income @ $0 - $14,999 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income @ $15,000 - $34,999 0.03 0.002 0.28 0.010 16.02 0.320
Income @ $35,000 - $49,999 0.07 0.001 0.54 0.009 34.82 0.540
Income @ $50,000 - $74,999 0.09 0.001 0.87 0.003 58.11 0.160
Income @ $75,000 - $99,999 0.13 <0.001 1.19 0.001 72.40 0.620
Income @ $100,000 - $199,999 0.17 <0.001 1.45 0.006 88.30 0.560
Income @ $199,000+ 0.19 0.002 1.74 0.007 105.61 1.400
Parents' Highest Level of Education
No/Some High School 0.00 0.00 0.00
High School Graduate 0.09 0.002 0.71 0.010 29.60 0.650
Some College 0.16 0.001 1.45 0.003 56.01 0.740
2-year College Graduate 0.26 0.003 2.01 0.012 88.14 1.610
4-year College Graduate 0.33 <0.001 2.93 0.001 117.43 0.800
Postgraduate Study 0.46 0.003 3.52 0.002 146.34 0.980
Rural High School 0.13 0.002 0.61 0.014 -7.77 0.639
High School Percent F/R Lunch -0.004 <0.001 -0.05 <0.001 -2.53 0.017
Size of 12th-Grade Class -0.0002 <0.001 0.0001 <0.001 -0.04 0.001
Student-to-Teacher Ratio 0.03 <0.001 0.12 0.002 3.80 0.065
Model Summary Statistics
R
2
0.12 0.19 0.19
Standard Error of the Estimate 0.69 4.31 180
HSGPA ACT Composite SAT Combined
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noteworthy in Table 4.5, socioeconomic variables explain more variation in ACT and SAT 
scores than they do in HSGPA. Variance explained is represented by R
2
, which is about 60% 
larger in ACT and SAT models (R
2
=0.19) than in the HSGPA model (R
2
=0.12). 
The parameter estimates in Table 4.5 enable calculation of Sandra‟s Overachievement 
Index (SAT), and that calculation is presented in Equations 4.8 and 4.9 below. First, her 
predicted SAT score – conditional on socioeconomic measures – is computed. The numbers in 
parentheses represent Sandra‟s socioeconomic values; those numbers are multiplied by the 
corresponding parameter estimates shown in Table 4.5. 
                                                                                
= 888 
(4.8) 
 Next, the Overachievement Index (SAT) is computed by subtracting Sandra‟s SES-
predicted SAT combined score from her observed score. 
OI = 1170 – 888 = 282 
(4.9) 
 So, Sandra has scored 282 points above the average SAT combined score of students 
with similar socioeconomic backgrounds. An approach to determining which values represent 
substantial overachievement is discussed later in this chapter. 
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Implementing the Indices at CU 
Estimating Parameters of the Regression Models: Data Sources 
If the parameters in the Indices‟ regression models (i.e., β, ξ, and θ) were known a priori, 
prediction equations could be formed and Disadvantage and Overachievement Index values 
could be calculated for each applicant to CU. Those parameters are not known, however, so they 
were estimated using extant data. As such, the University of Colorado‟s class-based system relies 
on the Education Longitudinal Study (ELS) database (U.S. Department of Education, 2006). The 
ELS data contain information on a nationally representative cohort of students attending 
American schools.  The same students were surveyed both during high school – in 2002 and 
2004 (grades 10 and 12, respectively) – and two years after high school graduation, in 2006. The 
Education Longitudinal Study was the most complete resource available for quantifying the 
relationships between SES, high school academic credentials, and four-year college enrollment 
for American students applying to postsecondary institutions. Historically, CU has not collected 
detailed socioeconomic data from its applicants, nor has it investigated whether applicants who 
did not come to CU eventually enrolled in another four-year institution. Because the ELS 
collected extensive data on both socioeconomic and academic variables from respondents in high 
school, and tracked students‟ progress beyond high school, this dataset seemed ideal for 
development of the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices. Moreover, ELS allowed CU to 
avoid a weakness it perceived in other class-based approaches – the reliance on simulated 
enrollment outcomes (e.g., Sander, 1997) rather than empirical enrollment data. 
The Education Longitudinal Study represents a heterogeneous sample of students, some 
of whom ultimately applied to college and some of whom did not. In an effort to choose the ELS 
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observations that most closely mirror the CU applicant pool, the university applied a number of 
restrictions to this dataset prior to estimating parameters for the regression models. First, the 
restricted sample included only those ELS students who applied to any postsecondary institution. 
Additionally, students in the restricted sample must have non-missing values for each 
socioeconomic variable included in any of the Indices, non-missing HSGPAs, at least one non-
missing admissions test score, and non-zero sampling weights. Imposing these restrictions 
significantly reduces the number of available ELS observations, from 16,197 to 3,907. This 
reduced sample was used exclusively to develop the Indices (in the following chapter, impact of 
this decision is examined in depth). Furthermore, as implied above, ELS includes sampling 
weights for use when examining data at various time points in the data collection cycle. For the 
development of the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices, CU consistently used 
F1PNLWT – the panel weight corresponding to both the base year (2002) and follow-up year 
(2004) data collection points – to estimate the parameters for any given regression model. 
Estimating Parameters of the Regression Models: ELS Variables 
In theory, the list of variables used as predictors in the Indices‟ regression models could 
be expanded. One could conceive of additional variables not included in these models that 
nonetheless explain variation in college enrollment or high school academic credentials. The 
University of Colorado‟s class-based measures are subject to data constraints, which merit 
explanation here. Two preliminary criteria had to be met in order for an independent variable to 
be included in the Indices‟ regression models. First, data on that variable needed to be available 
for the CU applicant pool, either through the student application for admission or an otherwise 
reliable source (e.g., high-school-level data were pulled from the NCES Common Core of Data). 
Second, the variable needed to be present in the ELS data. These criteria immediately eliminated 
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some potentially useful explanatory variables from the development of the Indices. For example, 
exploratory analyses indicated that the percentage of students in an applicant‟s high school who 
enrolled in a postsecondary institution may impact that applicant‟s likelihood of attending 
college. This predictor could not be included in the Disadvantage Index, because while it is 
present in ELS, it is not readily available for CU applicants. In addition, it is reasonable to 
suspect status as a foster child might affect a student‟s likelihood of attending college. 
Unfortunately, while this information is collected from CU applicants, it is not available in ELS.  
Furthermore, although single-parent status is available both in ELS and from the CU 
application, its estimated association with college enrollment is negligible. As such, single parent 
status was removed from consideration for the Disadvantage Index. It was not necessary to 
exclude single-parent status from the Overachievement Indices; in ELS, having a single parent is 
associated with decreases in academic credentials. Finally, in the model of college enrollment, 
one pair of independent variables – family income level and number of dependents – was 
modeled as an interaction effect only. Modeling the interaction alone provided a reasonable 
interpretation of the impact of dependents on one‟s chances of college enrollment: At low 
income levels, an increase in the number of dependents decreases the likelihood of attending a 
four-year college
7
. In models of academic credentials, the number of dependents and family 
income level were both modeled as main effects only. Modeling main effects provided a 
reasonable interpretation of those variables‟ influence on academic credentials: To varying 
degrees, an increase in the number of dependents is associated with decreases in academic 
                            
7
 In retrospect, the decision not to include an income main effect in the model of college enrollment was an error, 
because all else equal, increases in income are associated with increases in the likelihood of college enrollment. The 
Disadvantage Index has since been revised. 
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credentials, while an increase in family income is associated with sizeable increases in academic 
credentials. 
Establishing Thresholds along the Indices’ Scales 
Once the parameters for the regression models were estimated and the Indices‟ prediction 
equations were formed, CU established two thresholds along each Index‟s scale. Thresholds 
were necessary because for admissions personnel, the Indices represent somewhat unfamiliar 
scales. The Disadvantage Index is the difference between two estimated probabilities of college 
enrollment. The Overachievement Indices retain the scales of the academic credentials under 
consideration (HSGPA, ACT, and SAT), but each scale is re-centered around 0. Moreover, the 
scales are shrunken (i.e., standard deviations are reduced) following the removal of 
socioeconomic influences on academic credentials. Defining thresholds along each Index scale, 
CU theorized, would help admissions staff determine the values that represent substantial 
disadvantage or overachievement. Initially, thresholds for each Index were defined normatively – 
at one and two standard deviations from the mean of the CU applicant pool
8
.
 
These thresholds 
defined multiple categories of undergraduate applicants. For the Disadvantage Index, one 
standard deviation from the mean signified “moderate disadvantage.” Two standard deviations 
from the mean signified “severe disadvantage.” For the Overachievement Indices, those 
categories were termed “high achievement” and “extraordinary achievement,” respectively. 
Of course, these norm-referenced identification thresholds are somewhat arbitrary. To 
address this concern, CU undertook a standard-setting approach to introduce criterion-referenced 
considerations into determinations of disadvantage and overachievement. The standard-setting 
panel consisted of the Director of Admissions, the Associate Director, and a Senior Assistant 
                            
8
 These standard deviations were calculated from a random sample of 400 Fall 2009 CU applicants. 
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Director. The purpose of this procedure was to have admissions officers utilize familiar 
categories and scales (e.g., parents‟ education level, ACT scores) to determine thresholds for 
identification on the relatively unfamiliar Disadvantage and Overachievement Index scales. The 
standard-setting process is described in some detail here, because this sort of collaborative 
exercise is critical if educational researchers mean to design class-based systems that are 
grounded in the valuable institutional knowledge admissions officers possess. 
For the Disadvantage Index, each participant was asked to indicate values for family 
income (given two dependents), parents‟ education, and %FRL that represent the thresholds for 
moderate and severe disadvantage.
9
 In making these determinations, the panel had no knowledge 
of the mean socioeconomic characteristics of moderately and severely disadvantaged applicants, 
as defined by the normative thresholds. This procedure was crafted to be conceptually similar – 
although certainly not identical – to a Bookmark standard-setting (Mitzel et al., 2001). This is a 
commonly used technique in educational assessment. In this method, panelists are presented a 
battery of items sorted in order of increasing difficulty, and asked to indicate the point at which 
items have become too difficult for a student at a given achievement threshold to have a 
reasonable chance of responding correctly. Similarly, with the Disadvantage Index procedure, 
panelists were asked to indicate socioeconomic values (parents‟ education, income, and %FRL) 
that an applicant would be unlikely to exhibit if he or she were not moderately or severely 
disadvantaged. 
The Overachievement Indices procedure, on the other hand, bore no resemblance to a 
Bookmark standard setting, and was in fact a much simpler process. In this scenario, panelists 
were asked to set numerical thresholds for overachievement. Specifically, panelists were asked to 
                            
9
 For the sake of expediency, I used only these variables for the Disadvantage Index standard-setting procedure. 
These are most influential predictors in the underlying logistic regression model of college enrollment. 
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“imagine the average CU applicant, and imagine the HSGPA, ACT composite, and SAT 
combined scores you would expect to see from that average applicant. Now imagine that 
applicant has demonstrated high overachievement. What does that look like, in terms of the 
difference between the academic credentials you expected to see, and what you do see? 
Furthermore, what would extraordinary overachievement look like?” For both standard-setting 
procedures, each panelist was asked to make these determinations independently, to avoid 
suggestions from the Director of Admissions influencing the decisions of his subordinates.  
The panel meeting ultimately illustrated a famous adage in educational measurement. To 
paraphrase William Angoff: “Scratch a criterion, and you‟ll find a norm” (Angoff, 1974). After 
the panel came to consensus regarding thresholds for disadvantage and overachievement, they 
examined the percentage of applicants that would be identified for additional consideration given 
the revised thresholds.
10
 The panelists had independently selected rather stringent thresholds, so 
identifications for moderate / severe disadvantage, or high / extraordinary overachievement, were 
rare. Based on admissions officers‟ initial responses, only five percent of applicants were 
identified by any of the Indices. 
Admissions officers preferred more frequent identifications from this class-based system. 
The thresholds were eased, with the following directives from the panel: (1) Stay as close to the 
criterion-referenced thresholds as possible, (2) do not make it substantially more difficult to be 
identified under one Index than any other, and (3) aim to identify between 25% and 30% of the 
applicant pool for additional consideration. The revised thresholds for identification are 
presented in Table 4.6, alongside the normative thresholds for comparison.  
                            
10
 For the standard-setting panel, applicant classification percentages were calculated using a random sample of 
1,000 Fall 2010 undergraduate applicants. 
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Table 4.6. Disadvantage and Overachievement Thresholds for the Indices 
 
 Continuing with the examples introduced in the previous section, both Sandra and James 
are flagged by the Indices. Specifically, Sandra‟s Overachievement Index (SAT) value of 282 
places her in the “extraordinary overachievement” category. James‟s reduced chances of college 
enrollment (a Disadvantage Index value of –24.5 percentage points) places him in the “severe 
disadvantage” category. It is also important to emphasize the iterative nature of the standard-
setting procedure employed to set the thresholds presented in Table 4.6. In Chapter 5, I will 
consider adjustments to the Indices. Implementing some such adjustments may result in more or 
fewer applicants identified as disadvantaged or overachieving, if identification thresholds are not 
subsequently adjusted. To the extent that normative considerations (i.e., the proportion of 
students identified for additional consideration) are important to an undergraduate admissions 
Measure
Normative 
Thresholds
Standard-Setting 
Thresholds
Disadvantage Index
Moderate Disadvantage -5% -6.30%
Severe Disadvantage -10% -19%
Overachievement Index (HSGPA)
High Overachievement 0.48 0.57
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.96 1.06
Overachievement Index (ACT)
High Overachievement 3.41 3.9
Extraordinary Overachievement 6.82 7.5
Overachievement Index (SAT)
High Overachievement 129 151
Extraordinary Overachievement 258 273
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department, identification thresholds should be modified following adjustments to the Indices‟ 
equations. 
Considering the Indices in Admissions Decisions 
Utilization of the Indices by admissions personnel relies on the thresholds set to identify 
applicants with substantial disadvantage or overachievement. Applicants experiencing moderate 
or severe disadvantage, or exhibiting high or extraordinary overachievement, are granted 
additional consideration during applications review. No applicant identified under any Index may 
be refused admission outright; any application exhibiting disadvantage or overachievement must, 
at the very least, be referred to a committee of admissions officers for holistic review (a 
Committee of the Whole). Further, identification under any Index can serve as a primary or 
secondary factor for admission without further review. Primary and secondary factors comprise 
all measures and indicators admissions officers use to evaluate undergraduate applications. As 
noted previously, primary factors (e.g., high school grades) are the most consequential elements 
of an application, while secondary factors (e.g., legacy status) are less influential. Because 
substantial disadvantage or overachievement can trigger primary factor consideration, 
identification under the Indices can wield powerful influence over an applicant‟s prospects for 
admission. Table 4.7 below details the implementation of the Disadvantage and 
Overachievement Indices in admissions decisions. In Table 4.7, “high overachievement” and 
“extraordinary overachievement” refer to any one of the three Overachievement Index values for 
HSGPA, ACT, or SAT. One need only overachieve on one of these measures to earn additional 
consideration. 
Table 4.7. Additional Consideration Granted to Disadvantaged and Overachieving Applicants 
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With these implementation rules in mind, let us return to the example applicants, Sandra 
and James. First, recall that Sandra has a HSGPA of 3.1 and a combined score of 1170 on the 
SAT. With respect to academic credentials, Sandra‟s application is not extraordinarily strong. 
She is on the cusp of admission to CU. However, according to the standard-setting thresholds 
elaborated in Table 4.6, Sandra has demonstrated extraordinary overachievement. I will not 
detail the arithmetic that produces other Index values for Sandra, but it is important to note her 
Disadvantage Index value does not cross any standard-setting thresholds. Therefore, Sandra is 
located in the right-hand column, first row of Table 4.7. She has earned additional consideration 
in the form of a primary factor, which will considerably increase her chances of acceptance. 
At this point, a reasonable question may be posed: Why use two Indices? More 
specifically, if the Overachievement Indices effectively adjust high school academic credentials 
for the socioeconomic variables that influence them, what more is required of class-based 
affirmative action? What is the utility of the Disadvantage Index? It is useful when considering 
this problem to be aware of both CU‟s implementation procedures (Table 4.7) and Gutmann‟s 
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement
No Disadvantage
No additional 
consideration
Considered among 
secondary  factors
Considered among 
primary  factors
Moderate 
Disadvantage
Considered among 
secondary  factors
Considered among 
primary  factors
Considered among 
primary  factors
Severe Disadvantage
Considered among 
primary  factors
Considered among 
primary  factors
Considered among 
primary  factors
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relevant qualifications argument (Chapter 3, p. 39). The need for the Disadvantage Index may be 
best illustrated by way of our other example applicant – James. 
First, James‟s academic credentials (HSGPA of 2.7 and a composite score of 20 on the 
ACT) are roughly where we would expect them to be given James‟s background, so he is not 
identified by the Overachievement Indices. Still, he is flagged as having experienced “severe 
disadvantage,” so James receives primary factor consideration as a result of identification by this 
class-based system. He would be located in the left-hand column, bottom row of Table 4.7.  
James is not flagged by the Overachievement Indices, but he possesses relevant 
qualifications that CU would like to recognize in its undergraduate admissions process. That is, 
while we may not believe his raw academic credentials understate his potential, we do believe 
that when James enters CU, he will be able to draw on lived experiences that most of his 
undergraduate peers will not. Thus, James should bring views and perspectives to the university 
that would be absent were he refused admission. Significantly, the Overachievement Indices are 
not designed to identify the traits James exhibits. It is the Disadvantage Index that reveals 
relevant qualifications in this case. 
This chapter has introduced the regression models and subsequent prediction equations 
that constitute the Indices, along with the thresholds and implementation procedures that guide 
their use. These statistical methods and decision rules form the conceptual grounding for CU‟s 
system of class-based affirmative action. In the three chapters that follow, this system is 
investigated in greater depth. Specifically, Chapter 5 examines the consequences of technical 
decisions made during the development of the Indices. In Chapters 6 and 7, I use data from CU 
students to forecast the impact of putting this class-based system to use.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Sensitivity of the Indices to the ELS Sample and Regression Models 
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The investigations detailed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are conceived to specifically address 
the research questions presented in Chapter 1. The following chapter deals exclusively with 
Research Question 1:  
To what extent are CU’s measures of disadvantage and overachievement sensitive to the 
sample and the regression models used to devise them? 
The original formulation of CU‟s class-based system involved a number of equivocal 
decisions that deserve deeper scrutiny. The most important decisions are those related to 
constraining the ELS sample and specifying the regression models that underlie the 
Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices. A series of sensitivity analyses were conducted to 
investigate the potential impact of those decisions. Individual tasks are discussed in detail below, 
but it is important to describe them generally here. I consider four adjustments that would likely 
lead to changes in Disadvantage and Overachievement values for undergraduate applicants: (1) 
relaxing restrictions on the ELS sample imposed during CU‟s original operationalization of the 
Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices, (2) accounting for the probability of application to 
college, (3) imputing a school-wide poverty measure to include students for whom that 
information is missing, and (4) including a school-wide measure of college-going. Broadly, these 
tasks are designed so as to evaluate how the identification of applicants under CU‟s class-based 
system would change if different choices were to be made in the development of the 
Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices. As such, this investigation provides insights 
regarding the decision points (e.g., the choice of statistical models or the choice of samples) that 
merit careful consideration for any post-secondary institution interested in implementing a class-
based affirmative action system. 
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Before the methods and findings are presented, I will clarify three necessary 
modifications to the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices. First, a few students in the ELS 
dataset took either one semester or one year off following high school, and later enrolled in a 
four-year university. These “late-enrollers” were included in the original sample used to devise 
the Disadvantage Index, and counted as instances of students who had not enrolled in a four-year 
college. In hindsight, this was a mistake. These students should be excluded from CU‟s models 
of college enrollment; they did not begin attending college in October following their senior year 
in high school, but they also did not forego college altogether. The impact of this decision is 
minimal, because these late-enrollers represent only 94 of the 3,907 students (2.5%) in the 
original ELS sample. In addition, the predictor variable “family income level” was not included 
as a main effect in CU‟s model of college enrollment. It was specified only as an interaction with 
another predictor – “number of dependents.” Likewise, this was a mistake. First, increases in 
family income exhibit a sizeable positive influence on one‟s likelihood of attending college. For 
that reason, and for the sake of face validity, income should be included as a main effect in CU‟s 
models of college enrollment and, by extension, the Disadvantage Index prediction equation. 
Finally, “number of dependents” is missing at a high rate (24%) in ELS, and data are more likely 
to be missing for low-SES and low-achieving students. Thus, the number of dependents in an 
applicant‟s family should not be considered in the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices. 
The modifications spelled out here – removing late-enrollers from the ELS sample, including 
income as a main effect, and excluding “number of dependents” from consideration – exhibit 
minimal impact on applicants‟ classifications for additional consideration. 
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Methods 
This chapter examines changes in classifications for additional consideration in 
admissions (i.e., none, secondary factor, and primary factor) that are attributable to changes in 
either the ELS sample or the regression models that underlie the Indices. These sensitivity 
analyses draw exclusively upon ELS data. Because CU applicants are not examined in these 
sensitivity analyses, ELS students are implicitly treated as though they are CU applicants to 
determine the practical impact of changes to the ELS sample or regression model on class-based 
identification rates. In addition, this investigation required a fixed group of students to serve as a 
baseline for comparison. For each of the analyses that follow, that fixed group of students is the 
restricted ELS sample (n=3,907) previously used to devise the Indices‟ prediction equations 
detailed in the Chapter 4. Finally, the standard-setting-based numerical thresholds for 
classification are always held constant (i.e., classification thresholds are never adjusted or “re-
normed” following an adjustment to the ELS sample or regression models.) For each analysis, I 
present relatively simple measures of agreement and reclassification direction caused by 
adjustments to the ELS sample or regression models: (1) the percentage of ELS students for 
whom no classification change was observed, (2) the percentage who see a one-threshold change 
(e.g., “primary factor”  to “secondary factor”), (3) the percentage who see a two-threshold 
change (e.g., “no additional consideration” to “primary factor,” or vice-versa), and (4) the 
percentage of those reclassified who are granted more additional consideration (e.g., “secondary 
factor” to “primary factor”). 
Adjustments to the ELS sample and regression models are evaluated in terms of their 
practical impact – their effects on classification rates – to simplify the presentation of findings. 
Still, classification for additional consideration is considerably removed from ELS sample 
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selection and regression specifications. There are a number of steps – including forming 
prediction equations for the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices, and classifying students 
according to those Indices‟ identification thresholds – that must be followed before levels of 
additional consideration (i.e., primary or secondary factor) can be determined. The flow chart 
presented in Figure 5.1 elaborates the intervening steps. 
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Figure 5.1. Visual Representation of Sensitivity Analysis Design 
 
In this chapter I make adjustments in the first two rows of Figure 5.1, and the impact of 
those adjustments is evaluated via the bottom row, using the constant baseline ELS sample 
(n=3,907). The adjustments‟ impacts on the intervening steps (e.g., changes in parameter 
estimates or changes in Index-specific classification rates) are not generally discussed in detail, 
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although an illustrative example is carried through in the first sensitivity analysis. Finally, the 
tasks in this chapter involve various manipulations of the ELS sample and Indices‟ modeling 
procedures. To the extent possible, the sample and the regressions are manipulated separately, to 
isolate the effect of each discrete adjustment. To help the reader understand the changes under 
consideration in each analysis, Table 5.1 delineates the focus of each task. 
Table 5.1. Analytic Focus, by Sensitivity Analysis 
 
While some differences in classifications between the baseline and revised approaches 
are to be expected, the primary interest here is whether or not these changes are practically 
significant. Because conventional effect sizes are not available for use with purely categorical 
data, determinations of practical significance were made in consultation with CU admissions 
officers.  
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Findings 
 Each of the adjustments noted in Table 5.1 results in numerous reclassifications of ELS 
students, compared to the baseline. Therefore, each adjustment represents an important decision 
point for the architects of class-based affirmative action systems. Table 5.2 presents the 
percentage of ELS students reclassified following adjustments to the ELS sample and regression 
models, along with the direction of reclassification associated with each adjustment. 
Table 5.2. Changes in Classifications for Additional Consideration, by Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 In most cases, between 20% to 30% of ELS students are reclassified across one threshold. 
Moreover, in each case some ELS students are reclassified across two thresholds – a shift from 
no additional consideration to primary factor consideration, or vice-versa. Finally, every 
adjustment results in more classifications for additional consideration. Particularly striking is the 
reclassification pattern associated with imputing school-wide poverty: 95% of those reclassified 
are granted more additional consideration. Admissions officers confirmed that the rates of 
reclassification shown in Table 5.2 are substantial. These statistics provide a summary of the 
extent to identifications by the Indices are sensitive to the ELS sample and regression models. 
The sections that follow detail these adjustments and their effects with greater specificity. 
Sensitivity 
Analysis Description
Percent 
Agreement
Percent 
Reclassified
(One Threshold
a
)
Percent 
Reclassified
(Two Thresholds
b
)
Percent with 
Increased 
Consideration
c
1 Relax ELS Sample Restrictions 75.5% 24.1% 0.4% 80.8%
2 Adjust for Application Probability 77.5% 22.1% 0.4% 62.3%
3 Imputing School-Wide Poverty 78.7% 19.5% 1.8% 95.2%
4 Add School-Level College-Going Measure 67.6% 30.2% 2.2% 58.1%
5 Comprehensively Revised Sample and Models 52.3% 44.3% 3.4% 79.1%
a
 For example, primary factor  to secondary factor  reclassification
b
 For example, no additional consideration  to primary factor reclassification
c
 Of those reclassified , the percent granted more additional consideration (e.g., secondary factor  to primary factor )
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Relaxing Restrictions on the ELS Dataset 
 Restrictions placed on ELS for the original formulation of the Disadvantage and 
Overachievement Indices were detailed in Chapter 4. To recap, the restricted sample included all 
students who (1) ever applied to college, and have (2) non-missing values for each 
socioeconomic variable included in any of the Indices, (3) non-missing HSGPAs, (4) at least one 
non-missing admissions test score, and (5) non-zero sampling weights (n=3,907). While these 
criteria for inclusion were imposed so the ELS data would reflect the CU applicant pool as 
closely as possible, excluding so many ELS students could constitute a severe restriction of 
range. Restricting sample range impacts the parameter estimates of the Indices‟ regression 
models. To illustrate the implications of range restriction, Figure 5.2 is included below. In this 
hypothetical scenario, students‟ HSGPAs are plotted as a function of %FRL in a high school. 
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Figure 5.2. Illustration of Sample Range Restriction 
 
If we consider all the observations plotted in Figure 5.2 above, there appears to be a fairly 
strong negative relationship between %FRL and HSGPA (as represented by the dotted yellow 
line). In the plot above, a vertical line has been inserted at %FRL=60, and the observations to the 
right of that vertical line have been shaded gray. This illustrates a restriction of sample range – 
specifically, all observations where %FRL is greater than 60 are disregarded. Estimating the 
relationship between %FRL and HSGPA now relies only on those observations where %FRL is 
less than 60. As a result, the strength of the observed relationship weakens (as indicted by the 
solid orange line). As such, when estimating the relationships between SES, academic 
credentials, and college enrollment, range restriction could artificially shrink parameter estimates 
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toward 0. While the ELS sample restrictions detailed in rules 1-4 above are not as drastic as the 
restriction implemented in Figure 5.2, requiring students to have applied to college and taken an 
admissions test is likely to exclude many low-achieving and low-SES ELS students from models 
of college enrollment and academic credentials. 
To investigate this issue, rules 1-4 are relaxed. With these criteria eliminated, regression 
models include all ELS students who never applied to college, and the ELS sample size is 
allowed to vary according to the Index under consideration. For example, the revised regression 
model underlying the Overachievement Index (HSGPA) includes students without an admissions 
test score. These adjustments led to substantial increases in available sample size for estimating 
the college enrollment, HSGPA, ACT, and SAT regression models. The college enrollment 
sample increased 17% (from 3,907 to 4,554), and the HSGPA sample increased 96% (from 3,907 
to 7,688). The ACT sample increased 19% (from 2,453 to 2,926), and the SAT sample increased 
17% (from 2,243 to 2,627). 
 Relaxing the ELS sample restrictions in the manner described above led to substantial 
reclassification of the fixed sample of 3,907 ELS students. These changes in overall 
classification are largely due to the Overachievement Index (HSGPA), where a larger and 
qualitatively different sample becomes available. To illustrate generally the complex process by 
which lifting ELS sample restrictions or adding new variables alters class-based identifications, I 
show how changes to the Overachievement Index (HSGPA) can lead to changes in admissions 
classifications by following the steps outlined in Figure 5.1.  
First, in the language of Figure 5.1, comes the altering of the ELS sample. Once CU‟s 
sample restrictions (rules 1-4 above) are lifted, the available HSGPA sample nearly doubles from 
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3,907 to 7,688. Moreover, the mean HSGPA in the larger sample is reduced to 2.64, compared 
with 3.1 in the original sample of 3,907. The HSGPA standard deviation increases to 0.88 from 
0.72. Estimating the HSGPA regression model using this broadened sample leads to changed 
parameter estimates and a revised Overachievement Index prediction equation. The original 
equation is compared to the revised via Equations 5.1 and 5.2 below.  
Original Overachievement Index (HSGPA) 
OIi = HSGPAi – 2.52 – 0.04(ENGLISHi) – 0.18(SINGPTi) + 0.02(INCOMEi) + 0.08(PAREDi) + 0.13(RURALi) – 
0.004(%FRLi) – 0.0002(G12Ei) + 0.03(STRATIOi) 
(5.1) 
Revised Overachievement Index (HSGPA) 
OIi = HSGPAi – 2.27 – 0.02(ENGLISHi) – 0.2(SINGPTi) + 0.06(INCOMEi) + 0.12(PAREDi) + 0.08(RURALi) – 
0.005(%FRLi) – 0.0002(G12Ei) + 0.004(STRATIOi) 
(5.2) 
In the prediction equations above, applicants are indexed by i (i = 1,…,N). The variable 
OI refers to the Overachievement Index (HSGPA) for applicant i. HSGPA is the observed high 
school GPA. ENGLISH, SINGPT, and RURAL are dichotomous variables that take a value of 
“1” if the applicant‟s native language is English, is the child of a single parent, or attends a rural 
school, respectively, and are equal to “0” otherwise. INCOME and PARED refer to family 
income level and parents‟ highest level of education, respectively. INCOME takes values 
between 0 and 6, and PARED takes values between 0 and 5. For ease of interpretation, those 
variables are treated as single continuous measures in this example. %FRL, G12E, and STR are 
high-school-level variables referring to the percentage of students receiving free or reduced-price 
lunch, the 12
th
 grade enrollment, and the school-wide student-to-teacher ratio. 
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In Equations 5.1 and 5.2, the intercepts (2.52 and 2.27, respectively) are interpreted as the 
average HSGPA for ELS students for whom all socioeconomic measures are equal to 0. Not 
surprisingly, the intercept is reduced once CU‟s sample restrictions are lifted; the mean HSGPA 
in the unrestricted sample is 2.64, compared to 3.1 in the restricted sample. Furthermore, 
parameter estimates for INCOME and PARED are further from 0 following elimination of 
sample restrictions. This, too, is not surprising. Recall from the example in Figure 5.2 that the 
relationship between predictors and outcomes should strengthen following the removal of a 
range restriction. Such is the case with INCOME and PARED. Interestingly, however, this 
phenomenon is not consistent across socioeconomic predictors in the HSGPA model. 
Specifically, parameter estimates for ENGLISH, RURAL, and STRATIO shrink toward 0 once 
CU‟s sample restrictions are relaxed. This is not an artifact of range restriction as described 
above. Rather, for the ELS students excluded by CU‟s original sample restrictions, distinctly 
different relationships between HSGPA, ENGLISH, RURAL, and STRATIO are observed. In 
the restricted sample (as evidenced by the regression coefficients in Equation 5.1), the 
relationship between ENGLISH and HSGPA is negative, while the relationships between 
RURAL and HSGPA, and STRATIO and HSGPA, are positive. Among students who were 
excluded by CU‟s sample restrictions, those relationships are all reversed. The effect, then, of 
introducing those previously excluded students into the expanded ELS sample is to shrink 
parameter estimates for ENGLISH, RURAL, and STRATIO toward 0. 
Applying the revised prediction equation (5.2) to the baseline ELS sample (n=3,907) 
results in new Overachievement Index (HSGPA) values for ELS students. In some cases, those 
revised Index values relocate ELS students across HSGPA identification thresholds – which are 
held constant. In fact, 32.7% of ELS students are reclassified across one threshold for this Index, 
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and 2% are reclassified across two thresholds. Specifically, these changes are directional: all the 
ELS students who are reclassified are granted more additional consideration than they were 
under the original prediction equation, based on the restricted ELS sample. The contingency 
table (5.3) below details this phenomenon. Table 5.3 provides an empirical example of Index-
specific classification changes visually represented in Figure 5.1. 
Table 5.3. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (HSGPA), Following the 
Removal of Restrictions to ELS Sample 
 
With the revised prediction equation, 26% of ELS students are classified as high 
overachievers and nearly 18% are classified as extraordinary overachievers (as indicated by the 
Column Sum in Table 5.3). With ELS sample restrictions in place, those numbers are 18% and 
3%, respectively (as indicated by the Row Sum). In contrast, classification changes under the 
Disadvantage Index and the SAT and ACT Overachievement Indices are less drastic. Most 
students with a non-missing admissions test score applied to college, while students who did not 
apply to college (the students included in the relaxed sample) were unlikely to have taken an 
admissions test. As such, eliminating the requirement that ELS students must have applied to 
college and taken an admissions test does not dramatically change the number of ELS 
observations available for models of college enrollment, ACT scores, or SAT scores. Overall, as 
indicated in Table 5.2, 24% of ELS students were reclassified across one threshold for additional 
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 56.2% 20.2% 1.9% 78.3%
Original High Overachievement 0.0% 5.8% 12.5% 18.3%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 3.3%
Column Sum 56.2% 26.0% 17.8% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (HSGPA)
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consideration (primary/secondary factor), and 0.4% were reclassified across two thresholds. 
Those results are disaggregated in the contingency table (5.4) below. 
Table 5.4. Changes in Classifications for Additional Consideration, Following the Removal of 
ELS Sample Restrictions 
 
As shown in Table 5.4, identifications for additional consideration increase with removal 
of CU‟s sample restrictions. Of those ELS students reclassified (i.e., all those not located on the 
main diagonal in Table 5.4), 81% were granted more additional consideration. Note that in Table 
5.4, some ELS students actually receive lower levels of additional consideration given the 
revised sample. These reductions in additional consideration owe to compensating changes to 
ELS students‟ Disadvantage Index values, where about 6% of the ELS sample was reclassified 
either from severe to moderate disadvantage, or from moderate to no disadvantage. Classification 
changes for that Index are presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5. Changes in Classifications for the Disadvantage Index, Following the Removal of 
Restrictions to ELS Sample 
 
Revised
None
Secondary 
Factor Primary Factor Row Sum
None 23.8% 7.5% 0.4% 31.7%
Original Secondary Factor 2.3% 27.6% 11.9% 41.8%
Primary Factor 0.0% 2.4% 24.1% 26.5%
Column Sum 26.1% 37.5% 36.4% 100.0%
Additional Consideration
Revised
No Disadvantage
Moderate 
Disadvantage
Severe 
Disadvantage Row Sum
No Disadvantage 48.5% 1.7% 0.0% 50.2%
Original Moderate Disadvantage 2.7% 34.0% 0.6% 37.4%
Severe Disadvantage 0.0% 3.1% 9.4% 12.4%
Column Sum 51.2% 38.8% 10.0% 100.0%
Disadvantage Index
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Changes to Disadvantage Index values were modest, but the Disadvantage Index counts 
as much toward additional consideration as all three of the Overachievement Indices. As such, 
fewer identifications of disadvantage somewhat mitigate the increases in HSGPA 
overachievement measures summarized in Table 5.3. Simply put, introducing ELS students who 
did not apply to college and did not take admissions tests tended to substantially increase 
measures of overachievement in the baseline ELS sample (n=3,907) and slightly decrease 
measures of disadvantage. 
The example above, using HSGPA, should offer insight regarding the process by which 
adjustments are made (e.g., “altering the sample” at the top of Figure 5.1) and the practical 
impact of those adjustments is evaluated (e.g., “practical significance” at the bottom of Figure 
5.1). Due to space constraints, remaining sensitivity analyses in this chapter are not covered in 
such detail. However, for those interested in a summary of classification changes more detailed 
than Table 5.2, task-specific contingency tables are included in Appendix 5.1. As with all other 
sensitivity analyses presented in this section, results of lifting ELS sample restrictions suggest 
the architects of class-based affirmative action systems face a critically important sampling 
decision should they choose to model HSGPA on individual- and school-level socioeconomic 
characteristics. In this case, lifting restrictions on ELS appears to be the proper course of action. 
First, the imposition of restrictive criteria in the original formulation of the Disadvantage and 
Overachievement Indices severely restricted the range of students eligible for consideration in 
the HSGPA model. Second, the range restriction may be systematic: Requiring students in the 
HSGPA model to have applied to college creates an artificially high floor on the range of 
HSGPAs in the sample under consideration. Finally, upon reflection, restricting the ELS sample 
was motivated by CU‟s original definition of a target population for this class-based system 
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(those who apply to college and take admissions tests), which may have been misguided. Such a 
sample will yield estimates of disadvantage and overachievement given application, and it is 
useful to consider the broader pool of high school students who could conceivably apply to 
college. In the next section, this issue is considered in more depth. 
Modeling Application to College 
Another critical issue in the construction of class-based systems is the likelihood 
disadvantaged students will apply to college. The Disadvantage Index is based on an estimated 
probability of enrollment in college. It is possible, however, that some students‟ low SES 
substantially reduces their chances of applying to college in the first place. If that were the case, 
low-SES students‟ estimated probabilities of enrollment in college would be artificially high. 
This section presents an analysis that addresses this concern.  A simple binary logistic regression 
model of application to a four-year college is estimated as a starting point. Independent variables 
in this model include a compulsory composite (reading / math) achievement score from 10
th
 
grade, the ELS SES measure F1SES2R, and the interaction of the two. The achievement measure 
has a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. The SES measure is a standard normal 
composite. Appendix 5.2, presents parameter estimates from this basic model of application to 
college. It is important to note that the ELS dataset is uniquely suited to this research task: Each 
student in that study participated in standardized achievement test in 10
th
 grade, so models 
estimating the relationship between achievement, SES, and college application can capitalize on 
the full ELS sample. 
This simple logistic regression model suggests the presence of a strong association 
between the likelihood of college application and the interaction of achievement and SES. 
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Specifically, for students at higher levels of achievement, low SES substantially reduces the 
probability of application to college. The impact of achievement, SES, and their interaction on 
application to college are best illustrated through a prototypical plot, provided in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3. Probability of Application to College, by Achievement and SES
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the interaction of achievement and SES allows the slopes of 
ogives to differ when SES is fixed at SES = -1, SES = 0, and SES = 1. These three levels of SES 
represent students roughly one standard deviation below the mean, students at the mean, and 
students roughly one standard deviation above the mean. It would seem as though the 
relationship between achievement and college application is mediated by SES, where decreases 
in SES flatten the relationship between achievement and the probability of application. This 
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suggests an adjustment to the Disadvantage Index prediction equation may be necessary. There 
are some applicants who are not only unlikely to attend college, but who are also – owing to SES 
– quite unlikely to apply in the first place.  
The adjustment to be applied to the Disadvantage Index is developed by the equations 
below. First, recall from Chapter 4 (p. 45) the probability of enrollment in college is calculated 
as a function of a vector of socioeconomic variables (Xi) and a vector of achievement variables 
(Zi): 
        
            
              
 
(5.3) 
Above, P(Ei = 1) represents the probability of enrollment in college unadjusted for the 
probability of application to college. To calculate the probability of application to college, a 
similar binary logistic regression model is specified: 
        
            
              
 
(5.4) 
Next, the probability of enrollment – adjusted for the probability of application – is 
calculated as the product of the two probabilities estimated in Equations 5.3 and 5.4: 
                                                                              
 (5.5) 
Of course, determinations of disadvantage in this class-based system are not made solely 
via estimated enrollment probabilities, but rather by the extent to which those probabilities have 
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been reduced by socioeconomic circumstance. As such, two probabilities are calculated for each 
applicant. The first is                                  , which represents the adjusted 
probability that applicant i will enroll in college given his achievement measures (Xi) and 
socioeconomic measures (Zi). The second is                                
  , where 
socioeconomic measures have been fixed at those of a typical CU applicant – represented by the 
substitution of    for   . The adjusted Disadvantage Index (DI*) represents the difference 
between these two estimated probabilities: 
DI*i =                                                                  
   
(5.6) 
In Equations 5.3 through 5.6, students are indexed by i (i = 1,…,I). Ei and Ai are 
dichotomous variables that take a value of “1” when student i enrolls in or applies to a four-year 
college, respectively. These variables take a value of “0” otherwise. Let Xi be a vector of 
achievement variables and Zi be a vector of socioeconomic variables included in the 
Disadvantage Index.  
The vectors Xi and Zi are altered somewhat from the original formulation of the 
Disadvantage Index (described in Chapter 4), and these changes require careful explanation here. 
A model in which application to college is the outcome of interest – rather than college 
enrollment – requires a revised set of independent variables. First, the model of application to 
college uses a 10
th
-grade achievement test score (compulsory for ELS students) rather than SAT 
or ACT scores. This was necessary because inclusion of SAT or ACT scores as standardized 
achievement measures excludes most of the ELS students who did not apply to college. Second, 
incorporating the necessary interaction term (SES*achievement) required construction of a 
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continuous SES measure. The SES measure must be calculable using CU data, because SES 
values for the typical CU applicant are required for the Disadvantage Index. This measure is 
based on parents‟ highest level of education and family income; it is the average of those 
variables once they have been standardized about their means.  
Unfortunately, this leads to two distinct Xi and Zi vectors – one specific to a model of 
college enrollment and another specific to a model of college application. Calculating a joint 
probability on the left-hand side of Equation 5.5 requires a constant set of socioeconomic and 
achievement predictors. As such, for this task, the model of college enrollment (Equation 5.3) 
includes the independent variables (1) 10
th
-grade achievement and (2) composite SES. These 
independent variables replace (1) ACT and SAT scores, and (2) parents‟ education and family 
income, respectively. For this task, the 10
th
-grade achievement measure may serve as an 
acceptable proxy for SAT or ACT scores, because these measures are highly correlated. In ELS, 
the correlation between 10
th
-grade achievement and SAT combined scores is 0.81, while the 
correlation between 10
th
-grade achievement and ACT composite scores is 0.82.  
Figure 5.4 includes a prototypical plot to illustrate the changes to estimated enrollment 
probabilities resulting from the adjustment detailed in Equation 5.5.  
  
88 
 
Figure 5.4. College Enrollment Probability, Adjusted for Application Probability 
 
First, Figure 5.4 suggests across-the-board decreases in the estimated probability of 
enrollment. This is to be expected, because the proposed adjustment involves multiplication of 
an estimated probability of enrollment by an estimated probability of application, which will 
always be less than 1. More importantly, the adjustments are differential. For example, for a 
middle-SES
11
 student with achievement one standard deviation above the mean, the probability 
of enrollment in college is reduced nine percentage points. In contrast, a low-SES
12
 student at the 
same achievement level has his probability of enrollment adjusted down 27 percentage points.  
                            
11
 For illustrative purposes, I define a middle-SES applicant as (1) income between $50,000 and $75,000, (2) 
parents‟ highest level of education is 2-year college, (3) non-rural high school, and (4) 30% FRL. 
12
 I define a low-SES applicant as (1) income less than $15,000, (2) parents‟ highest level of education is high 
school diploma, (3) rural high school, and (4) 60% FRL. 
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These adjustments to the model of college enrollment produce substantial changes in the 
Disadvantage Index. Those changes are illustrated via Figure 5.5.  
Figure 5.5. Disadvantage Index, Adjusted for Application Probability 
 
Disadvantage Index values are plotted as a function of 10
th
-grade achievement. The 
curves in Figure 5.5 more clearly illustrate the impact of this adjustment for low-SES applicants. 
If the probability of enrollment were consistently overestimated for low-SES and middle-SES 
students, and for high achievers and low achievers alike, no adjustment to the Disadvantage 
Index would be necessary. In fact, adjusting for the probability of application to college results in 
substantial and systematic changes to measures of disadvantage. Middle-SES students see 
relatively minor changes made to their Disadvantage Index values, while low-SES students – 
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particularly those achieving at high levels – see large downward adjustment to their 
Disadvantage Index values. For example, a middle-SES student with achievement one standard 
deviation above the mean would see his Disadvantage Index value adjusted down approximately 
three percentage points. By contrast, a low-SES student with achievement one standard deviation 
above the mean sees his Disadvantage Index value adjusted down roughly 19 percentage points. 
 Applying the adjusted Disadvantage Index prediction equation to the baseline ELS 
sample begets numerous reclassifications. As shown in Table 5.2, about 22% of the sample is 
reclassified across one threshold, and an additional 4% is reclassified across two thresholds. The 
changes are moderately directional; of those ELS students reclassified, 62% would receive more 
additional consideration. These results suggest the Disadvantage Index should be modified. 
Specifically, when determinations of disadvantage are made using models of college enrollment, 
the probability of college application should be carefully considered. It seems the high school 
students we generally believe should be the primary beneficiaries of class-based affirmative 
action – those who demonstrate high achievement and low SES – are the students most likely to 
be unfairly penalized by overestimated probabilities of college enrollment. 
Including Private School Students by Imputing a School-Wide Poverty Measure 
The first sensitivity analysis in this chapter (broadening the ELS sample) examines the 
effects purposeful sample restriction. In developing the Indices‟ prediction equations, CU also 
inadvertently limited the ELS sample via missing data. The school-wide percentage of students 
receiving free or reduced-price lunch (%FRL) is missing for 34% of students in the ELS 
database. Moreover, these values are missing systematically, for all students attending private 
high schools. As such, private school students were effectively eliminated from the ELS sample 
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for the original formulation of the Indices. If we seek to include private school students in these 
regression models, dropping the variable %FRL is one potential remedy. Still, increases in 
%FRL are associated with (1) a reduced likelihood of enrollment in college and (2) lower 
academic credentials. Another option for incorporating %FRL in Indices models is imputing it at 
the school level when it is missing.  
To impute %FRL, I first executed a rather simple procedure. Students‟ socioeconomic 
status (SES)
13
 is used to predict school-level %FRL for public school students. Specifically, 
mean SES is calculated within each school in the ELS dataset. School-level mean SES becomes 
the independent variable in a regression model, with school-level %FRL as the outcome. The 
relationship between mean school-level SES and school-level %FRL is non-linear, as illustrated 
by the scatterplot in Figure 5.6 below. 
Figure 5.6. School-Level %FRL by Mean School-Level SES in ELS
  
                            
13
 SES is represented in the ELS by the composite variable F1SES2R 
92 
 
The best fitting imputation equation in this case is a quadratic model, where:  
                                           
  
(5.7) 
In Equation 5.7, schools are indexed by s (s = 1,…,S). The independent variable 
MEANSES represents the school-level mean at school s for students who participated in ELS. 
The predicted outcome,     , represents the percentage (ranging from 0 to 100) of students 
who receive free or reduced-price lunch at school s. As evidenced by the intercept in the 
prediction equation above, the predicted %FRL is roughly 21% at a school where mean SES is 0 
(i.e., the middle of the socioeconomic spectrum). Negative SES values are associated with larger 
school-level values of %FRL. The relationship is exponential, such that school-level SES one 
standard deviation below the mean predicts 71% of students are eligible for free or reduced-price 
lunch. The model is heteroskedastic, but no systematic prediction bias (i.e., under-prediction or 
over-prediction) is evident. This school-level quadratic model explains 47% of the variance in 
%FRL.  
Ultimately, however, many admissions departments may not be able to recreate the SES 
measure F1SES2R in ELS. It relies on a measure of parents‟ occupational prestige, and both 
parents‟ education levels. Placing each parent‟s occupation on a quantitative scale requires 
accurate reporting and coding of applicants‟ parents‟ jobs. Such coding is not feasible at CU, and 
that is likely the case at many other postsecondary institutions. Still, alternate, more feasible 
models for imputing school-level %FRL may produce better estimates. Specifically, mean 
school-level parents‟ highest education level and family income, used as independent variables, 
produce an imputation model that explains more variance in %FRL (R
2
=0.6) than the quadratic 
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model in Equation 5.7. In this variation, school-level %FRL is imputed using the predictors (1) 
mean, school-level, parents‟ highest education level, (2) mean, school-level family income level, 
and (3) the interaction of the two. Like the quadratic model above, this model also exhibits 
heteroskedasticity, but there is no evidence of systematic prediction bias. That imputation 
equation is specified as follows:  
                                                    
                               
(5.8) 
In Equation 5.8, schools are again indexed by s. Furthermore, MEANParentEd refers to 
the school-level mean at school s of the highest level of parental education for students who 
participated in ELS. Likewise, MEANIncome refers to the school-level mean at school s of the 
family income level for students who participated in ELS. The interaction term 
MEANParentEd*MEANIncome is the product of these two variables. Levels of ParentEd range 
from 0 to 6, while levels of family income range from 0 to 5. The coefficients in Equation 5.8 
describe an intuitive phenomenon: Low levels of mean parents‟ education and mean income are 
associated with high levels of %FRL.  
Of course, imputed %FRL values are only useful insofar as they serve as an adequate 
proxy for observed %FRL in models of college enrollment and high school academic credentials. 
If models using imputed %FRL values do relatively well accounting for variation in these 
outcomes, imputing %FRL may be a reasonable remedy for high rates of missing data in ELS. 
To investigate this issue empirically, all Indices models are re-estimated, using only public 
school students in ELS. For these students, %FRL is not missing. Each Index model is estimated 
three ways, using a constant sample: Once without %FRL, once with the observed %FRL, and 
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once with the imputed %FRL. Table 5.6 presents the variance explained by each of these models. 
To aid in interpretation, Table 5.6 includes a simple, albeit somewhat crude, measure of “added 
predictive power.” That statistic is intended to capture the gains in variance explained associated 
with imputing %FRL (as opposed to discarding it), as a share of the variance explained using the 
observed %FRL values. 
Table 5.6. Changes in Variance Explained Following Imputation of %FRL 
 
 Table 5.6 suggests imputing %FRL using parents‟ education and family income adds 
predictive power to models of ACT and SAT scores. For the ACT model, R
2
 increases from 0.16 
to 0.19 following the imputation. For the SAT model, R
2
 increases from 0.14 to 0.18. The value-
add associated with imputed %FRL is less for models of HSGPA and college enrollment. It 
appears that generally, %FRL exhibits comparatively little influence on those outcomes. Two 
important points should be emphasized here. First, and perhaps obviously, imputed %FRL values 
should only be used in cases where observed %FRL is missing for an ELS student. Second, and 
less obvious, the measures of added predictive power displayed in Table 5.5 are only useful 
descriptors of the extent to which imputed %FRL approximates observed %FRL if parameter 
estimates from regression models employing imputed %FRL are not drastically altered. In this 
case, parameter estimates are stable across observed %FRL and imputed %FRL models of 
R
2
 Without 
%FRL
R
2
 Observed 
%FRL
R
2
 Imputed 
%FRL
Added 
Predictive 
Power
a
College Enrollment
b 0.300 0.316 0.313 4%
HSGPA 0.120 0.129 0.125 4%
ACT 0.162 0.196 0.188 13%
SAT 0.141 0.189 0.179 20%
a
Added Predictive Power is calculated as (R
2
 Imputed %FRL - R
2
 Without %FRL)/(R
2
 Observed %FRL)
b
Variance explained for college enrollment is Nagelkerke R
2
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college enrollment and academic credentials. In particular, parameter estimates for parents‟ 
education and family income – the two variables used to impute %FRL at the school level – 
remain largely unchanged when imputed %FRL models are specified. 
Imputing %FRL where it is missing allows the incorporation of data for a large number 
of private school students. With all other original restrictions still in place, available observations 
increase from 3,907 to 6,294. The broadened sample results in revised parameter estimates and 
substantial classification changes in the ELS baseline sample of 3,907. More than 19% of ELS 
students are reclassified across one threshold, and nearly 2% are reclassified across two 
thresholds. The reclassification is almost uniformly directional: of those ELS students 
reclassified, 95% would be granted more additional consideration (e.g., from secondary to 
primary factor) than under the original specification. These changes are to be expected; the 
infusion of wealthier private school students into the distribution of ELS students brings into 
sharper relief the relative disadvantage of low-SES ELS students. As such, the imputation of 
%FRL (and the attendant inclusion of private school students) represents a critical decision point 
for the architects of class-based affirmative action systems. This is especially relevant if those 
architects choose to employ ELS when developing class-based systems. These findings suggest 
%FRL may be imputed without sacrificing substantial amounts of explanatory power.  
Adding a School-Level College-Going Measure  
As noted in Chapter 4, the socioeconomic and high school achievement variables used in 
the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices are restricted by what could be gathered from the 
CU application for undergraduate admission, or collected from an otherwise reliable source. 
Still, it is reasonable to believe these constraints may not apply in other contexts (e.g., at other 
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universities or in future admissions cycles at CU). This analysis considers the use of an 
additional socioeconomic predictor variable for the Indices: the percentage of seniors at an 
applicant‟s high school moving on to four-year colleges (%COLLEGE). This variable was 
chosen because while it is a plausible candidate for use in future class-based systems, it is not yet 
collected systematically. Indeed, 35% of the values for this variable are missing in ELS. 
The variable %COLLEGE is operationalized in ELS as the percentage of seniors 
graduating in 2003 who enrolled in four-year colleges. Because so many values are missing, the 
available sample for this task was reduced from 3,907 to 3,327. The addition of %COLLEGE as 
an independent variable to models of college enrollment and high school academic credentials 
results in numerous classification changes. As introduced in Table 5.2, more than 30% of ELS 
students are reclassified across one threshold, and an additional 2% are reclassified across two 
thresholds. The reclassifications are directional, but not overwhelmingly so: Of the ELS students 
reclassified, 58% would receive more additional consideration. This is generally driven by 
changes in Disadvantage Index classifications, which should not be surprising. Parameter 
estimates suggest %COLLEGE is positively associated with an applicant‟s likelihood of 
attending a four-year college. In addition, %COLLEGE is associated with ACT and SAT scores, 
but has little association with HSGPA. The partial association between %COLLEGE, college 
enrollment, and academic credentials argues strongly in favor of its inclusion in measures of 
disadvantage and overachievement.  
Unfortunately, the Achilles‟ heel of %COLLEGE is its high rate of missing data in ELS. 
Its restrictive effect on the available sample must, in this case, exclude it from consideration. 
Moreover, to my knowledge, the high-school-level percentage of students going on to four-year 
colleges is not collected systematically outside ELS. As such, postsecondary institutions may 
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lack the resources to collect this information from applicants. In the future, if these data were 
collected systematically and made public, %COLLEGE would be an excellent candidate for 
making determinations of disadvantage and overachievement. 
Comprehensively Revised ELS Samples and Indices Models 
To conclude the presentation of Research Question 1 findings, I examine the cumulative 
impact of the adjustments described above. Of course, previous sections of this chapter offer 
more detailed information regarding the discrete effects of individual adjustments. However, 
from this section the reader should glean a general sense of the effect of implementing the sum 
total of these modifications. Those changes include: (1) relaxing purposeful sample restrictions 
in ELS, (2) adjusting the Disadvantage Index to account for the likelihood of application to 
college, and (3) imputing %FRL to include private school students. Parameter estimates for 
comprehensively revised models of college enrollment and academic credentials, along with the 
model of application to college, are included in Appendix 5.3. 
One of the goals of these adjustments was the inclusion of additional available 
observations in ELS. These modifications succeeded in broadening the sample used for 
estimation: The Disadvantage Index sample size increased 113% (from 3,907 to 8,340); the 
Overachievement Index (HSGPA) sample size increased 255% (3,907 to 13,904); the 
Overachievement Index (ACT) sample size increased 42% (3,907 to 5,530); and the 
Overachievement Index (SAT) sample size increased 37% (907 to 5,353). These increases owe 
to the elimination of restrictions on the ELS sample and the imputation of %FRL to include 
private school students.  
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Implementing all of these modifications results in substantial reclassification in ELS. 
More than 44% of ELS students are reclassified across one threshold, and 3.4% are reclassified 
across two thresholds. Again, reclassifications are directional: 79% of those reclassified would 
be granted more additional consideration. The increases in identification rates should not be 
surprising. With respect to the Disadvantage Index, including private school students and 
adjusting for the likelihood of application to college increased the chances that low-SES students 
would be identified as having experienced disadvantage. With respect to the HSGPA model, the 
introduction of students who did not apply to college (and had lower HSGPAs) increased the 
likelihood of overachievement identifications for higher achieving students already in the 
sample. Such large and directional reclassification rates also required revisiting the identification 
thresholds for additional consideration. As noted in Chapter 4 (p. 62), admissions officers at CU 
prefer that roughly 30% of the applicant pool be identified by this class-based system for 
additional consideration. This normative consideration requires iterative adjustment of the 
thresholds, using the sort of impact data I have presented in this chapter: As modifications to the 
Indices yield higher likelihoods of class-based identifications, the thresholds for identification 
must be made more stringent. The alternative to changing identification thresholds would be 
allowing far greater numbers of undergraduate applicants to be identified for additional 
consideration, which would not be feasible for many admissions departments. To sum, technical 
choices made during the creation of class-based affirmative action systems can have sizeable 
impacts. This chapter has highlighted particular decision points with substantial consequences. 
The following chapters examine the impact of putting CU‟s class-based system into practice. 
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Impact of Class-Based Approach on Acceptance Rates 
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In this chapter I evaluate the impact of class-based affirmative action on undergraduate 
acceptance rates in order to answer Research Questions 2:  
To what extent does the implementation of CU’s class-based affirmative action policy 
change the likelihood of acceptance for low-SES and minority students? 
This investigation hinges on two experiments, one conducted in 2009, and another in 
2010. The 2009 experiment was designed to compare race-based and class-based affirmative 
action. The 2010 iteration was designed to compare a race-based policy with an admissions 
framework where both race and class are considered.  
Comparing Race-Based and Class-Based Affirmative Action 
Methods 
In November, 2008 – after the initial development of the Disadvantage and 
Overachievement Indices – the Colorado Civil Rights Initiative was defeated. The voters‟ 
rejection of Amendment 46 presented CU with an opportunity further “beta test” the Indices, 
comparing admissions decisions made under a class-based approach to those made under the 
official race-based policy. To gauge the effect of implementing a class-based approach to replace 
race-based admissions, I designed a small-scale repeated measures experiment. Four hundred 
eighty applications from the full applicant pool (i.e., all students applying for admission for Fall 
2009). Of the 480 applications sampled, 478 had sufficient information to be included in this 
experiment.
14
 Each of the selected applications had already been reviewed under the race-based 
policy. An additional review of each sampled application was conducted using CU‟s class-based 
                            
14
 The two applications that did not have sufficiently complete applications were both missing cumulative high 
school GPAs and admissions test scores.  
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approach, with all race identifiers removed. Application review using the Indices was considered 
the treatment condition. The official review – using the race-based policy rather than the Indices 
– was the control condition. It is critical to note that the differences between the treatment and 
control conditions are actually two-fold. First, the treatment condition involves a class-based 
application review, while the control condition uses a race-based review. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, a class-based identification may constitute a primary factor, while minority 
status (i.e., a race-based identification) is a secondary factor. Thus, class-based identifications 
are privileged, relative to race-based identifications.  
In this experiment, admissions officers used the original normative thresholds for 
classification under the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices (see Chapter 4, pp. 63). Ten 
admissions officers participated in this experiment. Each reviewed roughly 50 applications, and 
no reviewer evaluated the same application twice. In this experimental framework, each 
application functioned as its own counterfactual; I was able to observe both the outcome of the 
treatment (i.e., class-based affirmative action) and what would otherwise have occurred had the 
treatment not been administered (i.e., race-based affirmative action). It is important to 
acknowledge that this experiment utilized random sampling, but not random assignment. 
Random sampling provides generalizability, but random assignment would have addressed some 
threats to internal validity. Those threats are discussed at the conclusion of this section. 
A key focus of this analysis was the extent to which CU‟s class-based approach is able to 
“recover” rates of admission for minority applicants in the absence of race-based affirmative 
action. Another focus is the academic credentials of students admitted under each condition. 
While CU aims to enroll a socioeconomically and racially diverse incoming class, like many 
postsecondary institutions it is unwilling to sacrifice selectivity standards to do so. As such, it is 
102 
 
important to investigate whether or not these changes to admissions policies would be associated 
with significant changes in the academic qualifications of admitted classes. 
Findings 
Results from the 2009 randomized experiment indicated that low-SES applicants were 
more likely to be admitted under class-based than under race-based affirmative action. In 
addition, underrepresented minority (URM) applicants (i.e., Blacks, Hispanics, and Native 
Americans) are more likely to be admitted under the class-based approach than under the race-
based policy. The differences in acceptance rates for low- and severely-low-SES students are 
statistically significant. The difference for URM applicants is not. Hypothesis testing was carried 
out using McNemar‟s test of correlated proportions (McNemar, 1947). These results are 
summarized in Table 6.1. Within the experimental sample, 25% of applicants were low-SES, 7% 
were severely low-SES
15
, and ten percent were URM. Finally, overall acceptance rates were 
similar across experimental conditions, at 76% under the class-based policy and 74% under the 
race-based policy. 
Table 6.1. Acceptance Rates by Admissions Condition and Subgroup 
 
                            
15
 A low-SES applicant is defined as having either low parental income (i.e., less than $60,000) or low parental 
education (i.e., neither parent received a college degree). Severely low-SES applicants exhibit both low parental 
income and low parental education. 
N Class-based Race-based Difference
Low SES 121 81% 72% 9%**
Severely Low SES 35 83% 63% 20%*
URM 48 65% 56% 9%
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
Applicant Type
Acceptance Rate
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It is not surprising that acceptance rates improve for low-SES students under CU‟s class-
based system. The approach was designed specifically to identify such applicants for additional 
consideration. Further, this result aligns with findings from simulation and empirical studies that 
informed this work (Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Sander, 1997; Carnevale & Rose, 2004). On 
the other hand, the increase in acceptance rates for URMs under the class-based approach 
(relative to the race-based approach) would seem to contradict simulations and empirical work 
completed to date (Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Espenshade & Chung, 2005; Sander, 1997; 
Bowen & Bok, 1998; Bowen, Kurzweil, & Tobin, 2005; Carnevale & Rose, 2004). It is also 
important to note that, like any class-based approach, the Indices are not perfect identifiers of 
URM applicants. In the case of this experiment, 65% of URM applicants were identified in some 
way by the Indices, although 79% of those identified were conferred additional consideration in 
the form of a primary factor. 
This seemingly contradictory finding highlights the importance of the amount of 
additional consideration offered by identification in class-based affirmative action. The class-
based approach at CU is comparatively privileged in this context: Under the Disadvantage and 
Overachievement Indices, identification can grant primary factor consideration. Under race-
based affirmative action at CU, minority status is a secondary factor. These qualitative 
distinctions are further illustrated by way of a few binary logistic regression analyses. Using the 
full experimental sample (n=478), these regressions examine the influence of various applicant 
factors on the probability of admission to CU under both race-based and class-based admissions 
conditions. Holding constant high school GPA and standardized test scores, applicants identified 
in any way by the Indices are 2.2 times more likely to be admitted as those not identified. 
Applicants identified for primary factor consideration are 5.7 times more likely to be admitted. 
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Under CU‟s race-based policy (again controlling for grades and test scores), URMs are 1.4 times 
more likely than non-URMs to be admitted. Because just over half of URMs receive primary 
factor consideration, URM applicants are 2.4 times more likely than non-URMs to be admitted 
under CU‟s class-based system. Thus, the interpretation seems relatively straightforward: 
Although the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices are somewhat inefficient identifiers of 
minority applicants, minorities that this approach does identify are usually granted more 
consideration than they would receive under race-based affirmative action. In other words, (1) a 
high rate of primary factor identification for URMs and (2) the distinction between primary and 
secondary factor identification drive favorable results for the class-based approach. 
Another critical component of the 2009 experiment focused on the academic credentials 
of students admitted under each condition. There was little difference in qualifications across 
experimental groups. A summary is provided in Table 6.2. Standard deviations are presented 
parenthetically. 
Table 6.2. High School Academic Credentials of Applicants, by Experimental Condition and 
Admissions Decision, 2009 Experiment 
 
Class-based Race-based Class-based Race-based
N 370 349 108 129
Mean High School GPA
3.56
(0.39 )
3.58
(0.38 )
2.73
(0.31 )
2.8
(0.34 )
Mean ACT Composite
26
(3.7 )
27
(3.6 )
23
(4 )
23
(4.2 )
Mean SAT Combined
1197
(147 )
1207
(136 )
1048
(134 )
1028
(142 )
Accepted Applicants Refused Applicants
Measure
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High school GPAs and ACT scores are nearly identical among accepted students across 
conditions, while SAT scores were slightly higher among students accepted under the race-based 
policy. Observed similarities across experimental conditions in accepted students‟ grades and test 
scores suggest replacing race-based affirmative action with a class-based approach will not 
substantially affect aggregate measures of academic qualifications. Recall from Chapter 4 that 
class-based affirmative action at CU relies not only on a measure of disadvantage, but also on a 
measure of overachievement. In fact, the Overachievement Indices help balance academic 
credentials of accepted students across class-based and race-based conditions. This balance 
would not be possible if CU‟s class-based system sought to measure only disadvantage. To wit – 
students who were (1) accepted under the class-based approach, (2) identified by the 
Disadvantage Index, and (3) not identified by any of the Overachievement Indices had markedly 
lower HSGPAs, ACT scores, and SAT scores. The mean HSGPA for this group was 3.08; the 
mean ACT score was 21; and the mean SAT score was 950. The Overachievement Indices seem 
to play an important role ensuring this class-based system does not impact measures of academic 
strength for freshman classes. 
Table 6.3 presents a more nuanced look at academic credentials for admitted classes. 
Here, applicants are differentiated according to the four possible results from this experiment: (1) 
admitted under the class-based system but not under the race-based system, (2) admitted under 
the race-based system but not under the class-based system, (3) admitted under both, and (4) 
refused under both. 
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Table 6.3. Comparison of Academic Credentials by Category of Admissions Decision, 2009 
Experiment 
 
As we might expect, applicants accepted under the Disadvantage and Overachievement 
Indices who were not accepted under race-based affirmative action (lower-left quadrant of Table 
6.3) exhibit marginal academic credentials. These students had, on average, substantially lower 
HSGPAs and test scores than students admitted under both experimental conditions (upper-left 
quadrant). In fact, their mean SAT score is lower than the mean SAT score for applicants refused 
under both conditions (lower-right quadrant). Admissions officers noted that the students 
admitted under the class-based approach but refused under the race-based system do not exhibit 
academic credentials that would preclude success at CU. Still, their substantially lower academic 
Class-based: Accept
Race-based: Accept
Class-based: Refuse
Race-based: Accept
N 334 18
Mean High School GPA
3.6
(0.37 )
2.89
(0.26 )
Mean ACT Composite
27
(3.5 )
24
(4 )
Mean SAT Combined
1209
(137 )
1132
(89 )
Class-based: Accept
Race-based: Refuse
Class-based: Refuse
Race-based: Refuse
N 31 95
Mean High School GPA
3.09
(0.29 )
2.71
(0.31 )
Mean ACT Composite
23
(4.7 )
22
(4 )
Mean SAT Combined
992
(167 )
1037
(135 )
Admissions Decision
Measure
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credentials constitute a noteworthy research finding, which raises questions about their chances 
of success in college. This issue is addressed in depth in Chapter 7. 
Finally, the design of the 2009 experiment raises some internal validity concerns. 
Specifically, the conditions of this experiment may not realistically reflect the environment in 
which admissions officers make decisions. The treatment condition (review via the Disadvantage 
and Overachievement Indices, without consideration of race) constituted an unofficial 
admissions decision. The official decision had been rendered by way of the race-based policy. 
Under these circumstances, it is possible that admissions officers gave more weight to 
identification under the Indices than they would have had these class-based decisions been “for 
keeps.” As such, acceptance rates for low-SES and URM applicants under the class-based 
condition may be biased upwards.  
Comparing Race-Based and Class-Plus-Race Affirmative Action 
Methods 
 Race-conscious admissions policies remain legal in Colorado, and the CU Office of 
Admissions continues to implement them. For the Fall 2011 admissions cycle, CU moved to a 
hybrid “class-plus-race” affirmative action framework. Race is used as it has in the past (i.e., as a 
secondary factor), and the new class-based system is implemented as detailed in Table 4.7 in 
Chapter 4. To evaluate the likely impact of this change, I conducted a randomized controlled 
experiment in 2010. This analysis was crafted to address three shortcomings inherent in the 2009 
experiment. First, as noted above, that experiment did not employ random assignment of 
applicants to class-based and race-based frameworks for official decision-making. Second, that 
study was designed to evaluate race-based versus class-based comparisons. This is a useful 
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exercise, because many universities are forced to move immediately from a race-based to a class-
based approach when Civil Rights Initiatives do, in fact, pass (Long, 2004; Long, 2007). The 
University of Colorado is not, however, implementing a class-only approach at present, so it is 
important to examine the shift from a race-based to a class-plus-race system. This analysis may 
prove instructive to those universities who plan to phase-in class-based affirmative action 
alongside a race-conscious admissions program. Third, the original experiment relied on a rather 
small sample of low-SES and URM applicants, and was drawn from the full applicant pool. 
Many applicants – specifically, those with either outstanding or particularly unimpressive 
academic credentials – will not be substantially affected by identification under the Indices.  
To address these concerns, I was granted permission by the Office of Admissions to test 
the effects of using the Indices in official admissions decisions. As a starting point, 2,000 
“borderline” applications were randomly sampled from the Fall 2010 pool. This group was 
composed of applications the Office of Admissions has determined are neither clear refusals nor 
clear admits. Prior research on college admissions suggests that identification by a class-based 
affirmative action system will likely carry the most weight for applicants fitting this profile 
(Willingham & Breland, 1982). As noted in Chapter 3, admissions decisions for borderline 
applicants are collaborative in nature. All such applications are discussed in depth during 
Committees of the Whole. When considering applicants on the cusp of admission, no admissions 
counselor makes a final decision (i.e., admit or refuse) in isolation. As such, it is not possible 
within this experimental framework to identify counselor-specific effects. 
Half the sample was randomly assigned to application review using both race and the 
Indices (i.e., a class-plus-race approach), and the other half to review using race-based 
affirmative action only. Those who undergo class-plus-race review are considered the treatment 
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group. Those reviewed under the race-based approach comprise the control group. Unlike the 
2009 experiment, this task used the standard-setting thresholds for identification under the 
Indices (see Table 4.6 in Chapter 4). In this iteration, and similarly in contrast to the 2009 
experiment, admissions decisions under both conditions were official. While it may be tempting 
to compare the results from the 2009 experiment to those of the 2010 experiment, some 
weaknesses must be acknowledged at the outset. First, the 2010 experiment uses a modified 
treatment – class-plus-race affirmative action rather than class-based affirmative action – as a 
replacement for the race-based control condition. Second, identification thresholds in the 2010 
experiment are standard-setting-based, rather than normative. Finally, the 2010 experiment 
examines a different population – borderline applicants – than the 2009 experiment, which drew 
from the full applicant pool. With so many adjustments from one experiment to the next, it is 
safest to view these experiments‟ results as complimentary, but not directly comparable.  
Philosophical and logistical challenges to the 2010 experiment also merit discussion. 
First, random assignment is not easily accomplished in educational settings (Gueron, 2002; 
Boruch, 1997). Controlled experiments often face ethical challenges, especially if investigators 
suspect the treatment administered may offer such a benefit that denial of that treatment could be 
considered unjust. Similarly, in this case, gaining permission from the Office of Admissions to 
construct a randomized experiment was difficult. Conducting the 2009 experiment was critical to 
this effort. Results from that experiment suggested a favorable effect associated with this class-
based system: At CU, implementing the Indices could improve low-SES applicants‟ acceptance 
rates and at least maintain those of underrepresented minorities. Admissions officers noted the 
successful execution and subsequent dissemination of results from the 2009 experiment paved 
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the way for an additional experiment in which different standards (race-based and class-plus-
race) would be applied to different applicants. 
In addition, conditions were imposed by the Office of Admissions before random 
assignment of applicants to race-based and class-plus-race conditions could be permitted. First, 
the Indices require socioeconomic information that, in prior years, was not collected on the 
undergraduate application. Data systems at CU had not, at the time of the 2010 experiment, been 
adapted to record applicants‟ parents‟ education levels, family income, or language status. As 
such, I manually entered those data – essential for calculating the Indices – from 2,000 hard-copy 
undergraduate applications. Second, in early 2010 no system existed to link the high schools 
listed in applicants‟ files to high-school-level information contained in the NCES Common Core 
of Data (CCD). The University of Colorado categorizes high schools according to numerical 
identifiers maintained by ACT. Unfortunately, there is no crosswalk available for linking those 
numerical codes to the unique identifiers in the CCD. As such, I matched all high schools 
feeding applicants to CU to all high schools listed in the CCD. Algorithms using a combination 
of schools‟ names and postal codes can assist with this link, but much of the work must be done 
by hand. The process required roughly three months to complete. So, although the analyses 
appropriate for a randomized controlled experiment are relatively straightforward (e.g., a simple 
comparison of mean outcomes), the legwork necessary to pull these studies off is occasionally 
difficult and often time-consuming. 
As with the first experiment, outcomes of interest here include acceptance rates for low-
SES and URM applicants and academic credentials of admitted students across experimental 
conditions. The few available simulation studies that compare race-based affirmative action to a 
class-plus-race policy indicate that the latter approach can be expected to substantially improve 
111 
 
campus socioeconomic diversity and marginally improve racial diversity (Bowen, Kurzweil, & 
Tobin 2005). Specifically, Espenshade and Radford (2009) estimate that for typical working-
class applicants (roughly equivalent to the low-SES applicants from Table 6.1) acceptance rates 
will increase 8.7 percentage points under class-plus-race systems. For lower-class applicants 
(roughly equivalent to the severely low-SES applicants from Table 6.1), acceptance rates should 
increase 2.9 percentage points. Espenshade and Radford predict more modest effects under class-
plus-race affirmative action for Blacks and Hispanics. Their findings suggest acceptance rates for 
these groups should increase about 1.2 percentage points. It is important to clarify that 
Espenshade and Radford merely simulated hypothetical class-based considerations, and in doing 
so attached a “legacy-sized” level of additional consideration to a class-based identification. In 
the language of undergraduate admissions at CU, legacy status represents a secondary factor. To 
my knowledge, no studies have yet been conducted that empirically investigate the impact of 
implementing a class-plus-race system in undergraduate admissions. 
Findings 
The results of the second experiment are largely similar to the results of the first. Under 
class-plus-race admissions, low-SES applicants have an increased likelihood of acceptance, 
compared to race-based admissions. These results are summarized in Table 6.4. Within the 
experimental sample, 24% of applicants are low-SES, and 6% are severely low-SES
16
. 
Hypothesis testing was carried out using Fisher‟s exact test (Fisher, 1922). 
 
                            
16
As with the 2009 experiment, a low-SES applicant is defined as having either low parental income (i.e., less than 
$60,000) or low parental education (i.e., neither parent received a college degree). Severely low-SES applicants 
exhibit both low parental income and low parental education.  
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Table 6.4. Acceptance Rates by Admissions Condition for Low-SES Applicants, 2010 Experiment 
 
Although acceptance rates were higher for low-SES applicants under the class-plus-race 
condition, overall acceptance rates were identical across experimental conditions, at 62%. 
Acceptance rates are equivalent because in the race-based condition, a higher percentage of the 
applicants who were neither low-SES nor severely low-SES were accepted, compared to the 
class-plus-race approach. That is, wealthier applicants were more likely to be accepted under the 
race-based condition, and low-income applicants were more likely to be accepted under the 
class-plus-race condition. This phenomenon balanced acceptance rates across conditions. The 
aggregate drop in overall acceptance rates compared to Experiment #1 (62% versus 75%) is to be 
expected, because the sample under consideration here includes only borderline applicants. 
These students have been deemed neither clear admits nor clear refusals, so aggregate acceptance 
rates for this group should be reduced compared to CU‟s relatively high overall acceptance rate 
of 80%. Put simply, the acceptance rate for a borderline applicant group at a given university 
should be closer to 50% than the overall acceptance rate at that university. 
The results presented in Table 6.4 should not be surprising. The differences in acceptance 
rates for low-SES applicants align nicely with Espenshade and Radford‟s (2009) predictions for 
working-class applicants, although effects for severely low-SES applicants are larger than that 
N Acceptance Rate N Acceptance Rate
Low SES 212 58% 195 49% 9%*
Severely Low SES 54 57% 55 44% 13%
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
a
 n = 901
b
 n = 912
Applicant Type Difference
Class-Plus-Race
a
Race-Based
b
113 
 
simulation predicted (see p. 111 of this chapter). As emphasized elsewhere, these measures were 
designed specifically to identify and grant additional consideration to low-SES applicants; their 
acceptance rates should improve when compared to admissions absent class-based 
considerations. This main effect is illustrated simply by way of logistic regression analysis. First, 
holding constant high school GPA and standardized test scores, applicants in the class-plus-race 
condition identified in any way by the Indices (i.e., secondary or primary factor consideration) 
are 2.3 times more likely to be admitted as those not identified. Applicants who earn primary 
factor consideration are 4.2 times more likely to be admitted. 
In addition, acceptance rates for URM applicants improved under the class-plus-race 
approach. Those results are presented in Table 6.5. Here, 13% of the sample are URMs and 5% 
are both low-SES and URMs. Again, in this case, the Indices are somewhat inefficient identifiers 
of minority applicants: 55% of URMs are identified in some way by the Indices, although 67% 
of those identified receive primary factor consideration. 
Table 6.5. Acceptance Rates by Admissions Condition for Minority Applicants, 2010 Experiment 
 
In and of itself, an increase in acceptance rates for URMs under class-plus-race 
affirmative action is not surprising. Still, the magnitude of the differences in acceptance rates for 
URMs between conditions (17 percentage points) is much larger than would be anticipated based 
on previous simulation studies. Espenshade and Radford‟s simulation study predicted increases 
N Acceptance Rate N Acceptance Rate
URM 118 62% 118 45% 17%**
Low SES and  URM 47 59% 43 27% 32%**
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
Applicant Type Difference
Class-Plus-Race Race-Based
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in acceptance rates around 1.2 percentage points for minorities under class-plus-race affirmative 
action (although their hypothetical class-based system carried only a legacy-sized level of 
additional consideration). The large difference in URM acceptance rates observable here is at 
least partially attributable to sizeable levels of additional consideration associated with a dual 
identification (i.e., being a low-SES and URM applicant) under the class-plus-race approach.  
I will elaborate with a few more logistic regression analyses. First, under CU‟s race-
based policy (again controlling for grades and test scores), borderline URMs are 1.1 times more 
likely than non-URMs to be admitted. Under class-plus-race admissions, URMs are 2.2 times 
more likely than non-URMs to be admitted. Simply put, an interaction exists between URM 
status and identification under the Indices. Under the class-plus-race approach, URMs identified 
in any way by the Indices are 4.9 times more likely to be admitted as URMs not identified. In 
contrast, non-URMs identified by the Indices are 1.9 times more likely to be admitted as non-
URMs not identified by the Indices. A primary factor identification for URMs is particularly 
impactful: Underrepresented minorities who earn primary factor consideration are 9.2 times 
more likely to be admitted. In contrast, non-URMs who earn primary factor consideration are 3.5 
times more likely to be admitted. Essentially, the effects of identification by this class-based 
system are not consistent across race groups. 
The dual identification effect substantially outstrips the levels of additional consideration 
granted to URMs under race-based affirmative action. This sizeable increase in the odds of 
admission for URMs under a class-plus-race approach may be due to uneven application of the 
Indices. Specifically, larger levels of class-based additional consideration are being conferred 
upon URMs than non-URMs. The larger class-based effects for URMs beget substantially 
improved acceptance rates for this group under class-plus-race admissions. In this case, it seems 
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as though the whole (class-based and race-based considerations for low-SES minorities) is 
greater than the sum of its parts. 
This analysis suggests multiple identifications under an affirmative action framework are 
not merely additive. Prior research on this topic has not dealt specifically with class-based and 
race-based considerations, but rather with considerations for athletes, legacies, and minorities. 
Shulman and Bowen (2001) conclude that the presence of multiple identifications in this context 
(e.g., a minority legacy applicant) are roughly additive in their effects on the likelihood of 
admission. Espenshade, Chung, and Walling (2004), on the other hand, conclude that multiple 
identifications for minorities (e.g., a minority athlete) translate to effects that are less than 
additive. My findings point to a slightly different conclusion, although it is critical to note that 
these previous studies did not consider class-based identifications. These results suggest dual 
identification under a class-plus-race system translates to an effect that is larger than the sum of 
separate identification effects. 
As with the 2009 experiment, the academic credentials of accepted classes of applicants 
are a pressing concern for CU. These aggregate statistics – coupled with overall acceptance rates 
– affect a university‟s reputation. Table 6.6 presents high school academic credentials for 
applicants accepted and refused under both conditions. 
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Table 6.6. High School Academic Credentials of Applicants, by Experimental Condition and 
Admissions Decision, 2010 Experiment 
 
In general, this comparison of academic credentials for accepted students yields results 
somewhat similar to those seen in the 2009 experiment. In that instance, high school academic 
credentials were slightly lower for students accepted under class-based as opposed to race-based 
affirmative action. In this experiment, in fact, differences in academic credentials across 
conditions are smaller. High school GPAs of students accepted under class-plus-race affirmative 
action are slightly lower (by two hundredths of a grade point) than the GPAs of students 
accepted under race-based affirmative action. Likewise, SAT scores are lower for the class-plus-
race group (by five points), although ACT scores are virtually identical. None of these 
differences is statistically significant. In this experiment – as with the first – the 
Overachievement Indices prove instrumental in maintaining the rough equivalence of academic 
credentials across the class-plus-race and race-based conditions. Such similarity would not be 
possible if this class-based system relied only on considerations of disadvantage. Mean HSGPAs, 
ACT scores, and SAT scores are substantially lower among those applicants (1) admitted under 
the class-plus-race condition, (2) identified by the Disadvantage Index, and (3) not identified by 
the Overachievement Indices. The mean HSGPA for this subgroup was 2.98; the mean ACT was 
Class-Plus-Race Race-Based Class-Plus-Race Race-Based
N 559 562 342 350
Mean HSGPA
3.16
(0.32 )
3.18
(0.31 )
2.88
(0.34 )
2.9
(0.34 )
Mean ACT Composite
25
(3.5 )
25
(3.2 )
23
(3.6)
23
(3.6)
Mean SAT Combined
1121
(133 )
1125
(135 )
1060
(144 )
1066
(138 )
Accepted Applicants Refused Applicants
Measure
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22; and the mean SAT was 1020. The central lesson here bears repeating: Measures of 
overachievement are critical if a class-based policy intends to leave aggregate measures of 
freshmen academic strength unchanged. 
Examining Sample Attrition 
At this point it is appropriate address a common threat to internal validity in experimental 
research: sample attrition (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Of the 2,000 applications sampled 
for the second experiment, 1,813 were reviewed by admissions officers. There were two reasons 
187 applicants (9.4%) were removed from this sample. For the most part, applicants who had 
been accepted to other postsecondary institutions notified CU of their plans to attend college 
elsewhere and cancelled their applications. Such applicants represented 170 of the 187 who left 
the sample. The remaining 17 were ineligible for review either because they were missing 
critical information on their application or they failed to pay an application processing fee. Table 
6.7 presents aggregate measures of HSGPA, ACT, and SAT scores for students who left and 
remained in each experimental condition. Standard deviations are included parenthetically. Two 
patterns should be immediately evident. First, applicant files that were removed from the sample 
differ systematically from those not removed. Second, for those applicant files remaining in the 
sample, academic credentials are nearly identical across experimental conditions. 
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Table 6.7. High School Academic Credentials of Applicants Remaining in and Withdrawing from 
the Experimental Sample 
  
 The random assignment of applicants to treatment and control groups should ensure 
attrition would be similar across experimental conditions. The descriptive statistics in Table 6.7 
suggest this is the case. Although 11 more applicants left the class-plus-race group than the race-
based group, mean academic credentials are quite similar across conditions for those who 
remained in the sample. Notably, the students who left the sample demonstrate slightly more 
impressive high school academic credentials, especially with respect to HSGPA. This is probably 
to be expected, as the vast majority of applicants who left the sample did so because they had 
already been accepted to a university they preferred above CU. Differences between those who 
left and those who remained, however, do not bias results: Attrition from the sample does not 
appear to be differential with respect to experimental conditions. 
In summary, this chapter has presented some evidence that putting CU‟s class-based 
policy into practice increases acceptance rates for low-SES students, as expected, and increases 
acceptance rates from URMs, more substantially than prior research would suggest. In addition, 
implementing the class-based approach leaves measures of academic credentials for accepted 
Class-Plus-Race 
Condition
Race-Based 
Condition
Class-Plus-Race 
Condition
Race-Based 
Condition
N 100 89 901 912
3.16 3.15 3.06 3.07
(0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36)
24 24 24 24
(3.4) (3.7) (3.5) (3.4)
1105 1109 1104 1103
(123) (137) (139) (139)
Mean SAT Combined
Measure
Left The Sample Remained in the Sample
Mean HSGPA
Mean ACT Composite
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classes unchanged. Of course, gross aggregate summaries of academic credentials are but one set 
of data admissions departments may use to evaluate the feasibility of class-based policies. In 
fact, these policies give rise to a more important concern – namely, that the beneficiaries of 
class-based admissions may not have a high likelihood of success in college. Class-based 
affirmative action will introduce a new type of student to the college ranks. How well we can 
expect that new type of student to perform in college is the focus of the next chapter. 
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College Outcomes for Class-Based Admits 
 
 
  
121 
 
The previous chapter explored the changes in acceptance rates that might attend 
implementation of a class-based admissions policy. It is insufficient, however, to design a system 
that increases acceptance rates for disadvantaged and overachieving applicants without 
considering whether or not those students are actually capable of handling college work. This 
chapter presents methods and findings related to Research Question 3: 
What is the likelihood of college success for students admitted under CU’s class-based policy? 
Methods 
The design of the 2009 experiment lends itself nicely to this inquiry. Specifically, the 
academic credentials of students accepted under race-based and class-based conditions deserve 
deeper scrutiny. Table 6.3 in the previous chapter (p. 106) presented substantially lower 
academic credentials for applicants admitted under class-based affirmative action and refused 
under race-based affirmative action.  For example, the mean HSGPA for these applicants was 
3.09, compared to 3.6 for the applicants accepted under both conditions. These findings suggest 
the need for an investigation of “academic mismatch” (Sander, 2004). Studies of mismatch have 
been carried out by many of the same researchers who have conducted the most thorough studies 
of race-based and class-based affirmative action (Sander, 2004; Espenshade & Radford, 2009; 
Bowen & Bok, 1998; Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009). The issue is fiercely debated. 
Those who claim mismatch is a significant problem (e.g., Sander, 2004) stress that under race-
based affirmative action, minorities attend colleges for which they are academically 
underprepared, and compete with academically superior peers. This scenario begets lower 
grades, lower graduation rates, and lower distal outcomes. Sander, for example, points to reduced 
rates of bar passage for Black students admitted to selective law schools under race-conscious 
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policies. Those who disagree point to significantly higher graduation rates at more selective 
universities (cf., Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Bowen & Bok, 1998; Bowen, Chingos, & 
McPherson, 2009). In short, these higher graduation rates completely cancel out decreases in 
college grades associated with minority status, and in fact point to a net gain associated with 
minority students enrolling at the most selective schools to which they are admitted.  
Previous analyses of this issue have relied upon secondary data from multiple institutions 
to gauge the comparative effects of attending more selective or less selective colleges. In 
addition, mismatch literature focuses nearly entirely on minority students admitted under race-
conscious policies. By contrast in the analysis that follows, focus is placed upon disadvantaged 
and overachieving students admitted under CU‟s class-based approach. The results of the 2009 
experiment suggest that students admitted under class-based affirmative action who might 
otherwise have been refused are more likely to be low-income and enter CU with lower-than-
average academic credentials. The available research on the effects of SES on college 
achievement reveals some troubling patterns with respect to students of this sort. Essentially, 
low-SES students tend to perform worse in college than their upper-class peers, even after 
controlling for high school academic credentials – which are themselves powerful predictors of 
college outcomes (e.g., Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009). When two students with 
equivalent high school academic credentials enter college, on average, the wealthier one will 
perform better. Such patterns underscore a legitimate concern: The University of Colorado 
would like to avoid admitting low-SES students who have little chance at success in college. In 
the section that follows, I introduce a matching strategy intended to approximate the likelihood 
of college success for beneficiaries of class-based affirmative action. 
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Gauging the Likelihood of Success at CU via Coarsened Exact Matching 
This analysis focuses on college outcomes for students fitting the profile of the 31 
applicants in the lower-left quadrant of Table 6.3. Notably, only 19 of those 31 were actually 
identified by the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices. These 19 students represent “class-
based admits.” These class-based admits had slightly lower academic credentials and 
substantially lower SES than the other 12 students who were not identified by the Indices but 
were granted admission under the class-based system. Admissions officers noted that this 
phenomenon was likely an artifact of fairly low inter-reader reliability when marginally qualified 
applicants are evaluated. That is, the 12 students accepted under class-based affirmative action 
who were not identified under the Indices were extremely “close calls;” their likelihood of 
acceptance may vary more from reader to reader than would the acceptance likelihood for typical 
undergraduate applicants. Because these 12 students may well have been accepted under slightly 
different admissions conditions (i.e., an alternate reader) they cannot be reasonably identified as 
beneficiaries of class-based affirmative action. As such, to ensure the results in this section 
constitute a fair representation of college success for class-based beneficiaries, these 12 students 
were removed from the pool of class-based admits.  
In the 2009 experiment, class-based admissions decisions were unofficial. The official 
decisions had already been rendered by way of the race-based policy. Because these 19 class-
based admits were refused under the official admissions policy at CU, it is not possible to follow 
their progress in college. To investigate the issue empirically, high school and college data were 
collected from the roughly 21,100 students who first enrolled at CU between 2000 and 2003. The 
set was limited to these four years because each student who enrolled during this time has had 
the opportunity to graduate from college in six years – a common measuring stick in research on 
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college outcomes (Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009). I 
sought to identify a matched set of students from that set of 21,100 to act as “surrogates” for the 
19 class-based admits described in Table 6.3. In fairness, it may seem as though CU – which 
operated under a race-based policy between 2000 and 2003 – should never have enrolled class-
based admits. In fact, minor fluctuations in applicant pools from year to year and the uncertainty 
inherent in undergraduate admissions have produced numerous students whose profiles closely 
match students from the lower-left quadrant of Table 6.3.  
Surrogate students were selected from the historical dataset using coarsened exact 
matching (CEM; Iacus, King, & Porro, 2008). The tasks involved in CEM are implied by its 
name. First, a set of covariates is chosen as the basis for matching class-based admits to their 
historical surrogates. In this case, candidate covariates included all available socioeconomic and 
high school achievement measures that influence the likelihood of admission in CU‟s class-based 
system. The variables available in both the experimental and the historical datasets are family 
income level, parents‟ highest education level17, high school cumulative weighted GPA, ACT 
composite scores, SAT combined scores, and “Predicted Freshman Year GPA.” The last 
academic measure, known as PGPA, is the predicted value of an applicant‟s freshman year GPA 
at CU. The measure is derived from a regression equation, which is based solely on high school 
GPA and either SAT scores or ACT scores. The class-based admits‟ and historical students‟ 
PGPAs are not specific to students‟ undergraduate programs (e.g., business, engineering, arts and 
sciences). A student‟s PGPA is a linear transformation of his or her entrance exam scores and 
HSGPA. As such, PGPA can be conceived of as a single-measure alternative to the academic 
measures that comprise it. 
                            
17
 Levels of parents‟ education and family income match those modeled in the Indices, with one important 
exception: Family income level 5 captures all income above $75,000 per year. 
125 
 
Because four matching covariates are continuous variables – HSGPA, ACT, SAT, and 
PGPA – exact matches on all covariates between class-based admits and historical students will 
be rare. As such, the HSGPA, ACT, SAT, and PGPA scales must be coarsened, in other words, 
recoded into discrete ordinal categories
18
. Although the categories of a coarsened continuous 
variable need not have equal bin sizes, the researcher should have a substantive justification for 
making some categories broader than others within the same scale. I have no such justification, 
so the HSGPA, ACT, SAT, and PGPA scales are divided into roughly equally sized categories 
(equally sized within each variable, but certainly not equally sized across all four). 
Decisions about the degree of coarsening in CEM are made somewhat subjectively, using 
substantive knowledge of the scales to be coarsened. There are no rules of thumb for this 
process, although it is generally considered unwise to coarsen continuous variables beyond the 
point at which crucial information is lost. Given a number of potential coarsening choices (i.e., 
0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 standard deviations), admissions officers suggested academic measures 
should not be coarsened beyond 0.5 standard deviations in the historical dataset. Specifically, the 
corresponding category widths are 0.15 grade points for HSGPA, 2 points for ACT, 70 points for 
SAT, and 0.15 grade points for PGPA. When possible, interval widths less than 0.5 standard 
deviations are specified, to enable greater similarity between the class-based admit group and the 
historical surrogate group (e.g., Stevens, King, & Shibuya, 2010). It should also be noted that in 
CEM, the degree of coarsening controls the balance on covariate values between, in this case, the 
experimental class-based admits and their historical surrogates. Finally, as noted above, family 
income level and parents‟ education level are already categorical variables, so they are not 
                            
18
 It may be argued that none of the academic measures employed for matching (HSGPA, ACT, SAT, and PGPA) 
represent true interval scales. In that sense, the coarsening involved in this CEM application is akin to increasing the 
grain size of measures that, in their original form, are actually ordinal. 
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coarsened any further. Once all covariates have been recoded as categorical variables, strata are 
formed in the experimental and historical dataset. Each stratum is defined by a unique 
combination of values on the categorical covariates.  
The next step in CEM is straightforward: Surrogates comprise all the students in the 
historical dataset located in a stratum occupied by at least one class-based admit. Any class-
based admits without at least one matched surrogate are not represented in the surrogate student 
set. One further step is necessary, before analysis of surrogate students‟ college outcomes can 
commence. Not all of the 19 experimental class-based admits were matched to the same number 
of historical surrogates. Some class-based admits have more surrogates than others. To ensure 
certain class-based admits are not disproportionately represented in the surrogate student group, 
weights are applied to each stratum in the historical dataset. The weighting procedure is 
introduced by Iacus, King, and Porro (2008). Let    be the total number of class-based admits 
matched to at least one surrogate student, and    be the total number of matched surrogate 
students. Further, let   
  be the number of class-based admits in stratum s, and   
  be the number 
of matched surrogate students in stratum s (s = 1, . . . , S). The weight for stratum s, Ws, is given 
by: 
    
  
  
   
  
 
  
  
(7.1) 
In cases where very few surrogate students are available in a stratum occupied by at least 
one class-based admit, (i.e., the ratio of   
  to   
  is particularly low) the associated strata weights 
are quite high. To reduce the impact of highly weighted and therefore highly influential surrogate 
students, I explore trimming strata weights at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Of course, trimming 
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strata weights biases the estimates of college outcomes toward the unweighted estimates, so 
analyses are conducted with and without trimmed weights to determine if the trimming exhibits a 
substantial effect on the results. 
Ultimately, measures of college success are examined for the selected group of historical 
surrogates to determine the extent to which CU can expect the beneficiaries of class-based 
affirmative action to do well in college. Those measures of collegiate success include the 
continuous outcomes (1) cumulative GPA at CU (CUGPA) and (2) total credit hours earned, and 
the dichotomous outcomes (3) graduation in four years and (4) graduation in six years. To form a 
baseline to which surrogate students‟ outcomes can be compared, I also examine mean CUGPA 
and credit hours earned, and percent graduating in four and six years for all students in the 
historical dataset not included in the surrogate group. 
Findings 
Matching Class-Based Admits to Historical Surrogates: Choosing and Coarsening Covariates 
Matching students on coarsened HSGPA, ACT scores, and SAT scores yielded relatively 
few surrogates for class-based admits. As such, their single-measure alternative – PGPA – is 
used to identify historical surrogates. When PGPA is used as the sole academic credential, that 
scale can be coarsened to 0.25 standard deviations, and historical surrogates are still assigned to 
18 of the 19 class-based admits. A critical criterion for any matching method considered was the 
number of class-based admits that could be matched to at least one historical surrogate. As a 
general rule, class-based admits who are difficult to match to historical surrogates tend to be 
those with very low SES and marginal academic credentials (i.e., those with severe disadvantage 
and minimal or no overachievement). These are the students we are most concerned about in any 
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investigation of academic mismatch. As such, I focus on matching methods that assign 
surrogates to as many of those class-based admits as possible. 
The best matching strategy to address this concern is coarsening PGPA to 0.25 standard 
deviations, which is equivalent to roughly 0.075 grade points. Using this approach leaves one 
class-based admit unmatched. As we would expect, this unmatched class-based admit is a low-
SES applicant with low academic credentials. Neither of his parents earned a high school 
diploma, and his PGPA was 2.07. No students in the historical dataset fit this applicant‟s profile. 
This is not to say none of the class-based admits with low academic credentials and low SES 
were matched to historical surrogates; some such successful matches are detailed below. The 
absence of historical surrogates for this particular class-based admit is due to the absence of 
students in the historical data with such low levels of both academic achievement and SES. 
Matching Class-Based Admits to Historical Surrogates: Developing Weights 
A critical component of CEM is the implementation of differential weights for strata 
defined by unique combinations of the matching covariates. Trimming weights at their 1
st
 and 
99
th
 percentiles consistently biased estimates of college outcomes toward the unweighted 
estimates – which are quite close to college outcomes for the baseline (non-surrogate) group. 
This is expected, because the class-based admits most likely to be matched to numerous 
surrogates are those most likely to have been admitted to CU in the past – applicants with higher 
academic credentials. Thus, weighting the estimates of college outcomes is absolutely crucial. 
Trimming those weights may not be. Class-based admits with low academic credentials and low 
SES deserve high weights. These are the students of primary interest in studies of academic 
mismatch. 
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Evaluating Balance  
An important piece of any analysis that utilizes matching is the examination of the extent 
to which matching covariates share similar measures of central tendency and dispersion, across 
matched groups. Eighteen of the 19 class-based admits were assigned 2,704 historical surrogates 
via coarsened exact matching. As noted above, the only coarsened covariate in this procedure 
was PGPA, which was coarsened to 0.25 standard deviations. The original categories of the 
socioeconomic status variables parents‟ education level and family income level were used for 
matching without additional coarsening. Table 7.1 presents means and standard deviations for 
high school academic and socioeconomic measures
19
, for both the class-based admits and their 
historical surrogates. This table, and the figures that follow, utilize the weighting scheme for 
CEM detailed in Equation 7.1, and do not employ trimmed weights. 
Table 7.1. Academic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Class-Based Admits and Historical 
Surrogates 
 
 Means and standard deviations in the table above suggest adequate balance on the 
covariates used for matching. Further evidence of balance is presented in Figure 7.1. These 
histograms present the extent to which the distributions of PGPA, parents‟ education, and 
income overlap for class-based admits and their surrogates. In each histogram, the bars shaded 
                            
19
 For simplicity‟s sake, I present means and standard deviations of parents‟ education and income in Table 7.2. The 
percentages of class-based admits and historical surrogates in each level of these variables is displayed in Figure 
7.1. 
N Mean SD N Mean SD
PGPA 18 2.55 0.35 2,704 2.55 0.35
Parents' Education 18 4.33 1.53 2,704 4.33 1.49
Family Income 18 3.33 1.41 2,704 3.33 1.37
Class-Based Admits Surrogates
Measure
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blue represent the distribution for class-based admits. The bars outlined in red represent the 
distribution for surrogates. 
Figure 7.1. Distributions of Academic and Socioeconomic Characteristics for Class-Based 
Admits and Historical Surrogates 
 
The substantial overlap in the distributions above indicates adequate balance on the 
matching covariates used in this CEM procedure. With respect to the variables employed in 
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matching, there are few discrepancies between the class-based admit group and the surrogate 
group. These histograms reinforce statistics presented in Table 7.1. 
Outcomes for Class-Based Admits  
Analyses of grades, credit hours earned, and graduation rates for the historical surrogates 
suggest college outcomes will be consistently lower for class-based admits than for typical 
undergraduates at CU. Table 7.2 presents aggregate measures of college success for those 
students. The reader may interpret statistics associated with surrogates in Table 7.2 as the best 
available prediction of college outcomes for class-based admits. As a baseline for comparison, 
the table includes the same measures for all historical students not categorized as surrogates. 
Standard deviations are included parenthetically. 
Table 7.2. College Outcomes for Historical CU Students, by Group 
 
 Across measures, college outcomes were lower for surrogates when compared with the 
baseline. With respect to both undergraduate GPA and credit hours earned, these differences 
were roughly equivalent to one half of a standard deviation – a substantial drop off in college 
performance. More than half of the historical surrogates eventually graduated from college, but 
graduation rates at four, five, and six years for historical surrogates lagged significantly behind 
the graduation rates of other CU students. Still, as a share of the baseline graduation rates, 
Group N CU GPA
Credit Hours 
Earned
% Graduating, 
4 Years
% Graduating, 
5 Years
% Graduating, 
6 Years
2.50 25.9
(0.76) (9.9)
2.83 31.6
(0.77) (12)
Baseline
Surrogates 2,704
18,422
28.3% 44.3% 52.9%
39.8% 61.4% 66.0%
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historical surrogates‟ graduation rates increased following additional years of college. The 
surrogates‟ graduation was 70% of the baseline graduation rate after four years, 72% after five 
years, and 80% after six years. As such, it would seem as though graduation rates for class-based 
admits may begin to approach baseline graduation rates given additional years in college. These 
results are robust to alternate matching strategies.  For example, using matching covariates 
HSGPA, ACT and SAT scores rather than PGPA, or coarsening PGPA to either 0.5 or 0.125 
standard deviations yields estimates similar to those above. Under alternate matching strategies 
six-year graduation rates for historical surrogates range from 50% to 55%, and baseline six-year 
graduation rates hold steady at 66%. 
 One additional factor may confound the findings regarding class-based admits‟ predicted 
college performance relative to the baseline. The distributions of undergraduate schools attended 
are not equivalent across the historical surrogate and baseline groups. The vast majority of 
surrogates (83%) enrolled in the College of Arts and Sciences at CU. All other undergraduates 
were more likely than the surrogates to enroll in more academically rigorous programs, such as 
business or engineering. A smaller percentage of this baseline group (71%) enrolled in the 
College of Arts and Sciences. A fairer comparison, then, might involve restricting this analysis to 
only those students enrolled in the College of Arts and Sciences. Those results are presented in 
Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3. College Outcomes for Historical CU Students, by Group, Arts & Sciences Only 
 
There are no substantial changes when the analysis of college outcomes is restricted to 
the College of Arts and Sciences. Lower college outcomes remain evident for the surrogates; 
their cumulative GPA at CU still lags 0.5 standard deviations behind the baseline. Likewise, 
graduation rates were lower for surrogates at four, five, and six years, and the percentage-point 
differences with respect to the baseline are nearly identical to those in the previous, unrestricted, 
analysis. That said, with or without this Arts and Sciences restriction, more than half of the 
surrogates eventually graduated. Furthermore, in Table 7.3, surrogates‟ graduation rates still rise 
over time as a share of the baseline: After four years the surrogate graduation rate was 71% of 
the baseline graduation rate, but after six years that figure rose to 81%. 
Finally, and not surprisingly, the college outcomes detailed above vary, depending upon 
how class-based admits were identified by the Indices. Impressive college outcomes are more 
often observed for the surrogates of those class-based admits identified by the Overachievement 
Indices. For example, four class-based admits from the 2009 experiment were identified by the 
Overachievement Indices but not by the Disadvantage Index. Those class-based admits have 601 
historical surrogates, and those surrogates performed well in college. In fact, their mean 
cumulative GPA (2.94) and six-year graduation rate (70%) surpassed the baseline. In contrast, 10 
class-based admits from the 2009 experiment were identified by the Disadvantage Index but not 
Group N CU GPA
Credit Hours 
Earned
% Graduating, 
4 Years
% Graduating, 
5 Years
% Graduating, 
6 Years
2.46 24.9
(0.72) (9.3)
2.80 30.7
(0.78) (11.7)
Baseline
Surrogates 2,236
13,206
27.7% 41.9% 51.5%
38.7% 58.8% 63.5%
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by the Overachievement Indices. They were assigned 1,352 historical surrogates. These 
surrogates did not fare as well in college. Their mean undergraduate GPA was 2.25, and less than 
half (42%) graduated in six years. These results are consistent whether or not analyses are 
restricted to the College of Arts and Sciences. These findings echo those presented in the 
previous chapter regarding the aggregate strength of accepted classes: The Overachievement 
Indices are critical to maintaining high measures of freshman class strength and college success 
associated with class-based affirmative action.  
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present aggregate statistics for large groups of historical students. 
Another approach is to more closely examine the college careers of a few historical students 
whose high school academic credentials and socioeconomic status represent perfect matches 
(i.e., identical PGPAs, levels of parents‟ education, and levels of family income) for some of the 
19 class-based admits that emerged from the 2009 experiment. Below, five such students are 
profiled
20
. These descriptions are constructed from the historical dataset. Unfortunately, 
confidentiality agreements did not permit more thorough qualitative analytic procedures, such as 
interviews or in-depth reviews of student records. Still, these brief accounts provide context that 
is lacking in the summative analyses above.  
Richard Karl began his undergraduate career at CU in the fall of 2003. His PGPA was 
2.05, which means his grades and test scores in high school placed him roughly at the first 
percentile among students who enroll at CU. Richard is a White male whose parents – at the time 
of his application – made between $25,000 and $50,000 annually. At least one of his parents had 
graduated from high school, but neither had attended college. Richard was accepted into CU‟s 
                            
20
 To protect confidentiality, pseudonyms are used throughout these descriptions. 
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College of Arts and Sciences. He majored in International Affairs. Richard graduated from CU in 
four years. He completed 31 credit hours of study, and earned a 3.16 cumulative GPA. 
Daniela Hilario enrolled at CU in 2002. Her PGPA was 2.13, which placed her around 
the second percentile of CU students in terms of high school academic performance. Her parents 
earned between $25,000 and $50,000, but neither had graduated from college. Daniela is a 
Hispanic female who was accepted into the College of Arts and Sciences. She majored in 
English, and graduated from CU in six years. She completed 26 credit hours and earned a 3.22 
undergraduate GPA. 
Alice Caracter began her CU undergraduate career in 2000. Like Daniela, Alice had a 
PGPA of 2.13. Her parents also earned between $25,000 and $50,000, but neither had graduated 
from college. Alice is a Black female who was accepted into the College of Arts and Sciences. 
Alice, however, never chose a major. She left CU in the middle of her sophomore year, and did 
not graduate. She completed 16 credit hours at CU, and her GPA at the time of her departure was 
1.65. 
Steven Vogelman came to CU in the fall of 2002. His PGPA was 2.75, which placed him 
at the 35
th
 percentile of CU undergrads. Steven is a White male whose parents made between 
$15,000 and $35,000. Both his parents had earned high school diplomas, but neither had attended 
college. Steven was a psychology major in the College of Arts and Sciences, and he graduated 
from CU in five years. He completed 32 credit hours, and maintained a 3.44 GPA 
Andrea Gasol enrolled at CU in the fall of 2002. Her PGPA was 2.45 – at about the 7th 
percentile among CU undergrads. Andrea is a Hispanic female. At least one of her parents had 
graduated from college and completed some postgraduate study, but her family earned between 
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$15,000 and $35,000 annually. Although Andrea was admitted to the College of Arts and 
Sciences, she never declared a major. She left CU during her junior year, and did not graduate. 
Andrea completed 25 credit hours, and her GPA upon departure was 2.75. 
This chapter‟s presentation of college outcomes suggests college success for class-based 
admits is possible, but far from guaranteed. Compared to their undergraduate peers, we can 
expect fewer class-based admits to graduate from college. We can also expect, on average, lower 
college grades from class-based admits. This will be especially true of class-based admits singled 
out solely by the Disadvantage Index. These general findings are illustrated with the qualitative 
descriptions provided above; two of the five profiled historical students failed to graduate from 
CU. Still, more than half of the matched surrogates did ultimately earn a college degree, and 
three of the profiled historical students overcame substantial obstacles to compile impressive 
undergraduate records at CU. Moreover, class-based admits who were identified due to 
overachievement in high school may perform quite well in college – better, in fact, than typical 
CU undergraduates. 
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Implications for Class-Based Affirmative Action 
As noted in Chapter 1, this dissertation‟s analyses may be characterized as an 
investigation into the validity of CU‟s class-based affirmative action system. The Indices may 
not be valid if classifications based upon them are highly sensitive to technical choices that 
occurred during their conception. Moreover, use of the Indices may not be valid if the applicants 
they identify are not admitted with increased frequency, or if this system‟s primary beneficiaries 
are unlikely to earn a degree. The results detailed in this Chapters 5, 6, and 7 cover a broad range 
of research tasks in substantial detail, so it may help to summarize the central findings with this 
validity evidence in mind.  
First, Research Question 1 constituted an investigation of the validity of CU‟s measures 
of disadvantage and overachievement. In some cases, identification under CU‟s class-based 
system is quite sensitive to the regression models and the ELS sample that underpinned the 
original specifications of these measures. From that perspective, the validity of these measures 
could be called into question. However, through the sensitivity analyses presented in this 
dissertation, I have identified strategies to alleviate some validity concerns. The most important 
step to improve this class-based system is explicitly accounting for an applicant‟s likelihood of 
application to college when estimating his or her probability of enrolling in college. Beyond 
providing a meaningful adjustment to the Disadvantage Index prediction equation, my 
investigation of college application likelihood may inform recruitment strategies: There are a 
number of highly qualified, low-SES high school students who are unlikely to apply to college. 
If these students could be reached early in their high school careers and encouraged to pursue a 
college education, socioeconomic integration efforts could benefit tremendously.  
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In addition, it is important to address sample range restriction imposed either 
purposefully (i.e., CU‟s sample restrictions) or through missing data (i.e., the absence of %FRL 
for private school students). Addressing these issues resulted in increased rates of identification 
for additional consideration. As a result, disadvantage and overachievement thresholds set via 
standard-setting required revision to ensure a manageable number of applicants were identified 
for additional consideration. In addition, a high-school-level measure of college-going may be a 
valuable component of class-based affirmative action systems in the future, although use of this 
variable will only be feasible if it is collected systematically and made public. Ultimately, the 
decision points highlighted in Chapter 5 have consequences. Institutions should decide which 
options allow them to best represent their conceptions of disadvantage and overachievement, and 
test the impact of choosing alternate paths. 
Chapters 6 and 7 (Research Questions 2 and 3, respectively) address the potential impact 
of putting this class-based system into practice. The University of Colorado‟s approach was 
designed with particular goals in mind: maintaining minority acceptance rates in the absence of 
race-based affirmative action, and increasing acceptance rates for socioeconomically 
disadvantaged but deserving applicants. In these respects, the results are promising. Acceptance 
rates for low-SES and minority applicants improve under class-plus-race affirmative action. In 
particular, the improvement in acceptance rates for URM applicants is larger than prior research 
would suggest. A critically important lesson to draw from both experiments is the following: The 
amount of additional consideration conferred by class-based affirmative action systems matters a 
great deal. At CU, a class-based identification can count as a primary factor, while a race-based 
identification is used only as a secondary factor. This distinction is critical to understanding the 
results of the 2009 and 2010 experiments. When race-based and class-based approaches are 
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compared, URMs are usually conferred more additional consideration under the class-based 
approach than they would receive under the race-based counterfactual. When race-based and 
class-plus-race approaches are compared, dual identification (i.e., status as a low-SES minority) 
under a class-plus-race approach dramatically improves the odds of acceptance. This conclusion 
should help shape future evaluations or simulations of class-based admissions policies. Much of 
the research that informed this work (e.g., Carnevale & Strohl, 2010; Espenshade & Radford, 
2009; Bowen & Bok, 1998) relied upon simulation studies to hypothesize the impact of 
implementing class-based affirmative action. For understandable reasons, those studies tend to 
conceive levels of additional consideration for class-based systems that are equivalent to 
considerations observed for other personal qualities (e.g., minority or legacy status). In the 
language of undergraduate admissions at CU, prior research has assigned “secondary factor” 
levels of consideration to class-based measures. This dissertation demonstrates that class-based 
systems need not be formulated in such narrow terms; indeed, attaching higher levels of 
additional consideration (e.g., “primary factor”) to such class-based systems could boost 
universities‟ chances of maintaining racially diverse campuses in the absence of race-conscious 
admissions.  
Attaching so much additional consideration to class-based identifications may not always 
be feasible (see the discussion of limitations below), so maintaining minority representation on 
campus may require that class and race be used together to grant additional consideration in 
undergraduate admissions. The University of Colorado managed (in the 2009 experiment) to 
maintain rates of minority acceptance by replacing race-based with class-conscious admissions, 
but the circumstances that produced that effect (primary factor levels of class-based 
consideration) may be sufficiently uncommon that swapping minority status for the 
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Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices will not work in every occasion. Therefore, race-
based considerations may be necessary to maintain campus racial diversity. This caveat is 
critical, because racial diversity is valuable to a university and its students. Research has shown 
that substantial measureable benefits accrue – in both student engagement and student 
satisfaction – from increased racial diversity on campus (Denson & Chang, 2009; Milem & 
Hakuta, 2000). 
When the beneficiaries of class-based affirmative action matriculate, we can expect 
substantially lower college outcomes. Analysis of historical CU data suggests class-based admits 
graduate at lower rates and earn lower grades than their peers. This finding is not damning for 
class-based affirmative action, but it does raise a legitimate concern: While the class-based 
system at CU holds promise for maintaining minority representation and increasing 
socioeconomic diversity, its implementation will result in the admission of some students whose 
academic credentials and SES suggest a reduced likelihood of college success. Students 
identified solely by the Disadvantage Index are those most likely to have trouble maintaining 
strong GPAs throughout their college careers and ultimately attaining a degree.  
The stories and statistics presented in the analysis of matched historical surrogates do not 
rule out the possibility of college success for the beneficiaries of class-based affirmative action. 
They do argue for the provision of robust academic support systems for low-income, marginally 
qualified students once they arrive on campus. In that vein, it is worth restating that as of 2011, 
the Disadvantage Index will be used to identify candidates for the McNeill Academic Program – 
a structured support system designed to serve disadvantaged and sometimes underprepared 
students at CU. The historical data did not contain information on the receipt of academic 
support services including McNeill, which did not exist in its current form between 2000 and 
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2003. Given automatic referral to an academic support system, we may expect those class-based 
admits identified only by the Disadvantage Index to perform a bit better in college than analyses 
of historical data would suggest. That is, the predictions of college outcomes for disadvantaged 
class-based admits presented in Chapter 7 may be slight underestimates.  
Ultimately, although the Disadvantage Index – absent its companion measure of 
overachievement – identifies students who will likely need help to successfully handle college 
work, it is an indispensable class-based measure. Logistically, it provides CU a more systematic 
means of assigning admits to the McNeill program. Conceptually, it flags students who possess 
meaningful, highly valued, relevant qualifications for admission to CU (Gutmann, 1987). 
Disadvantaged admits are essential to CU‟s social function. Their presence on campus and in 
classrooms should further CU‟s mission to prepare leaders for a diverse society. Campus 
diversity may be construed as exposure to academically qualified students whose socioeconomic 
circumstances present significant barriers to college access. The Disadvantage Index is 
conceptually designed to enhance diversity defined as such, so it fundamentally addresses the 
concept of diversity in ways other personal qualifications in undergraduate admissions do not. 
Still, CU aims to graduate all students who enroll, and the university faces a nontrivial challenge 
ensuring success for its severely disadvantaged admits. This challenge must be taken seriously; 
as noted in Chapter 3, accepted applicants with lower-than-average academic credentials are 
much more likely to actually enroll at CU. Roughly translated, that means class-based admits 
identified solely by the Disadvantage Index are quite likely to matriculate. 
Of course, the measures of college success available for my analysis may not adequately 
capture all the benefits that exposure to higher education will yield for disadvantaged students, 
nor all the benefits their presence at CU will yield for the university. Their cumulative GPAs 
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may lag behind those of their peers, and they may require more time in college to earn a degree, 
but the ultimate attainment of such a degree – even for some – has been shown to confer 
tremendous rewards (Lochner & Moretti, 2004; Carneiro & Heckman, 2002; Card, 1999; Card & 
Kreuger, 1992). To underscore this point, it may be useful to imagine the 2009 experiment 
extrapolated to a full applicant pool. The 500 applications examined in that experiment become 
22,000. The 19 class-based admits (3.8% of the experimental sample) become 836. If only half 
of those class-based admits matriculate, historical patterns suggest CU would graduate an 
additional 200 disadvantaged and overachieving students every year. 
Limitations 
This dissertation represents a single-case study. Therefore, what it gains from in-depth 
examination of class-based policies at one institution, it may lose in generalizability. 
Specifically, researchers who study the effects of race-based and class-based affirmative action 
may be curious about whether or not these conclusions generalize to elite, highly selective 
universities. In this regard, the generalizability of my findings cannot fully be known. This 
dissertation digs deeply into the mechanisms and philosophies that comprise CU‟s class-based 
approach, and much of the prior research on the prospects of class-based affirmative action – 
most notably William Bowen and Derek Bok‟s work in The Shape of the River – focuses on 
race-conscious and class-conscious strategies at elite, highly selective colleges (Bowen & Bok, 
1998).  
The University of Colorado at Boulder is a different sort of institution. Two features in 
particular distinguish CU from the institutions most often included in prior research on 
affirmative action. First, while still the flagship public university in Colorado, CU‟s overall 
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acceptance rate is much higher than those reported at highly selective colleges. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, the level of additional consideration associated with minority status at 
CU is relatively small. Research by Espenshade and Radford (2009), Long (2007), and Sander 
(2004) suggests that at many selective private and public schools, the consideration accorded to 
minority status is quite large. Findings from the 2009 experiment suggest the effectiveness of 
class-based affirmative action as a replacement for race-based policies hinges upon the amount 
of additional consideration class-based systems confer. Universities with admissions frameworks 
similar to CU‟s – those that place relatively little weight on minority status, and are willing to 
place substantial weight on class-based measures – should be able to replicate these findings. At 
highly selective schools, however, it may not always be feasible to enact class-based 
considerations that are appreciably larger than the sizeable race-based considerations already in 
place.  
The same may be said of the postsecondary prospects for class-based admits. Analyses in 
Chapter 7 indicate those students, in general, do not perform as well in college as typical 
undergraduates. Class-based admits at CU may not be able to attend four-year colleges in the 
absence of class-based admissions considerations (Hurtado, Inkelas, Briggs, & Rhee, 1997). 
There is reason to suspect applicants on the cusp of admission at highly selective schools will 
fare slightly better in college. Those schools receive numerous applications from qualified 
students; many of those refused admission to elite schools may nonetheless be capable of 
handling the work (Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009; Bowen 
& Bok, 1998). These open questions of generalizability likely cannot be answered until similar 
class-based systems are enacted and researched on those campuses. 
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Still, the CU case is meaningful. Unfortunately, determining whether these results in 
particular would generalize to institutions of similar size and selectivity to CU is outside the 
scope of this study. It is possible, however, that CU represents a certain class of university – one 
to which the bulk of class-based simulations to date do not reasonably apply – where 
considerations for minority status were never particularly large to begin with, and class-based 
affirmative action can be counted upon to produce levels of racial diversity nearly equivalent to 
those realized under race-conscious admissions. In addition, with respect to (1) statistical 
methods for capturing disadvantage and overachievement and (2) comparing race-based to class-
plus-race affirmative action, some conclusions may apply in a broader context. First, lessons 
learned regarding the use of ELS as a basis for the Indices can inform any institution that seeks 
to examine nationally representative data to develop or revise class-based admissions policies. 
Second, this investigation of a class-plus-race policy‟s impact on acceptance rates draws strength 
from the population under examination. Borderline applicants will be present at any university – 
highly selective or moderately selective – that has competitive admissions. For these applicants, 
personal qualities, such as race and class, will be particularly influential in an admissions 
decision (Willingham & Breland, 1982). For this segment of the applicant pool, it is more 
reasonable to suspect my conclusions will generalize. As such, this dissertation provides some 
evidence that, at various institutions, consideration of class (or class and race together) in 
undergraduate admissions may significantly increase acceptance rates for disadvantaged and 
URM applicants. 
Finally, this dissertation has, in part, focused on admissions officers‟ decisions to admit 
or refuse. As should be clear following discussion of the “admissions funnel” in Chapter 3 (p. 
28), the decision to admit or refuse is only one component of enrollment management, and, by 
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extension, diversity in higher education. Low-SES and minority applicants may be more likely to 
be accepted given certain interventions, but other factors align to help determine whether or not 
they will actually enroll (e.g., financial aid, campus environments). Moreover, admissions 
officers at CU emphasized that targeted recruitment strategies are essential in encouraging such 
students to apply in the first place. Finally, campus diversity depends very much on 
underrepresented students staying in school. To that end, academic support systems – such as 
CU‟s McNeill Program – are essential to ensuring disadvantaged matriculants have the best 
possible chance at success in college. So, multiple institutional responsibilities – recruitment, 
financial aid, and academic support – must be closely coordinated for diversity initiatives to meet 
with success. While the admissions decision is a useful unit of analysis for affirmative action 
research, changes in those decisions will not necessarily translate to changes in the racial and 
socioeconomic makeup of higher education. 
Future Research 
This section presents a few logical extensions to this research, unavailable presently 
because of time constraints, data constraints, or the institutional needs of CU. Extensions are 
discussed as they pertain to each research question, beginning with the measurement of 
disadvantage and overachievement, continuing with the estimation of effects on acceptance rates, 
and concluding with the investigation of college outcomes for class-based admits. First, with 
respect to measuring overachievement, the use of HSGPA, ACT, and SAT may deserve closer 
examination. Using these measures kept the scales of the Overachievement Indices as familiar as 
possible for admissions officers. Still, only one identification of overachievement is necessary to 
trigger additional consideration, as noted in Table 4.7. One potential remedy for this issue may 
be the exploration of an Overachievement Index constructed using a single academic credential 
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composite, such as PGPA. This idea was discussed during the early phases of planning, but 
PGPA is a prediction of freshman-year grades based on high school grades and admissions test 
scores. Thus, an Overachievement Index (PGPA) measure would essentially represent the 
residual based on a prediction of a prediction. Such a measure is conceptually difficult to defend, 
but it does carry the advantage of synthesizing multiple high school academic credentials using a 
single measure. 
Another option for limiting the number of overachievement measures would be the 
removal of HSGPA from the class-based system altogether. This was not discussed seriously at 
CU, because HSGPA is such an important consideration in undergraduate admissions, and CU is 
reluctant to place any more emphasis on SAT and ACT scores than it already does. Still, HSGPA 
is a somewhat unreliable measure, subject to the grading criteria and stringency of an applicant‟s 
high school, along with the relative academic strength of his high school peers. As such, one 
could conceive of a single Overachievement Index representing the higher of two admissions test 
scores. In the case of CU, SAT scores would likely be converted to the ACT scale to choose the 
highest attained score, because CU applicants take the ACT more frequently than they take the 
SAT. 
More generally, the models that produce the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices 
may be extended. Specifically, multilevel models, structural equation models, or latent class 
models may be appropriate for this context. The ELS dataset contains a sample of students 
clustered in the high schools where the data were collected. As such, the regression models‟ 
outcomes (academic credentials and college enrollment) may not be independent among students 
attending the same high school. Such nesting in the data suggests consideration of a multilevel 
approach to modeling academic credentials and college enrollment in ELS (Singer & Willett, 
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2003; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2001). Moreover, the Indices‟ regression models use multiple 
socioeconomic measures to predict grades, test scores, and college enrollment, some of which 
are highly correlated. To the extent CU aims to measure some sort of latent trait (i.e., 
socioeconomic barriers to college access or socioeconomic hindrances to academic 
achievement), a structural equation model may be appropriate. Furthermore, incorporating both 
these extensions may suggest the use of a multilevel latent variable model (Skrondal & Rabe-
Hesketh, 2004). Finally, because the Indices are utilized to classify applicants for additional 
consideration under class-based affirmative action, a latent class model (Lazarsfeld & Henry, 
1968) using the same manifest socioeconomic predictors the Indices use may be appropriate. The 
specification of a latent class model and examination of its outputs could serve as a useful check 
on whether or not the Indices‟ classifications hold up under different measurement approaches.  
All of these variations on modeling approach were outside the scope of this study, but 
each may prove fruitful in future efforts to capture disadvantage and overachievement using 
ELS. Of course, although multilevel models enjoy wide application in educational research, 
structural equation models, multilevel latent variable models, and latent class models are less 
familiar to the higher education research community. Such statistical methods are quite complex, 
and thus less likely to be as transparent to stakeholders (e.g., admissions officers) as the linear 
and logistic regression models that underlie the Indices. Ultimately, more complex statistical 
methods sacrifice interpretability, so the models of college enrollment and academic credentials 
noted above would need to compensate by providing far greater measures of fit and explanatory 
power than those presently in use at CU. 
The single most obvious improvement that could be made to the analysis of CU‟s class-
based systems‟ impact on acceptance rates is the design and implementation of a true 
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randomized controlled experiment to compare race-based and class-based affirmative action. In 
such an experiment, applicants would be randomly assigned to race-only and class-only 
admissions schemes, and all decisions would be official. Indeed, such an experiment would 
probably constitute the single most valuable addition to this dissertation. Unfortunately, this 
would inevitably require the removal of race data from applications for official decision-making 
purposes. Admissions officers stated such a procedure would be ethically indefensible. My 
results point to favorable effects associated with this class-based system as a replacement for 
race-conscious admissions; perhaps future research may rely on these results to argue the need 
for the random assignment this dissertation could not achieve.  
One additional set of analyses might focus on the extent to which PGPA has the same 
predictive utility for class-based admits it does for other undergraduates. The historical CU data 
do not permit such an investigation – only cumulative GPAs, rather than freshman-year GPAs, 
are provided. Ideally, class-based admits‟ observed freshman-year GPAs would be compared to 
what was predicted via PGPA. If class-based admits are more likely than other undergraduates to 
overshoot their predicted freshman-year outcomes, we may conclude that PGPA tends to 
underestimate the academic potential of applicants identified by class-based systems. If such 
predictions in fact prove to be under-predictions, methods for forecasting college success should 
be revised such that PGPA – and its equivalents at other institutions – do not unfairly 
underestimate the potential of the most disadvantaged college applicants. 
A Final Note on Class-Conscious Admissions 
Finally, a lesson I carried throughout this process bears mentioning here: Class-based 
affirmative action is terribly complex. These systems tend to come into existence hurriedly, 
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under the threat of an affirmative action ban (e.g., Sander, 1997). A class-based approach – by 
definition and often by law – must be designed to measure one thing (class) while its architects 
often hope to conveniently proxy another (race). Moreover, the system to which a class-based 
approach is compared is usually quite simple. Race-based affirmative action relies on an 
observable binary indicator – minority / non-minority – to confer additional consideration in 
admissions. Class-based approaches offer no such simplicity. Even if thresholds of disadvantage 
are established to form categories of applicants – as was the case with CU‟s effort – considerable 
care must be taken in defining and justifying those thresholds. Finally, building CU‟s class-based 
system required access to multiple large-scale datasets, not only for the estimation of the 
regression models that underpin the approach, but also for testing, refining, and assessing the 
method once it has been put to use. Still, I hope this research has demonstrated that the 
development of a class-based approach is doable in relatively short order. Further, validity 
studies can be carried out and evaluation criteria established such that any class-conscious 
system will be flexible over time to the changing needs of the admissions officers who 
implement it. 
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Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1. Standards for Guaranteed Admission for Colorado Residents, by Undergraduate Program 
 
  
HSGPA SAT ACT HSGPA SAT ACT GPA SAT ACT
Architecture and Planning 3.8 - - 3.5 1150 25 3.25 1260 28
Arts and Sciences 3.8 - - 3.5 1150 25 3.25 1260 28
Business 3.5 1220 27 - - - - - -
Engineering and Applied Science 3.7 1270 30 - - - - - -
Music 3.8 - - 3.5 1150 25 3.25 1260 28
a
 The undergraduate School of Journalism and Mass Communication has no guaranteed admission criteria.
b
 If thresholds in the first criterion are not met, meeting thresholds in the second criterion guarantees admission.
c
 If thresholds in the first and second criteria are not met, meeting third criteria thresholds guarantees admission.
Second Criterion
b
Third Criterion
c
Undergraduate School
a First Criterion
1
6
2
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Chapter 5 
Appendix 5.1.  
Changes in Classifications for Indices and Additional Consideration (Cross-Tabulations) 
Table 5.1.1. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (ACT), Following the 
Removal of Restrictions to ELS Sample 
 
 
Table 5.1.2. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (SAT), Following the 
Removal of Restrictions to ELS Sample 
 
 
  
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 86.9% 1.7% 0.0% 88.6%
Original High Overachievement 0.0% 7.6% 0.7% 8.3%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 3.1%
Column Sum 86.9% 9.3% 3.8% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (ACT)
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 87.2% 1.2% 0.0% 88.5%
Original High Overachievement 0.0% 6.8% 0.9% 7.6%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.0% 3.9% 3.9%
Column Sum 87.2% 8.0% 4.8% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (SAT)
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Table 5.1.3. Changes in Classifications for the Disadvantage Index, Following Adjustment for 
the Probability of College Application 
 
 
Table 5.1.4. Changes in Classifications for Additional Consideration, with the Disadvantage 
Index Adjusted for the Probability of College Application 
 
 
Table 5.1.5. Changes in Classifications for the Disadvantage Index, with %FRL Imputed and 
Private School Students Included 
 
  
Revised
No Disadvantage
Moderate 
Disadvantage
Severe 
Disadvantage Row Sum
No Disadvantage 42.1% 8.3% 0.4% 50.8%
Original Moderate Disadvantage 5.2% 26.1% 6.8% 38.1%
Severe Disadvantage 0.0% 3.9% 7.2% 11.1%
Column Sum 47.3% 38.3% 14.4% 100.0%
Disadvantage Index
Revised
None
Secondary 
Factor Primary Factor Row Sum
None 26.8% 7.9% 0.4% 35.1%
Secondary Factor 4.8% 30.1% 5.7% 40.6%
Primary Factor 0.0% 3.7% 20.5% 24.2%
Column Sum 31.6% 41.7% 26.6% 100.0%
Original
Additional Consideration
Revised
No Disadvantage
Moderate 
Disadvantage
Severe 
Disadvantage Row Sum
No Disadvantage 40.3% 9.8% 0.0% 50.2%
Original Moderate Disadvantage 0.6% 26.4% 10.4% 37.4%
Severe Disadvantage 0.0% 0.0% 12.4% 12.4%
Column Sum 40.9% 36.3% 22.8% 100.0%
Disadvantage Index
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Table 5.1.6. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (HSGPA), with %FRL 
Imputed and Private School Students Included 
 
 
Table 5.1.7. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (ACT), with %FRL 
Imputed and Private School Students Included 
 
 
Table 5.1.8. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (SAT), with %FRL 
Imputed and Private School Students Included 
 
 
  
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 75.7% 2.6% 0.0% 78.3%
Original High Overachievement 0.4% 17.3% 0.6% 18.3%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.4% 2.9% 3.3%
Column Sum 76.1% 20.3% 3.5% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (HSGPA)
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 87.5% 1.1% 0.0% 88.6%
Original High Overachievement 0.9% 6.9% 0.5% 8.3%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.3% 2.8% 3.1%
Column Sum 88.4% 8.3% 3.3% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (ACT)
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 87.3% 1.2% 0.0% 88.5%
Original High Overachievement 1.3% 6.0% 0.4% 7.6%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.5% 3.4% 3.9%
Column Sum 88.6% 7.6% 3.8% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (SAT)
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Table 5.1.9. Changes in Classifications for Additional Consideration, with %FRL Imputed and 
Private School Students Included 
 
 
Table 5.1.10. Changes in Classifications for the Disadvantage Index, with the Addition of a 
High-School-Level Measure of College-Going 
 
 
Table 5.1.11. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (HSGPA), with the 
Addition of a High-School-Level Measure of College-Going 
 
  
Revised
None
Secondary 
Factor Primary Factor Row Sum
None 21.7% 8.2% 1.8% 31.7%
Secondary Factor 0.6% 30.8% 10.4% 41.8%
Primary Factor 0.0% 0.3% 26.2% 26.5%
Column Sum 22.3% 39.3% 38.4% 100.0%
Original
Additional Consideration
Revised
No Disadvantage
Moderate 
Disadvantage
Severe 
Disadvantage Row Sum
No Disadvantage 39.4% 10.5% 1.6% 51.5%
Original Moderate Disadvantage 10.1% 18.3% 8.0% 36.4%
Severe Disadvantage 0.6% 3.2% 8.3% 12.1%
Column Sum 50.1% 32.0% 17.9% 100.0%
Disadvantage Index
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 76.3% 1.0% 0.0% 77.3%
Original High Overachievement 1.3% 17.6% 0.2% 19.2%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.8% 2.7% 3.5%
Column Sum 77.7% 19.4% 2.9% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (HSGPA)
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Table 5.1.12. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (ACT), with the Addition 
of a High-School-Level Measure of College-Going 
 
 
Table 5.1.13. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (SAT), with the Addition 
of a High-School-Level Measure of College-Going 
 
 
Table 5.1.14. Changes in Classifications for Additional Consideration, with the Addition of a 
High-School-Level Measure of College-Going 
 
 
  
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 87.8% 0.2% 0.0% 88.0%
Original High Overachievement 0.7% 8.0% 0.0% 8.7%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.2% 3.0% 3.2%
Column Sum 88.5% 8.4% 3.1% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (ACT)
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 87.9% 0.4% 0.0% 88.3%
Original High Overachievement 0.8% 6.8% 0.3% 7.8%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.4% 3.4% 3.8%
Column Sum 88.7% 7.6% 3.8% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (SAT)
Revised
None
Secondary 
Factor Primary Factor Row Sum
None 22.5% 8.3% 1.5% 32.3%
Original Secondary Factor 7.4% 24.6% 8.9% 40.9%
Primary Factor 0.7% 5.6% 20.5% 26.8%
Column Sum 30.6% 38.5% 30.9% 100.0%
Additional Consideration
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Table 5.1.15. Changes in Classifications for the Disadvantage Index, with Comprehensively 
Revised ELS Samples and Regression Models 
 
 
Table 5.1.16. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (HSGPA), with 
Comprehensively Revised ELS Samples and Regression Models 
 
 
Table 5.1.17. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (ACT), with 
Comprehensively Revised ELS Samples and Regression Models 
 
 
  
Revised
No Disadvantage
Moderate 
Disadvantage
Severe 
Disadvantage Row Sum
No Disadvantage 35.0% 9.5% 1.8% 46.3%
Original Moderate Disadvantage 7.2% 16.7% 15.0% 38.9%
Severe Disadvantage 0.2% 6.8% 7.8% 14.8%
Column Sum 42.4% 33.0% 24.6% 100.0%
Disadvantage Index
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 47.9% 22.1% 7.0% 77.0%
Original High Overachievement 0.9% 1.1% 17.0% 19.0%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.7% 3.3% 4.0%
Column Sum 48.8% 23.9% 27.3% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (HSGPA)
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 86.4% 2.0% 0.0% 88.4%
Original High Overachievement 0.5% 7.0% 0.9% 8.4%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 0.2% 3.0% 3.2%
Column Sum 86.9% 9.2% 3.9% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (ACT)
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Table 5.1.18. Changes in Classifications for the Overachievement Index (SAT), with 
Comprehensively Revised ELS Samples and Regression Models 
 
 
Table 5.1.19. Changes in Classifications for Additional Consideration, with Comprehensively 
Revised ELS Samples and Regression Models 
 
 
 
  
Revised
No 
Overachievement
High 
Overachievement
Extraordinary 
Overachievement Row Sum
No Overachievement 83.8% 1.9% 0.0% 85.7%
Original High Overachievement 1.8% 6.0% 1.6% 9.4%
Extraordinary Overachievement 0.0% 1.3% 3.6% 4.9%
Column Sum 85.6% 9.2% 5.2% 100.0%
Overachievement Index (SAT)
Revised
None
Secondary 
Factor Primary Factor Row Sum
None 15.4% 12.9% 3.4% 31.7%
Original Secondary Factor 4.8% 15.6% 21.4% 41.8%
Primary Factor 0.0% 5.2% 21.3% 26.5%
Column Sum 20.2% 33.7% 46.1% 100.0%
Additional Consideration
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Appendix 5.2. Parameter Estimates and Fit Statistics for Three Binary Logistic Regression 
Models of Application to College 
 
n=15,892 (98% of the ELS sample) 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept -5.11 -4.17 -4.21
0.007 0.007 0.007
Achievement 0.1 0.083 0.083
0.001 0.001 0.001
SES 0.589 -0.174
0.002 0.01
Achievement*SES 0.015
0.001
Nagelkerke R
2 0.228 0.26 0.262
Percent Predicted Correctly 68.2 69.2 69.2
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Appendix 5.3. Parameter Estimates from Comprehensively Revised Models for the Disadvantage and Overachievement Indices 
 
Predictor Variables
a
Log Odds
Estimate S.E.
Log Odds
Estimate S.E.
OLS 
Estimate S.E.
OLS 
Estimate S.E.
OLS 
Estimate S.E.
Intercept -2.16 0.015 -4.41 0.010 2.31 0.003 17.41 0.029 903.90 1.114
Native Language English 0.06 0.006 0.04 0.004 -0.01 0.001 1.20 0.015 7.41 0.582
Single Parent -0.20 0.001 -0.57 0.011 -22.98 0.486
Income @ $0 - $14,999 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Income @ $15,000 - $34,999 0.04 0.001 0.06 0.002 0.36 0.004 16.46 0.321
Income @ $35,000 - $49,999 0.09 0.003 0.13 0.001 0.65 0.009 35.10 0.545
Income @ $50,000 - $74,999 0.13 0.003 0.20 0.001 1.10 0.050 57.20 0.212
Income @ $75,000 - $99,999 0.15 0.002 0.25 <0.001 1.34 0.001 75.41 0.540
Income @ $100,000 - $199,999 0.21 0.002 0.31 <0.001 1.78 0.002 85.32 0.498
Income @ $199,000+ 0.25 0.001 0.35 0.002 2.20 0.008 104.45 0.987
Parents' Highest Level of Education
No/Some High School 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
High School Graduate 0.15 0.006 0.12 0.002 0.61 0.010 28.41 0.128
Some College 0.31 0.004 0.25 0.001 1.25 0.005 56.42 0.159
2-year College Graduate 0.49 0.005 0.37 0.003 1.84 0.010 87.33 0.877
4-year College Graduate 0.65 0.002 0.47 <0.001 2.30 0.002 113.20 0.897
Postgraduate Study 0.78 0.001 0.59 0.003 3.12 0.002 143.15 0.254
Rural High School -0.26 0.005 -0.33 0.006 0.08 0.001 0.50 0.011 1.42 0.123
High School Percent F/R Lunch -0.003 <0.001 -0.003 <0.001 -0.005 <0.001 -0.07 <0.001 -2.72 0.013
Size of 12th-Grade Class 0.0001 <0.001 0.0006 <0.001 -0.0002 <0.001 0.0001 <0.001 -0.35 0.001
Student-to-Teacher Ratio -0.03 0.001 -0.05 <0.001 0.01 <0.001 0.04 0.001 1.91 0.050
High School Weighted GPA 0.85 0.003 1.08 0.002
Highest Test Score, Standardized 0.60 0.003
SES Composite 0.005 0.001
Tenth Grade Achievement Score 0.040 <0.001
SES*Tenth Grade Achievement 0.070 <0.001
Model Summary Statistics
Nagelkerke R
2
-2 Log Likelihood
R
2
Standard Error of the Model
a
Unless otherwise noted, parameter estimates are significant at α = 0.001
0.14
0.82
0.2
4.3
0.19
184
1889970.5
Disadvantage Index
Overachievement 
Index (HSGPA)
Overachievement 
Index (ACT)
Overachievement 
Index (SAT)
0.32
Application to College
0.38
3282168.4
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